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AI3STRAc-r 
The role of analogical reasoning in academic and social competence was Ïnvestigated 
in Grade 6 and Grade 8 cbildren. Skill in analogical reasoning was assessed ushg a 
categorizaton ta& in which children had to sort accordmg to underiymg principles in vignettes 
with academic or social problem-sohg themes. Academic competence was assessed using 
an achievement test, teacher ratings of success in school and a self-report measure of 
academic success, while social competence was assessed ushg teacher ratings, a peer 
sociometnc, and a self-report measure of social competence. Two studies, using diffierent 
samples of chiidren, were canied out. In both studies the same pattern of resutts was found. 
haiogicd reasoning was found to be related to acadeoiic but not to social competence. 
Exploratory path analyses on the data obtained m Study One suggested two causal models to 
account for the factors innuencing self-perception of academic success on the one hand, and 
those infiuencing self-perception of social competence on the other. These modeis were 
tested with the data fiom Shidy Two and were f o d  to be a good fit for the data. The r e d s  
are discussed in light of current theory and research on the nature and measurement of 
analogical reasoning and its role m academic and social problem sohring. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCITON 
In education, the primary emphasis is on teachmg and improving academic skills. 
*en our rapidly changing technologicd environment, it has become HicreasingSr important 
for educators to focus on helping children develop higher-level cognitive ùriIls of reasoning 
and problem s o h g ,  and not only on expanding howledge m academic content areas. The 
emphasis is on how to leam new information, and not sinq>ly on what to l e m  A wealth of 
research and training programs has been generated over the past twenty years lookmg at 
various aspects of cognitive problem soh.ing (e.g., Newell & Simon, 1972; Feuerstein, 1980; 
Sternberg, 1985; Adams, 1989; Brown, 1989; Goswami, 199 1; Schraagen, 1993). More 
recemly, and out of necesgty due to social and behavioural concerns, educators have also had 
to foais on helpmg chiltiren acquire more effective social skiUs. Social problem sohring skiil 
has been suggested to be a primary conni%utor to social coqetence (e.g., Spivack, Platt & 
Shure, 1976; Rubin & Krasnor, 1986; Crick & Dodge, 1994). It has been acknowledged for 
some time that children demonstrating hadequate social problem s o k g  sküis are 'at risk' for 
psychological adkstment problems in iater üfe (see Parker & Asher, 1987, for a review). As 
with cognitive problem s o h g ,  considerable research and speac training programs 
investigating and prornoting social problem-sohring skilis have been conducted m the social 
domain (e.g., Spivack & Shure, 1974; Weissberg, Camike, Toro, Rackin, DaGdson, Cowen, 
198 1; Rubh & Krasior, 1986; Andrews, Peat, Muicahy, & &do,  1990). With the mcreasing 
dernands on the educationd system to address both academic and social coqetaice, an 
important issue is whether it is possile to teach general problem sohring skiUs that can 
promote triansfer of leaming across different domains. Thiç assumes that similar processes 
underlie problem sohring m social and non-social (academic) domains- 
There has been considerable debate as to whether teaching generalized thmkmg slalls 
versus dom&specific howledge will enhance leamhg across disparate domains (e.g., 
Sternberg, 1985; Glaser, 1985; Bransford, Stein, Arbitman-Smith & Vye, 1985). Ifsmüar 
processes underlie problem sotvmg in different domains, then one would expect that skiUs are 
generalizable across different domains. Certahdy, leamhg would occur most efficiently if 
sküls leamed in one domaiu could be easüy t r d e r r e d  to other domains. Conversely, if 
problem s o k g  processes are not similar, then the acquisition of knowledge specific to a 
&en domain would be of primary importance. This would mean that prior leamhg m other 
domains would not assist leaming m novel domains. At present, thiç issue remains unresolved. 
Howwer, ahhough recent theones have attempted to strike a balance between these two 
perspectives (Le., domain-specific knowledge versus g e n e r h d  ski&), the balance ciiffiers 
fkom theory to theory and remains somewhat weighted m one of the two directions (e.g., 
Sternberg, 1985; Chi, 1988; Nathan, Kmtscb & Young, 1992). Thus, this issue continues to 
have implications with respect to which aspect of problem s o h g  should receive greater 
emphasis in training. 
Researchers have postulated similar problem sohring processes in the social and non- 
social domains (e.g., Hayes, 1981: Crick & Dodge, 1994; Andrews, et. al., 1990; Holyoak & 
Thagard, 1995). Some have discussed how cognitive problem solving research can be applied 
to social mformation (e.g., Wyer & Gordon, 1984; Holyoak & Thagard, 1995), and others 
have compared academk and social cornpetence (e-g., Wentzel 199 1). Moreover, a recent 
thmking skills program focuses on promotmg transfer of leamhg m academic and social 
domains by training generalized problem solving skills (Mulcahy, Andrew & Peat, 1988). 
However, although parallek have been drawn m theoretical models and assumptions made 
that Zmilar problem sohing processes exkt in the two domains, there are no known studies 
that have directly compared cognitive and social (social-cognitive) problem sohring. Both 
social and cognitive mformation processing rnodels have noted the critical importance of the 
early stages of sohring a problem (e.g., Crick & Dodge, 1994; Anderson, Greeno, Kline & 
Neves, 1981). That is, how a person interprets or m e n t e  represents a problem situation is 
considered to be a key aspect of successfùi problem soivirïg. In the cognitive literature, two 
areas of study have examined the early stages of s o h g  a problem, namely, studies of 
expertise and andogical reasoning. Studies of expertise have focused on the knowledge 
structures that individuals employ to concepnialize a problem (Chi, 1985). It is the acquigtion 
of knowledge specific to a given domain that is considered to be of plimary importance in 
successfiil problem sohhg. Conversely, studies of analogous thinkmg have emphasized the 
process of identmg similar relations needed to map Somation between two problems. 
Andogical reasonhg is seen as a hdamental ski11 m leamhg and transfer (e.g., Vosniadou, 
1988; Gentner, Ratterman & Forbus, 1993; Anderson & Thompson, 1989). Some have 
argued that it is the main method used to sohe novel problems in all d o d s  (e-g., Polya, 
1957; RumeIhart, 1989). Of particular interest m analogies research is why relevant 
lmowledge often remains mert even though it is potentially usefid to sobe an analogous 
problem (e.g., Gick & Holyoak, 1983 ; Perfetto, Bransford & Franks, 1983). Thus, analogies 
researchers focus on the process of i d e n m g  and accessing simiiar relations across 
problems, and expertise researchers focus on the knowledge structures m a specinc domain. 
The primary goal of the present research invohres examining the assumption that there 
are similar problem s o h g  skills in the social and non-social domains, and the implications for 
the transfer of leamhg in these domains. This will mvolve first, assessing the adequacy of 
' equatedl mdices of social and non-social problem solving. Second, the similanties and 
Werences m problem solving that arise in social and non-social domains using these materials 
will be studied. Fmally, the relationship between problem s o b g  and coqetence @oth 
academic and social) will be explored. 
To thiç end, I will be& with an oveMew of cognitive and social-cognitive problem 
solving models. Particular attention will be paid to the mental actMties mvoked m the early 
stages of solving a problem, namely, the mental representation of information. Studies of 
analogical reasoning and relevant -dies of expertise wiIl be descriied and the d c a l  role of 
the representation of Sonnation will be highlighted. My investigation wdl focus on problem 
s o b g  by analogies. Pardels wiu be made to the social literature by examining research on 
childrenls interpretation of social situations. The issue of generalized çkiuç versus domain- 
specific knowledge will then be addressed by examming training studies m both domains that 
have attempted to a c h e  transfér of leaming. Fmally, a piiot study will be summarized and 
the present mvestigation will be descriied within the context of these issues. 
Theories of Pro blem Solving 
Prominent models of social problem s o h g  have been dweloped fiom theoretical 
formulations m the cognitive literature. Therefore, I wiIl begin by describing cognitive 
theones of problem s o h g  and follow with social-cognitÎve theones. 
Co~nitive Theories of Problem Solvinp 
Eady experimental research on problem solving was initiated by Gestalt psychologists 
(e.g-, hincker, 1945), who çtudied problems of insight. They emphasized the tendency of the 
mind to perceive situations as total structures. Roblems represented gaps or inconsistencies 
in these structures, and problem ~hriog mvolved achieving good structure through cognitive 
organktion. However, the narrow focus on msight problems lirnited the development of a 
general problem sohring theory (Greeno, 1978). Around the same time, behaviorists and 
associationists were also studying problem solving (e-g., Maltanan, 1955). They focused on 
the probability of emitting a response. A problem arose when an appropriate response was 
weaker than other competing responses. Successflll problem s o b g  mvohred increashg the 
strength of the appropriate response. These researchers contnbuted information regardhg 
conditions that facilitate or hmder problem s o m g ,  but there was little analysis of the 
components of the problem sohhg process (Greeno, 1978). 
Significant gains in problem s o f i g  research occurred when researchers started to 
analyze the component processes of problem s o b g .  Early mfomtion processing models of 
problem s o h g ,  most notably Neweli and Simon's (1972) General Problem Solver, focused 
on general search strategies through states in a problern space. The problem solver was 
viewed as an idonnation processing system that mteracts with a task environment (the 
presenthg problem). The problem s o b g  system is organized as a mies of productions 
which are condition - action d e s  that spe* the action or operator to select, based on 
certain conditions/features. The problem situation is represented by the problem soiver m a 
problem space. The problem space contains both actual and possible solutions the problem 
soiver might consider, and dtimately d e t e d e s  the methods used for problem solving. A 
serial system, problems are tackied uskg the followbg processes: 
1) sensory mput f?om the task environment is attended to, 
2) an intemal representation of the eaernal task environment is produced and a 
problem space is selected, 
3) problem sohhg proceeds withm the fiamework of the mtemal representation (ie., 
general search strategies through the problem space), 
4) a problem s o h g  method is selected, 
5) and implemented - if not implemented, the system may abandon the problem, or a 
different interna1 representation/method is selected (ie., a feedback loop to steps 2 or 
3). 
Experimental investigations using this mode1 have largely fonised on welî-structured, puzzle- 
like problems m which al l  howledge needed to solve the problem is provided m the task 
environment. A variety of puzzle problems have been snidied, mcludmg the Towers of Hanoi 
(Neweil& Simon, 1974). 
In order to explain more language-based problem sohing, as with problems presented 
m text, problem solving is viewed as employing two complex processes: understandmg and 
s o h g  (Simon, 1978). The understandmg process generates a problem space fiom the text of 
a problem by interpretbg the language then constructing a representation. The sohhg 
process explores the problem space m attempts to solve the problem Problem sohring 
alternat es between the understanding and s o h g  pro cesses, and between int erpretation and 
construction. Roblem sohring begins as soon as enough mforrnation has been generated but 
will 'back-track' to the understandmg process to gain more information, d e n  needed. 
The infiormation processing fiamework has been successful m modeling general search 
strategies in problem sohing behaviour when the initial and goal states of a problem are well 
specified. More recent research usbg such problems has shiaed f?om an emphasis on general 
search strategies through a problem space, to the important role of the mtemal problem 
representation (e.g., Kotovsky, Hayes & Simon, 1985; Kotovdcy & Simon, 1990). 
Investigations mto aspects of problem difEcuity have found that it is not the size of the search 
space available in memory, but rather how the problem is represented that detemines the 
difEcdty of the problem Roblem solution depends on subjects working on the problem and 
developmg a better intemal representation of the problem Simüarly, with weQdefined text 
problems (e-g., algebra word problems), p e r f o m c e  Merences have been found to reflect 
different mental representations of the problem For example, Paige and Simon (1966) found 
that some subjects mterpreted a text problem ushg a more direct, syntactic translation of the 
text, whüe others represented the problem semanticaUy before solving the problem Kintsch 
(1988) has developed a theory of word-problem comprehension that focuses on the early 
stages of mterpreting a problem during readmg comprehension. Errors are considered to be 
failures to produce an appropriate mental representation of the word problem Nathan et. aL 
( 19%) demonstrated that training targeting the mterpretation of algebra-word problems 
redted  in improved comprehension and representation of the problem necessary for success 
m subsequent stages of the problem solving process. 
Although Newell and Simon's (1972) information-processing mode1 has been used 
largely with well-structured problems, the processes are assumed to be çimilar for a- 
structured problems (Simon, 1973). 'Well-structure& refers to problems that are clearly 
formulated, the desired outcome is clearly specified, and little latitude is possible m the steps 
Leading to a successful solution (Yussen, 1985; Frederiksen, 1984). ' I l l -~ctured '  refers to 
problems that lack a clear formulation, the desired outcome is not clearly defmed, and the 
ambiguity m the various alternatives possible m s o h g  a problem creates uncertamty and 
confusion (Yussen, 1985; Frederiksen, 1984). There is no sharp W o n  between what 
constitutes well- and iU-smictured problems. I11-stnictured problems rely more on information 
stored in memory a d o r  extemai sources to acquire additional infiormation necessary to solve 
a problem, and consequwtly are more characteristic of 'everydaf leaming experiences. 
Howwer, although NeweU and Simon's Bifomation processhg model is asçumed to be 
appropriate for iU-stnictured problems, the similanties have not been weli defbed. The model 
therefore provides limited msights into real world learning. 
More recent formulations of problem solving emphasize knowledge-based 
representations (e-g., Anderson, et.aL, 198 1) m the form of schemas (Le., clusters of 
Imowledge that contain typical characteristics of a problern type). Consistent with eariier 
models, the problem s o h g  process mvolves the construction of a problem representation 
(ie., problem space), search for a solution, and irriplementation of a solution. However, in 
'knowledgefilled' as opposed to 'knowledge-free' domams, features of a problem may 
activate howledge m memory during the construction of the problem representation. E a  
schema for a particular type of problem is activated, then the strategies and procedures found 
m the schema will be iniplemented. ûthenvise, a search strategy is employed which may 
mvohre such strategies as means-end analysis (ie., reduhg the difference between the curent 
and goal aates), planning (Le., decoqoshg the problem mto subgoals), or problem solving 
by analogies (Le., searchg for similar problems with known solutions). Thus, problem 
s o h g  is schema d r i v a  or search based, with the former leading directly to implementation 
of a solution. Hayes (198 1) has expanded on Newell and Simon's Somation processing 
model and descnied how s k W  processing at each aep can lead to efficient and effective 
solutions to complex cognitive tasks. Similar to Newell and Simon's formulation, Hayes has 
used the metaphor of the compter to describe the aeps invohed in processing Hiformation 
and sohring cognitive problems. He descnies the following stages of Somation processhg: 
1) find the problem (be aware that one exists), 
2) represent the problem @ossibly assisted by analogies, schemas and imagery), 
3) plan the sohtions (where the use of a variety of search heurisrics are possible, for 
example, trial and error, means-end strategies), 
4) carry out the plan, 
5) evaluate the solution (to determine ifthe intended goal has been reached), and 
6) consolidate leaming about the problem and its sohnion @y storing m memory to 
as& with fùture problem s o h g ) .  
A considerable amount of research on problern s o h g  has been generated based on 
these information-proceshg formulations. Moreover, these models have had a significant 
impact on models of social problem s o h g .  
Social-Cognitive Theories of Problem Solving 
The study of social cognition has been conducted by researchers m several different 
fields, mcluding developmentai, chical and educational psychology, and communication (see 
Shantz, 1975, 1983, for a review). Earlier theories were largely adapted fiom those used in 
the non-social, cognitive lit erature. Global constmcts were emp hasized, including perspective 
taking, role taking and referential comnninication. Major changes m empincal and theoretical 
approaches occurred in response to mked research hdings and the growing popularity of 
information-processhg theories. 
One of the preliminary conceptualkations of social problem s o h g  jnfiuenced by 
cognitive information-processing theones, was developed by Goldfiied and D'Zurilla (1969). 
They proposed the followhg steps as the basis to behave m a competent rnanner in social 
interactions: 
1) iden* the situation as problematic, 
2) search for possible alternatives to soke the problem, 
3) consider possible consequaices and choose an appropriate response, and 
4) implement the chosen response. 
This fiamework was expanded upon by Spivack and Shure (1974), who added three 
additional steps following step two. That is, after generating possible solutions to reach a 
goal, the individual would ideally engage m: 
3.1 "means-end thmking", or consideration of the sep-by-step means to achieve social 
go& 
3.2 "consequential thmkmg", or consideration of the consequences of social responses, 
and 
3.3 identification and understanding of the motives and behaviours of others. 
Spivack and Shure's (1974) model focused on developmental issues, a focus lacking m 
Goldfiied and DfZurilla's (1969) modeL They proposed that the ability to produce altemative 
solutions dwelopmentally precedes "means-end", "consequential thinking'', and 
" iden~~unders tand ing  the motives and behaviours of others". The research generated as 
a result of thiç model has largely concentrated on the number of alternative solutions 
generated (e.g., Shure & Spivack, 1975), and "means-end" thmking in older children (e.g., 
Platt & Spivack, 1972) as indices of problem s o b g .  Thus, the emphasis was on quantitative 
aspects of problem sohring. 
The limited scope presented with these social mformation-processing modeis led 
researchers to examine other aspects of iuterpersonal problem soiving, emphasizmg qualitative 
and not simply quantitative aspects of social problem sohring (e-g. Krasnor & Rubin, 198 1; 
Bream, 1989). With greater emphasis on the quahy of responses, researchers have been 
concerned witb the measurement of more process-onented variables (e.g., flexiiility of 
solutions, Rubin, 1982; consistency of solutions across problems, Hopper & Keirshenbaum, 
1985; bias in mterpreting social situations, Richard & Dodge, 1982; and indirect influences on 
problem solving such as personal goals, Renshaw & Asher, 198 1). The variety of research 
generated has contributed to the formulation of more recent social problem solving theories 
(e-g., Rubin & Krasnor, 1986; Cnck & Dodge, 1994). 
Flavell's (1974) conceptualization of the steps mvohed in making social inferences has 
also contributed to more recent social problem s o h g  models. He proposed four steps: 
1) being aware of the mternal eventskognition of another person, 
2) recognizmg the need to make an inference, 
3) actually m a h g  the mference, and 
4) applying or using the Seraice to guide behaviour. 
The steps are assumed to take place sequentially during a social mteraction. They are also 
assumed to develop sequentially with age. 
Dodge (1986) has utilized these early models of Goldfned and DfZurilla, and Flaved., 
as well as Neweil& Simon's and Hayes' models, to poshilate how children process social 
information to respond competently m social situations. His model has recently been 
refonnulated by Crick and Dodge (1994). They propose a six aep model. A child who 
responds skülfiilly at each level of processing mcreases hidher chances of behaving 
competently, while the child who does not, increases hidher chances of responding m a 
deviant or aggressive manner. According to the model a child enters a social situation with 
biologicdy determhed responses and a memory store of past experiences that predispose a 
child to respond in a parti& manner. The child receives a set of eues as input fkom the 
environment and the following idormation processing steps are hypothesized to occur: 
1) "encoding o f  extemal and interna1 cues": The child selectively attends to relevant 
social mes (both extemal and Sitemal) and encodes that Eiformation m memory. 
2) "mterpretation and mental representation of these mes" : A meaningful 
understanding of the social eues is constructed by using one or more of the following 
independent processes: 
a) a personalized mental representation is stored m long tenn memory, 
b) the child engages m a causal analysis of the events, 
c) Werences are drawn about the mtent of others, 
d) previous goal attainment is evaluated, 
e) past performance in a previous exchange is assessed, and 
f )  wahiations of self and others m terms of the prior and present exchange are 
W i e d ,  
3) "clarification or selection of a goal": A goal or desired outcome is selected for the 
situation or a pre-exishg goal is contmued. 
4) "response access or construction": Possible responses are accessed nom memory 
or new behaviours are constructed m novel situations. 
5) "response decision": The most positive response is chosen fiom an evaluation of 
the posçible responses (based on outcome expectations, confidence in behg able to 
enact the response, and the appropriateness of the response). 
6) "behavioural enactment": The chosen response is implemented. 
The reformulated model is c o n c e p ~ d  as being cyclical m nature, with feedback loops 
between mterpretation and encodmg of idonnation (steps 1 and 2), and between response 
decision and response access (steps 4 and 5). At each step, a data base of mformation stored 
m memory influences processing and is, m turn, influmced by the present social exchange, 
resulting m on-gomg changes to memory. hdividuals engage m multiple social informaton 
processhg activities at any @en Qne. Consequentiy, processing is assumed to be 
sixnultaneou at each step. At the same tirne, response to a single Shiation is assumed to 
fonow a Iogical sequaice of steps. The problem sohing process is asswned to nnish afier 
the response is bplemented. Proceshg i s  thought to occur at a very rapid rate, and can 
occur conscioudy or unconscioudy. Awareness of processing is thought to occur d k g  
highly novel or complex tasks or in response to cues to attend to processing (e.g., whai a 
child k asked wiiat helshe is thmkmg). The r e f o d t e d  mode1 aiso encompasses severai 
fkctors assumed important m the formation of social cognition, previousiy absent in the 
previous modeL The raised model takes mto account not ody a child's perspective, but also 
how peer evahiations andor peer responses to a cbild's behaviour wül infiuence a childk 
cognition (ie., reciprocal effects). In the modei, peer evahiations and responses occur after 
behavioural enactment and inmience encoding of the next social simation. Ah, the new 
model proposes that there are two types of mental processes: latent mental structures and on- 
h e  processing. Latent mental structures are mental representations of past events that are 
stored in long tenn memory and integrated with other mernories. These guide the hture 
processing or on-line processing of social cues. Fmaliy, emotions, typically a neglected aspect 
of mformation processing modek, are proposed to be an important aspect of each step of the 
reformulated model. 
Whüe Dodge's model has been used primarily to study factors mvohed m social 
maladjustment, in particular aggressive responding, applications to the study of pro-social 
behaviour have also been made (see Peny & Peny, 1987). 
This cursory review of some of the more prominent models of problem s o h g  
demonstrates the progression of theorking about problem s o h g  m the social and non-social 
domains over the past few decades. I am prMarily concemed with the smiilarities proposed 
by these modek as a basis for M e r  investigation. 
Integrating Cognitive and Social-Cognitive Models 
Four of the problem s o h g  models (i-e., Newell& Simon, 1972; Hayes, 1981; 
Goldfiied & dtZurilla, 1969; Crick & Dodge, 1994) are summarized and presented for 
cornparison m Table 1. Resented together, the high degree of overlap m the theoretical 
fiameworks suggests that simüar processes underlie cognitive and sociaGcognitive problem 
s o h g .  It is therefore not surprising that many researchers have proposed that there are 
sMilar processes that influence problem sohring m both social and non-social domains (e.g., 
Wyer & Gordon, 1984; Wentzei, 1991; Mulcahy, Andrews & Peat, 1987; Holyoak & 
Thagard, 1995). 
The complexity of the problem sohing process has led some researchers to suggen 
that problem solving skills may best be investigated using component analyses of the various 

skillsrsteps mvohed m problem solving (see Butler & Meichenbaum, 198 1). Following a 
'componential' approach, earlier modeis of problem s o h g  in both the cognitive and social 
domains tended to focus on the latter stages of information processing, nameiy, the generation 
and selection of responses and/or strategies to soke problems (e.g., m the cognitive literature, 
Newell & Simon, 1972; m the social literature, Spivack & Shine, 1974). Attention later 
turned to the early stages of information processing (ie., the mterndmental representation of 
idormation) as bemg cntical m f o d g  an initial understanding of the problem before soiution 
procedures are implemented. I now turn to a discussion of the eariy stages of problem 
sobiug. 
The Nature of the Internai Representation 
Hassebrock, Bullemer & Johnson (1988) desmibe a problem representation as "the 
product of an active comprehension process through which an mâividual selects relevant 
information f?om the problem statement or task mstnictions, makes inferences based on prior 
knowledge and experience with the problem, and mtegrates relevant domain concepts and 
procedures" (p. 2). The nature of the problem representation and its formation has received 
considerable attention fiom researchers m severd content areas. In the domain of 
academic/cognitive problem sohring, thiç has mcluded investigations of expednovice 
merences (for example, m physics, Chi, Feltovich & Glaser, 198 1; chess, Chase & Simon, 
1973; social sciences, Voss, Tyler & Yengo, 1983; algebra word problems, Nathan et.& 
19%; medical diagnosis, Gruppen, Wisdom & Wooliscroft, 199 1; text comprehençion, 
Vosniadou, Pearson & Rogers, 1988; electronics, Egan & Schwartz, 1979; architecture, A& 
1980; and children's dinosaur knowledge, Chi, Hutchmson & Robin, l988), and analogical 
reasonhg (for example, in classical analogies of the f o m  A:B: CD, Sternberg & Rifkb, 
1979; p d e  problems, Gick and Holyoak, 1980, 1983; algebra word problems, Ross, 1989; 
text, Gentner & Landers, 1985, cf Gentner. 1989; children's knowledge of biological themes, 
Brown & Kane, 1988; children's stories, Brown, Kane & Echols, 1986; and figurative 
comparisons, Gentner, 1988). In the social domah, aîtaition has focused on the social 
Hiformation attended to and biases individuah make m hterpretstg mterpersonal situations 
(e-g., use of social mes and schemata, Dodge & Tomlin, 1987; hostile attributional biases, 
Steinberg & Dodge, 1983; mtention-cue detection accuracy, Quiggle, Garber, Panak, & 
Dodge, 1992; and perceived social coqetence, Harter, 1982). 
I will £kst address the cognitive literature that focuses on the early stages of 
idiormation processing m studies of expertise and studies of analogical reasoning, and folIow 
with a discussion of relevant fhdmgs in the social Iiterature. 
Studies of Expertise 
Studies of expertise have focused considerable attention on the eady stages of 
information processing as a key aspect of problem sohring. Investigations of the cliffierences m 
expert and novice performance m a &en content do& have all yielded the same general 
hdmg that experts conceptualize infonnatiodproblem situations in a more abstract manner 
that highlights fiinctionally important aspects of a problem This has been demonstrated m the 
literature , where several Werent tasks have been used to explore the nature of the internai 
representation, inchiding tasks of memory, sortmg, text comprehension, and problem sohiing. 
Memorv Tasks 
In shidies of expertise, recall of information specific to a @en domain has ofien been 
used to compare the memory of experts and novices. For example, Chase and Simon ( 1973) 
compared novice and master chess players' r e cd  of chessboard positions. The chess masters 
were fàr superior to novices m their abiüty to reproduce meaningful configurations. When 
presented with random patterns of chess pieces, however, expert and novice recall did not 
mer. Thus, the experts' superior performance was a t t n i e d  to the considerable amoimt of 
well-organized chess patterns experts had nored in memoiy. Similarly, in medical diagnosis, 
Patei, Groen and Frederiksen (1986) fond  that experienced physicians' (experts) recail of 
diagnostic case reports contained more mferences and relevant propositions than novice 
physicians and medicd students, who provided verbatim r e c d  and relative& more irre1evant 
details. 
Memory stuclies have foimd that the recall of experts is organized around abstract and 
fimctionally important concepts, while novices tend to structure their recall according to more 
concrete and superficial aspects of available infoxmation. Experts typically demonstrate use of 
krger organized chunks of mformation m remembering task information. 
Sortine Tasks 
How mformation is represented in memory by experts and novices has also been 
compared on tasks that have mdividuals sort problems h o  dBerent categories. The 
conceptual categories used provide mformation about the content and orgauhtion of 
knowledge m the problem representation. In the domah of mathematics, Hindey, Hayes & 
Simon (1978) asked high school and conege students to catego* algebra word problems. 
They found that the students grouped problems according to solution principles. They also 
found that enors were made by poor students when irrelevant mformation about a relation 
was introduced, whüe good students tended not to be misled by such information. In 
cornparisons of the sorting behaviour of experts and novices m physics problems, (Chi, 
Feltovich & Glaser, 1981), experts categorized problems based on findimental laws of 
physics (e.g., conservation of energy, Newton's second law) while novices focused on visual 
features (e.g., mclined planes, thmgs that rotate). SimilarIy, m a categorization study with 
children differing m tenns of their knowledge of dinosaurs (Chi, Hutchinson & Robm, 1988)- 
the 'experts' grouped dinosaurs on the basis of more abstract dimensions @lied by the 
pictures (e-g., plant-eaters / meat-eaters). Novices, on the other hand, based their 
categorizations more on visible properties of the dinosaurs (e-g., s m d  head). Thus, these and 
other shidies have shown that experts typically clas@ problems based on shared abstract 
principles or concepts in a domain, while novices attend more to salient aspects or mrfhce 
details made explicit m the problem. 
The concept of a schema is usefiil m understandmg the process of representation, and 
has been employed as a tool to account for the performance of experts and novices on sortmg 
ta&. Schemas are structures m memory that contain prototypical information about 
fiequently experienced situations (Rumelhart, 198 1). A major fimction of schemas is to 
constmct interpretations of new situations. Incornhg information is 'fit mto the 
correspondhg variables or 'dots' of a schema, and if enough slots are med a schema is 
a h a t e d  and is available to provide additional information typical of a particular situation. 
When presented with a problem situation, an appropriate schema is activated and the slots E 
the schema determine which features are represented intemally. Features that do not fit h to  a 
dot are ignored, and missing information is 'filled id based on the schema. Thus, the schema 
provides the organization and structure needed to access the lmowledge needed to sohe 
problems. The categorization shidies of expertise have shown that expert problem solvers are 
not misled by superficial aspects of a problem, as are novices. Rather, the schemata of experts 
are more complete, m temu of their qyantity of knowledge, and complex, m terms of their 
organkation of knowledge (Le., organjzation based on abstract principles as opposed to 
&ce features) (Chi & Glaser, 1985). 
Text Comprehension Tasks 
Another approach in assessing the mental representation of Somation has been to 
study mdividuals understanding of text by a n a m g  recaîl of infonnation read. Studies have 
found that memoiy for text (e.g., SpiIlich, Vesonder, Chiesi & Voss, 1979), time to read text 
(e.g., Johnson & Kieras, 1983), and comprehension of text (e.g., Paige & Simon, 1966) are 
mfluenced by inWual's representations of textual mformation. In a comprehension 
monitoring snidy, Vomiadou, et. aL (1988) found that children's faüures to detect 
hconsistencies m text were rehted more to difnculties forming an accurate mental 
representation of text propositions than to dïfEculties comparEg inconsistent infonnation 
akeady represented in memory. Thus, the quality of the representation, mchding such factors 
as verbatim versus semantic representations of the text and the organbtion of the content, 
was related to the b d s  of idonnation that were recalied and understood d e r  reading 
passages. 
Pro blem Solving Tasks 
In the preceding tasks (memory, sorting and text comprehension), R is açsumed that 
the cognitive structures influencing performance on these tasks are the same structures 
involved m actual problem sohring situations. Other -dies have assessed individual's 
problem representation whüe actively engaged m problem s o h g .  Typicaily, protocols 
during problem soh.mg or r e cd  after a solution is reached have been employed For example, 
in the medical domain, Hassebrock, et. aL (1988) examined thmk aloud protocols of 
cardiologists, mtems and medical students as  they diagnosed cardi01ogy case reports. The 
results mdicated that expert representations specified the underlying principles of the cases. 
That is, the doctors identified subtle, but diapostically relevant infonilation. In contrast, 
novices tended to misead important mformation or focus on irrelevant details of the cases. 
Expertise differences have dso been studied using problems fiom the social sciences. For 
example, political science professors, chemisû-y professors, and undergraduates were asked to 
soke the problem of increasing crop p r o d u c m  m the Soviet Union (Voss, Tyler & Yengo, 
1983). Strong knowledge effects were found, in which the experts provided the most 
comprehençive and detailed solutions. Expert solution protocols focused to a significant 
degree on the initial state of the problem, with partidar emphasis on i d e n m g  constraints m 
s o h g  the problem Novice protocols, in cornparison, contained very little of this type of 
mformation. Therefore, the fkdmgs again demonstrate experts use of more abstract principles 
or nuidamental laws in a @en domah, m cornparison to novice's reliance on verbatim or 
obvious details. 
In considering knowledge dinerences m the mtemal representations of experts and 
novices, it is important to note that it is not o d y  the amount of knowledge, but &O (and wen 
more importantly) the structure of knowledge withm a representation that is cntical m 
successfùl problem s o h g .  While the structure of knowledge is to some extent detemineci 
by the q~il~ltisy of knowledge, it is the properties of the structure that effect the use of 
knowfedge (Chi, Hutchmson & Robin, 1988). Chi et. ai. (1988) have proposed that the 
properties of coherence and hierarchy are particuIar1y important characteristics of a structure. 
They adopt the popular notion of a network, m which the structure of a domain of knowledge 
is desmied as a network of nodes (the concepts) and links (the relations between concepts), 
and define: 
a) hierarchy as the pattern of relationships among substnictures, that is, how wen the 
whole structure is integrated, and 
b) coherence as the patterns of mterlinkmg and attnbute-sharing concepts of the 
subsmictures, that is , how well integrated the substruchiles are that form the 
hierarchy of the structure. 
To explore their proposal that coherence and hierarchy are meanhgful aspects of 
lmowledge structures, Chi et. al. (1988) had children, mering with respect to their 
lmowledge of dinosaurs, sort pictures of fâmüiar and novel dinosaurs accordmg to which 'go 
togethe?, relate their knowledge about certain dinosaus, and determine which dinosaur m a 
set of four does not fit (with Merences based on a higher order relation, e-g., meat or plant 
eater, or visual detail e.g., physical feature). The resuhs of these knowledge generation and 
categorization tasks found that expert children provided "more intelligent expianations, 
constrained ideremes, categorical reasoning, hierarchical classfications, and classifications 
based on well-defhed fàmily structures" (Chi, et. al., 1988, p. 28). Novices provided 
explanations and mferences that appeared incorrect and irrelevant, and their classifications and 
reasoning were limited and based on percepnial as opposed to conceptual features. Thus, the 
structure of expert children's knowledge of diuosaurs was more coherent and hierarchicd In 
contrast, expert and novice children demonstrateci comparable general learning skiils of 
making cornparisons and givmg causal explanations when they possessed equivalent 
knowledge m a domah (here, the animal domain was used). 
Thus, studies of expertise employing memory, categorization, text comprehension and 
problem sohring tasks have demonstrated the importance of possessing knowledge structures 
specific to a @en content domain for successfu problem s o h g .  Furthemore, studies such 
as that of Chi et.d (1988) described above suggest that knowledge structures and n a  general 
learning skills (ie., general processes) are critical aspects of problem sohing. This position 
contrasts with analogies research, that focuses on the process of identaying and accesshg 
similar relations across problems While analogical reasonhg research does not dispute the 
necessity of posseslsig relevant laiowledge to sohe problems, research efforts are directed at 
explainhg leaming and the transfer of learning to novel content domains. Studies of 
analogical reasoning are presented next, agam with particular attention paid to the miportance 
of the early stages of problem solvmg. 
Studies of Analo~ical Reasoning 
In contrast to studies of expertise, research in the use of analogies has focused on the 
process of mappmg relations fiom a &en (base) probledsituation to a new (target) 
problemktuation. Analogy is of padcular interest as a mechanism that brmgs pnor 
knowledge to bear on the acquisition of new knowledge (Vomiadou, 1988). Both adults and 
children are more successdid at s o h g  problems ifthey have praiousiy soived simüar 
problems (e.g., Holyoak & Koh, 1987; Novick, 1988; Brown & Kane, 1988). Analogical 
reasoning is thus considered fundamental in promoting transfer in problem solvmg. The 
process of analogical problem sohing (involving retrieval, mapping and adaptation) is 
influenced by the nature of the representation constnicted for the source and target problems 
(Novick, 199 1). Whiie researchers are interested in all component processes of analogical 
reasoning, an important question that involves the early stage of representing a problem is 
how information is mcoded and relations identified that d o w  a rnapping to take place. 
Studies of analogical reasoning can be divided mto two general categories, accordmg 
to how analogical reasoning has been measured. These include more traditional analogies of 
the fom A:B::C:D, and reasoning by analogy in problem tasks. 
Classical Anaio~ies - A:B::C:D 
The traditional measure of analogy involves four te-, where the second terni is 
related to the first, as the fourth t e m  is related to the third. An example would be: 
concert : audience :: game : spectators 
Historically, Sp earman (1 923) proposed the h t  processing mode1 of analogical 
reasoning. Verbal analogies played a dominant role m Speannants theones of mtelligence and 
cognition, as he considered verbal analogies to be the bea measure of gaieral intelligence, 
"g", and the prototype of mtelligent thought. Spearman postulated three principles mvohed m 
reasoning with verbal analogies: 
1) the apprehension of experience, 
2) the eduction of relations, and 
3 ) the eduction of correlates. 
In contemporary ter-ology, these principles refer to: 
1) encoding the terms of the analogy mto a meaningfùi mtemd representation, 
2) infierring the relation between the £ira pair of te-, and 
3) applying the analogy to the second pair of terrns by howing the relation between 
the fkst pair of t e m .  
While Spearman's theory of cognition had little impact m its t h e ,  CulTent processing models 
of analogical reasoning are related to Spearman's theory. 
More recently¶ idormation processing theorists studying classical analogies have 
attempted to identify different component sliiUs mvohed m analogical reasoning (e-g., 
Sternberg & Nigro, 1980; Goldman, Pellegrino, Parseghian & Sallis, 
Componential Theory of Analogical Reasoning is more detailed than 
1982). Sternberg's 
Spearmants concenimg 
the spe&cs of p r o c e k g  and how processing difEnilty is iduenced by stimulus content. At 
the same time, Sternberg's theory is more general than Spearman's with respect to stmiuli 
content (i e., encompassing verbal, figurai and geomemc items). Sternberg ( 1977) postulsted 
six p rocekg  events or components when sohhg an analogy of the form A:B::C:D, narnely, 
1) encoding the terms, 
2) inferring the relations between the &st pair (A and B) of tenus, 
3) mapping the relation between A and C, 
4) applying a relation analogous to the A and C relation to the B tenn to solve for D, 
5) justifying that D is a good match among alternatives, and 
6) responding or making a response. 
More recently, researchers have moved nom studying ciassical analogies to reasoning 
by analogy in problem sohring tasks. Here, the analogy depends on the similarity of the 
relational structure between a problem that has already been sobed (the base) and a new 
problem (the target). Theones of andogical reasoniug are numerous, but for the most part 
differ m their emphasis as opposed to theu basic elements. There is generally agreement that 
there is a one-to-one mappmg of objects and a carry-over of predicates fkom one domah, the 
base, to another, the target. [As noted earlier, knowledge is represented here as propontional 
networks of nodes (concepts) and predicates (propositionai links between concepts).] Also, 
researchers agree that there is some variation of a selection prjnciple to determine which 
predicates are important m the match. However, accounts ditfer with respect to the nature of 
the selection principle, varying accordmg to the degree to which they are guided by structural 
versus pragmatic principles. A mode1 that is guided by structurai principles is Gentnets 
StnicnireMappmg Theory (1983, 1989), whüe Holyoak (1985, 1989) offers a pragmatic or 
goal-driven account of analogical processing. In between these extremes are models that 
propose a set of structural processes whüe also t a h g  into account the role of plans and goals 
(e.g., Burstein, 1986; Kedar-Cabe& 1985; Reed, 1987; RumeIhart & Norman, 1981; 
Winston, 1980, 1982). Whereas Gentner and Holyoak's rnodeis both emphasize the mappmg 
of abstract principles, other models such as the Exemplar Model of Ross (Ross, 1989) have 
posnilated that content speciiïcs (Le., eitber Ruface or structural information) are mvohred 
throughout the mapping process and are fâvored above abstract principles. These models and 
the different theoretical perspectives particularly those of Gentner, Holyoak, and Ross, are 
discussed m greater d e t d  later in this paper. 
An example of how people map relations m reasoning by andogy has been show m 
an experiment by Gentner (1983) that asked subjects to provide written descriptions of given 
objects mterpret analogical comparisons that used these objects, and rate the comparisons for 
mtereçthvorth m reading. According to analogical reasonhg theories, subjects should omit 
object attn'butes and focus on relations when reasoning with analogies. This was found. 
Subjects interpreted analogical comparisons (e-g., "Cigarettes are Lüce time bombs") in terms 
of conmion relations, and ratings of interedworth showed a preference for relational (as 
opposed to attributional) information. In contrast, simple object descriptions (e.g., 
"cigarettes") contained both at tn i tes  and relations. Thus, addts tended to focus on 
relational information and mdicated a preference for such information when interpretmg 
analogies. 
Of considerable mterest m the analogies literature is subjects' fàilure to detect 
analogous solutions to problems and the conditions under which analogous solutions are 
generated. This was demonstrated in an experiment ushg Dunckeis (1945) "radiation 
problem" as a target problem (Gick & Holyoak, 1980). In the radiation problem subjects are 
told to pretend they are doctors with a patient who has a malignant stomach tumor who wiil 
die unless the tumor is destroyed. An operation is impossible. A hi& mtensity ray cm 
destroy the tumor, but it win a h  destroy healthy tissue. At lower intensities the rays wili not 
harm healthy tissue, nor will it destroy the tumor. The problem is to find a way to use the rays 
to eliminate the tumor without destroying healthy tissue. A source analog was first presented 
to subjects, Ïn  wiiich subjects read a story about a generd who wants to capture a fortress. 
Many roads radiate fkom the fortress, but the roads are mined such that snall groups could 
travel d e @  but a larger group could detonate the mines. The general needed all of his men to 
mount a successfid attack. Subjects received different sohitions to the military problem, such 
as sendhg small groups down mihiple roads to arrive at the foxtress irimilftaneousty. Subjects 
were then presented with the radiation problem and asked to solve t. An analogous solution 
to the Ilnilitary problem would be to direct mikiple weak rays b m  different directions (the 
convergence solution). Gick and Holyoak found that 75% of coUege -dents generated the 
convergence sohttion after receiving the military problem with the convergence solution and a 
hint to apply the sohition. M y  10% of students genmted this solution &out receivmg the 
base analog (Le., the müitary problem). Subjects tended to use the sohition provided m the 
source story to solve the radiation problem d e r  a b t .  Thus, variations m soiution to a 
source analog r e d e d  m the generation of qualitatively dinerent sohitions to the target. Of 
parti& mterest, however, was that despite receivmg the target problem immediately 
foliowing the base story, only 30% of subjects generated a solution &out a hht (vs. 75% 
&er a h t ) .  The majonty of subjects fâiled to spontaneously make use of the anaiogy. 
Catrambone and Holyoak (1989) demonstrated the important role of schema mduction 
m spontaneously noticing analogies in remote domains They expanded on the experiments by 
Gick & Holyoak (1980, 1983) by presenting two convergence stories (e.g., the military 
problem and a bfightmg stoq where converging water sources are needed to put out a 
large fie), or one convergence story and one disanalogous story. Ail subjects wrote 
summaries of each story, and halfof the subjects wrote descriptions of the siniilarites 
in the two stories (the cornparison condition). Then they ali attempted to solve the 
radiation problem An earlier study similar in method but *out a cornparison condition, 
f o n d  that two analogs as opposed to only one analog resdted in a higher mcidence of 
spontaneous transfer of the convergence solution both before and d e r  a f i t .  However, it 
was not clear fiom the results whether greater success was because the two anaiogs helped 
subjects to abstract a schema representing the structure of the two andogs, or whether they 
sinipiy had two oppommities to be exposed to the analog. Hence, the comparison procedure 
was mchided m Holyoak and Catrambone's study to create a mappmg between the two 
stones. This was predicted to result m an explicit representation of the shared schematic 
structure (Le., schema mduction). Conversely, if the cornparison procedure is not crucial m 
schema mduction and the stones are realeved mdependently, then IWO analogs should 
produce greater transfer than one, regardless of whether the analogs are compared. The 
results mdicated that subjects in the comparison condition that received two analogs generated 
the convergent solution before receiving a hint significantly more than subjects who received 
one analogous and one disanalogous story (60% vs. 20% before a hint). When no cornparison 
was made, spontaneous transfer significantly dropped m the two analog group (35% in the no 
comparison group vs. 60% in the comparison group). Howwer, once a hmt was provided, 
trançfer did occur with or without explicit comparison mstmctions m the two analog groups 
(overd 90% and 80% m the comparison and no comparison groups, respectively). 
Moreover? subjects receiving the analogous and disaaalogous stones generated the 
convergence solution less fiequently with or without a h t ,  presumably because the presence 
of a distracter story impeded the application of a source analog. The results were taken to 
support the schema mduction hypothesis where direct instruction to d e  cornparisons 
triggered schema mduction that ultimateiy assisted m spontaneous transfier of the analogy to a 
target problem Studies such as these have demonstrated how the general process of 
reasoning by analogies influences successful problem solving across disparate content areas. 
Thus, in the cognitive literature, the nature of the eariy stages of information 
processing has been mvestigated in studies of expertise and analogical reasoning. Studieç of 
expertise have demonstrated the importance of the structure of knowledge m a specinc 
content domain. Shidies of analogical reasoning have demonstrated the importance of the 
process of identi£jring and accessing similar relations among problems. 1 now tum to a brief 
oveMew of research in the social literature that highiights the role of the intemal 
representation of mfonnation in mterpersonal situations. 
Studies in the Social Domain 
Similar to hdings in the cognitive literature, an understandmg of the processes of 
encoding and interpetmg social mes is very important since mterpretations made at this early 
stage of idonnation processhg most likely influence subsequent processiag of social 
idormation. Research findings have typicaily suggested that social& maladjusted children 
tend to d e  mors or produce biased mterpretations of social situations. S weral different 
tasks have been employed to demonstrate these hdings, including hypothetical sihiation 
mterviews or questiomaires, mterviews about real-Me social wents, and self-report 
inventories. 
Hwothetical Sitiiation Interviews or Questionnaires 
The hypothetical situation is the moa popular approach used m studies of social 
information-proces9ng. Children are presented with a hypothetical social situation (either a 
aory with or without pictures, or a video of cbildren m a social situation) and they are asked 
questions about the situation. Their responses are assumed to indicate how they have 
processed the social Sifomtion. For example, Dodge and Tomh (1987) presented children 
with hypotheticd situations mvohring peer provocation and conflict. The children were asked 
to Mer the mtent of the provoking peer and explain how they arrived at this iderence. 
Renilts indicated that aggressive children relied more on general mental structures fiorn their 
own experiences (Le., schemata) to mterpret the mtent of the peers. Convers+, non- 
aggressive children relied more on the immediate social nies presented in the story to infer 
htent. Simüarly, other studies using the hypothetical approach have shown that aggressive 
children m particuiar tend to attnbute hostile mtent to peers when presented with ambiguous 
situations of possible peer conflict (e.g., Dodge & Frame, 1982). Moreover, the consistency 
of this hdmg across many studies demonarates that the relationship between children's social 
matadjustment and h o d e  attribution bias is quite robust. These hdings have typically bem 
displiiyed by children with aggressÏve behavioural patterns. Few studies have looked at 
children with avoidant behaviourai characteristics and resuhs have been mixed. For example, 
Waldman (1988) did n s  find evidaice that a sample of withdrawn chüdren attniuted hostile 
intent to peers m hypothetical situations, while Quiggle et. aL (1992) folmd that depressed- 
nonaggressive children demonstrated hostile attriiution bias. Certahdy M e r  research wîth 
nonaggressive children with avoidant behavioral styles is needed- 
While hostile attniution bias has been found in ambiguous hypotheticd situations, 
hypothetical situations have also been used in which the provocation is clearly benign, hostile 
or accident a l  Here children's errors in mferring the mtent of peers presented m a hypothetical 
situation is assessed (ie., intention-cue detection accwacy). Studies have shown that socially 
maladjusted children (rejected or aggressive chüdren) make relatively more errors than their 
well-adjusted peers m mferring intent in unambiguous situations (e-g., Dodge, Murphy & 
Buchsbaum, 1984; Walrlman_ 1988). 
Interviews About Real Social Events 
The use of m t e ~ e w s  about actud social wents has been used infkequentiy. SimîIar to 
the hypothetical method, children are asked questions about a social situation, but with this 
approach the children respond to an a d  social experience. Steinberg and Dodge (1983) 
demonstrated hostile attri'bution bias m an actual play situation mvohring a peer who knocks 
down blocks of a building ori&aily erected by a subject. Whether the act was mtended to 
provoke the subject is ambiguous. Subjects were aggressive and non-aggressive children. 
Consistent with other findings using hypothetical situations, aggressive children were more 
likely than nonaggressive childm to attnbute hostile mtent to the peer. These findmgs m 
actud and hypothetical situations suggest that the hostile attn'bution bias is ecologically valid. 
Self-Re~ort Inventories 
Self-report mventones have &O been employed, where chüdren rate a senes of 
statements accordmg to how true each statement is for them In this marner, and ushg factor 
analyses to constnict meanin@ scales, general mental structures can be assessed. One such 
self-report instrument devdoped by Harter ( 1982) has been used to assess chüdren's 
perceptions of their own competence. 
In on-going s o d  mteractions the interpretative process hcludes an waluation of 
past eventsfgoals, the selfand others These selfevaluations and waluations of others are 
stored m memory as part of latent mental structures. Repeated instances of smiilar 
experiences are thought to resdt in the development of a chiid's perception of h i d m  social 
competence. Studies have shown a positive relationship between perceived social cornpetaice 
and peer status (social adjustment) in children beyond second grade (e-g., Kurdek & Krile, 
1982; Ladd & %ce, 1986). However, this relationship may Vary somewhat depending on the 
behavioural styles of children. Studies by Hymel Bowker & Woody ( 1992) and Rubin, Chen 
& Hymel(1995) have shown that rejected-withdrawn chüdren perceive themselves more 
negatively than their peers (ie., their view of themsehes as socially mcompetent is consistent 
with how their peers view them). Conversely, rejected-aggressive children did not view 
tbemsehes more negatively than their peers (ie., th& view of themselves as socially 
competent differs fiom the view of their peers who see them as incompetent). These results 
suggest that perceived competence may or may not show a relationship wdh social 
maladjustment, depending on the type of deviant behaviours exhi'bited by the sample. 
Thus, the importance of how an interpersonai situation is represented m memory in the 
eariy stages of mfonnation procesçing has been demonstrated in hypothetical situation and real 
life m te~ews ,  and self-report mventones. Biases in mteqreting social situations have been 
found to be characteristic of children less competent socially. 
In ~urrrmary, bnef reviews of the progression of theorizing about problem sohliig in 
both the cognitive and socialcialcognitive literature were presented The high degree of overhp 
in the information processing theories show how similar general processes are assumed to 
underlie these different domains of human capabilities. Of particular import is an earty stage of 
information proces&, namely the mtemal representation This was demonstrated m studies 
of expertise and analogical r e amhg  m the cognitive literature, and studies of atûiiutional 
bias in the social herature. However, studies of expertise and andogicai reasoning clearly 
mer m their emphasis on knowledge structures versus general processing sk&, respectiveiy. 
Consistent with the assumption of simüar processes underlymg problem solving in the 
cognitive and social domains, the analogies research suggests that the process of reasoning 
analogicaIly is critical m l e d g  and transfer across remote domains. In contrast, the 
expertise research highlights the role of knowledge structures in successfd performance. 
Moreover, the inference suggested by some results is that general processing skills are 
necessary but not essential to competent problem sohring. This issue of the relative 
importance of generalized skiUs/processes versus domain-specific knowledge is addressed m 
the foilowing section. 
Cenerai Processes vs. DomainSpecific Knowledge 
In the 1960's and 1970's considerable research was directed at promotmg thrm9ng 
skih and transfer of leaming. This was a continuation of the well-established tradition of 
training cognitive processes to enable students to leam m a wide variety of content domains 
(see Mann, 1979). The goal of dweloping general thinhg skills is to permit transfer to tasks 
that may be quite differmt fiom those practiced. As a consequence, training programs 
focused on general processes at times almost independent of a specific content domain (e.g., 
Feuerstein, 1980). And yet, r e d t s  feii short of expectations (see Segal, Chiprnan & Glaser, 
1985, for a r d e w  of several promhent programs). 
The trend m the 1980's was a in focus to teaching domain-speciiïc lmowledge 
(e.g., Glaser, 1984). In reaction to the claims of 'cognitive process training', it has been 
argued fkom as early as Thorndike, that trander is specific rather than general, and that 
practice and training in spedic content areas is most important. In this view, transfer is based 
on çpecific elements that are common across situations (e.g., Thomdike, 19 13). 
This process vs. knowledge issue was and continues to be an issue of great debate 
(e.g., Glaser, 1984, 1985; Sternberg, 1985, 1989). Ofconceni is "the trend to shat fiom 
over-emphasïs on one aspect of cognition to over-emphasis on another aspect of cognition" 
(Sternberg, 1985, p. 571). No one has attempted to claim that general processes or domain 
knowledge is more important to the exclusion of the other, and it is generaily accepted that 
both aspects of cognition coqlement each other. Howwer, researchers continue to seek 
confimution that one aspect, generai processes or spenfic knowledge, is most miportant in 
promotmg thinking and trander of leaming. Research fhdings fiom studies of analugies and 
expertise can be taken as support for the two different views of the importance of general 
cognitive processes (the focus of analogies research) versus knowledge s p e s c  to a particular 
domain (suggested by expertise research). Calhg a truce m the debate of relative ment and 
aclmowledging the importance of both process and knowiedge structures does not n e c e s d y  
as& the educational field m providmg the most escient means of teaching skills and (even 
more desirable) trander. The directive fiom the literature û to ' Teach it a. And yet, given 
that expertise research over the past dacade continues to focus largely on how knowledge is 
stuctured (e.g., Greeno & Simon, 1988; VanLehn, 1989), this suggests a directive to 'Teach 
it ai i  - but teach domah-specinc knowledge more'. Despite t h ,  researchers continue to 
reco- the importance of acquiring general th8iking skills to leam more eEciently, that is, 
to help students leam to l e m  (Bransford, et.&, 1985). 
In a rehim to earlier concephializations of learning and expertise, some recent research 
ha5 demunstrated the importance of general strategies when specific domain knowledge is 
hckuig. Schraagen (1993) compared the performance of subjects varying in ternis of their 
leve! of expertise when presented with the problem of designing an experiment in sensory 
psychology. Of particular interest was his cornparison of experts nimüiar with the &en 
problem (Le., experimental design experts in the field of sensory psychology) and experts for 
d o m  the problem was novel (Le., experimentai design experts d o  had not designed 
experiments in sensory psychology). The most notable resuh was that, aIthough experts 
lacking domain howledge produced inferior sohitions when compared to domain experts, 
both groups of experts employed the same structural approach to problem sokg .  That 4 aU 
experts exhi'bited the schema-driva problem solving that characterize their routine problem 
sohring. Thus, "ahhough the f o m  of the design experts' reasorhg was simüar to that of the 
domain experts, the content or substance of their reasoning was dissimilar" (p.305). As 
Schraagen points out "this result implies that expertise cannot only be considered the product 
of increasingly specialized domain howledge, as m e n t  theones of expertise would claim 
(e.g., Anderson, 1987)" (p.303). 
Many researchers concemed with process aspects or 'mental actionst invohed m 
problem sohring have studied reasonhg by analogy. It is considered by many to play a central 
role m solving problems and acquiring expertise (e-g-, NoMck, 1988; Gick, 1985), and some 
would even argue that analogical transfer is the main (and to some the on@) method used for 
s o b g  novel problems (Polya, 1957; Rumelhart, 1989; Moore & Newell, 1973). In order to 
better understand the process of reasonhg by analogies, a brief o v e ~ e w  of prominent 
theones and the development of snalogical reasoning follows. 
Theories of Analogieal Reasoning 
As noted earlier, theories of analogical reasoning are generdy consistent in their 
assumptions that there is a mapping of objects/relations fiom one domain to another, and a 
selection principle d e t e d e s  what is mapped. Beyond t h ,  theories m e r  m general with 
respect to their focus on structural versus pragmatic principles, and whether the development 
of analogical reasoning is seen as a deficit in coqetence or content howledge. Three 
prominent theories reflecting the cisering principles, mchidhg Gentnefs Structure-Mappmg 
theory (1983, 1989), Holyoak's Multiconstraint theory (1985, 1989; Holyoak Br Thagard, 
1995), and Rosst Exemplar theory (1989) are presented below. This is folIowed by a brief 
discussion of Merent theoretical perpectives on the development of analogical reasoning. 
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Gentmer's Structure-Ma~~ine Theorv 
Accordmg to Gentner's StnictureMappmg Theory (1983, 1989), in order to sohe an 
analogy knowledge is mapped fiom one domah, the base, into another, the target, such that a 
systern of relations among the base objects ako holds among the target objects. Success at 
reasoning analogically requkes noticing the simtlarities in the relational structure between the 
base and the target domains mdependent of the specinc objects used to convey the relations. 
Objects m the base are placed m a one-to-one correspondence with objects in the target, m a 
manner that maximkes the structural match. There is a preference not to map isolated 
predicates (lower-order relations e.g., 'bigger thad), but rather, to map systems of predicates 
linked by higher-order relations (e.g., 'causef). This is important in the mapping process and is 
cded the principle of systematicity. 
Accordmg to structure mappmg theory: 
a) the deepest - ie., most systematic - mappable structure is selected, 
b) the matching process between base and target is entireiy structural, Le., by 
p r e f h g  to match deep relational chaius, the system acts as a domah-generai matcher that 
maps semantic representations but not any particular pre-specified content, 
C) mterpretations of an analogy will cliffer dependmg on which predicates match 
between two domains, 
d) the actual process of reasoning by analogy is mdependent of the problem soher's 
goals. 
Gentner distmguishes between different h d s  of smilanty m reasoning, namely: 
mere appearance match, where object ateibutes are mapped, e.g., "The giass 
tabletop gleamed like water" @.207), 
literal similarity, where both relational and object atnl'butes are mapped e-g., "Milk is 
L e  water" @.207), 
analogy, where only relational predicates are mapped, e.g., ' The flow of heat is like 
the flow of water' @.202), and 
rela tional abstraction, where the base domain only contains abstract plmciples, and 
thus there are no object attnbutes omitted iu the relational mapping, e-g., "Heat is a through- 
variable" (p. 208), (understandable &en a imowledge of systern dynamics). 
These Mirent kinds of similarity represent a continuum of reasoning based on attriibutes 
(often seen in novice leamers) to reasoning based on abstract relations (characteristic of more 
successful problem soiving performance). 
Gentner's model does not take mto account plans and goals. This omission has been a 
common criticisrn of her model (e-g., Holyoak, 1985), but has recently been addressed by 
Gentner (1989). While remaining adamant that plans and goals have no role during the 
analogy process, she does propose that plans and goals influence reasonhg before and after 
the analogy process. Before the mappmg begins, plans and goals constrain the input that 
forms the mitid domain representation of the çituatiodproblem (ie., Bifomtion m worlcmg 
memory and what gets accessed fiom long term memory). After a match, plans and goals will 
Bifhience the evaluation of the stnictural soundness, relevance, and validity of the match. 
Other than these idluences, the analogy process itselfdoes not require plans and goals. An 
advantage of modeling the analogy process as  structure-driven as opposed to goal-driven, i s  
that it allows for the gaieration of unexpected matches, or even matches that contradict an 
individuals mitid problem solving goals. This has c e r t d y  proven important in scientinc 
discovery. 
Holvoak's Multiconstraint Theorv 
In contnist to Gentnefs Structure-Mapping Theory, Holyoak views analogical thinking 
as operating under the constraints of similarity? structure, and purpose (Holyoak, 1985, 1989; 
Holyoak & Thagard, 1995). Analogical problem sohring involves constructing a mental 
representation of the base and target, accessing a relevant base as an anaiog to the target, 
mapping the components of the base and target, and ushg the mapping to generate a sohtion 
to the target. In this latter stage, the useful commonalities between the base and the target are 
represented as new howledge structures (i.e., the mduction of new knowledge). These 
stages are essentiaiiy the same as those proposed by Gentner- However, beyond the 
theones differ, as Holyoak postdates a pragmatic account of analogy where plans and goais 
control the mapphg process. Thus, analogy is seen as part of a goal-driva processing 
system. DïfEerent goals resuft m different mapphgs fiom the same base problexn As Holyoak 
( 1985) states; "In any problem mode1 the components are directly relevant to the solution 
plan: the goal is a reason for it; the resources enable it; the constraints prevent alternative 
plans; and the outcome is the result of executing the solution plan" (p.70). Ifthe g o 4  
resources, operators and constraints are stx-ucturally sixniiar, then they c m  be mapped fhm the 
base problem to the target problem The common abstract structure in two problems is 
considered a schema for a generd class of simüar problems. Holyoak does not differentiate 
between properties (predicates with only one argument) and relations (predicates with more 
than one argument). He does distmguish between surface similanty and structural similanty. 
This distinction highlights the goal of the problem soher. Suface similanties are common 
aspects of two problem situations that play no causal role in determining posaile solutions. 
Structural nmilarities are commonalities that idluence whether or not a successfiil solution is 
reached. In retrievîng cues f?om the target and accessgig the base analog, success will depend 
on the problem solvefs abiIity to identify structural Smilanties and avoid superficially similar 
but unhelpful surface similanties. 
In their work on the use of analogies m problem sohring, Hoiyoak and his coileagues 
have found that successfùi trader of base information to a target analog is determined m 
large part by the development of an adequate schema (e.g., Gick & Holyoak, 1980, 1983). 
Schema induction is assumed to occur strategically (as opposed to automatically). That is, 
either by directly cornparhg two analogous problems (e.g., Catrambone & Holyoak, 1989) or 
mappmg one analog to another during problem sohing (e.g., Holyoak, 1985). WMe Genmer 
acknowledges that schema mduction does occur (Genmer, 1989), structure-mappmg theory 
provides no mechanism for schema induction. 
Holyoak and Thagard (1995) have been successfùl in modeling analogical problem 
s o h g  in the context of computer programs, one example being PI, or Rocesses of 
Induction. In PI, processing occurs using condition-action d e s  and spreading activation 
through associative links among concepts, all directed by goals and subgoals of the problem 
solver. 
Criticisms of Holyoak's theory have been lweled at the mability to account for 
unexpected analogies that may be comter to expectations of the problem çohrer. Also, the 
immense size of the database needed to mode1 d of the p otential associations and p ossile 
mappings in a &en domain may be too large for a system to handle. 
Ross' Exem~iar Theorv 
Exemplar models of analogical transfer dSer fiom Gentner and Holyoak's accounts m 
their emphasis on the importance of the specific content as opposed to abstract features of the 
base and target. For example, m the theory developed by Ross and his associates (e.g., Ross, 
1989; Ross Br Kennedy, 1990), they propose that previously leamed ewmples are what is 
mapped to a target problem . Reaieval of an analog is based on the degree of simbity 
between the base and target - inchidhg either surfsce or saucturd details. The assumption is 
made that spe&c information is fàvored over abstract infiormation. General solution 
principles are induced âom specinc exemplars, and abstract infiormation is used withm the 
context of the spedc information. White Gentner and Holyoak's theones both acknowledge 
the importance of specific content in the eariy stage of analogicd mapping, Ross' theory 
emphasizes content throughout the mapping stages (inchidmg selection and application). 
Empirical studies in the use of analogies m problem sohhg have demonstrated the 
utility of aspects of each of these theones in problem s o h g .  For example, evidence for the 
prsiciple of systematicity was found by Clement and Gentner (199 1). They gave subjects a 
full base analogue, had them compare the simüarites wah an mcomplete target problem and 
then asked them to rate idormation (analogous to the base story) as more or less important to 
the target story. They found ba t  the subjects rated idormation consistent with a system of 
relations as more iniponant than mformation that was not systematicdy related. 
Furthemore, their own mferences that they drew about the target story were consistent with 
the comected system of rehtions presented m the base story, and did not represent isolated 
predicates. The study desnibed earlier by Catrambone and Holyoak (1989) demonstrated the 
strategic nature of schema induction in solving analogous problems. They found that two 
analogous aones as opposed to onh/ one resulted in greater spontaneous -der to the target 
problem, and this was enhanced when subjects were asked to compare as opposed to Smply 
summarize the two analogous aories. In addition, presentation of a .  analogous and 
disanalogous aory appeared to impede the application of the analogous solution to the target 
problem Thus, as predicted by Holyoak's theory, subjects needed to work at schema 
mduction And h a l l y ,  studies have shown that exemplar-specific idormation is retahed and 
is often bighly conducive to access and use of a base analog m sohring a target problem. For 
example, m a variation of Duncker's radiation problem, Keane (1987) modifïed the nmilanty 
of the semantic domain (medical vs. niilitaiy) and shared common surface details (e-g., doaor, 
tumor, 2 rays). He found that success m sohmig the radiation problem was enbanced when 
both semantic and surfàce detds were similar. SimilarIy, Holyoak and Koh (1987) 
manipulated the nmüarity/dissimilanty of surface and structural elements in aories analogous 
to a target problem (DMcker's radiation problem). Stones that combmed simüar airface and 
similar structural elements demonstrated an additive effect m facilitatmg spontaneous transfer 
of the analogous solution. However, structural similanty was critical for overd success (Le., 
with or without a hint) in sotving the target problem. 
The theones of Gentner, Holyoak and Ross were reviewed and contrasted by Reeves 
and Weisberg (1994) and used to account for the empirical evidence. Reeves and Weisberg 
concluded that "AU of the theones of analogical transfer dimissed herem receive partial 
support fkom the empirical ewidence.. ." (p. 395). Moreover, "to explain d of the available 
data, a hybrid of the structural, pragmatic, and exemplar views is necessaxy" (p.396). 
Theories of analogical reasonhg have also differed m their account of how this general 
processing ski11 develops. 
Develo~mentaI Considerations 
A typical hding of research mvestigatmg children's use of analogies has been that 
young chüdren are essentially unable to do it. Rather, analogical reasoning is thought to 
develop with age (e-g., Inhe1der & Piaget, 1958; Sternberg & Nigro, 1980). For example, 
Sternberg and Nigro (1980) postuiated two lwels of perfomiance. For younger children, 
analogicd reasoning is incoqlete but not absent and perfo~nance is characterized more by a 
reliance on associations among ternis as opposed to analogical relations. At the second level, 
analogical reasoning is attained. For example, for the simple analogical probiem: 
bird : nest :: dog : ? (horse, doghouse, bone, walk) 
a younger child (at level one) is expected to choose the associate *bonet, while the older child 
(at level two) is expected to choose the analogical relation 'doghouse'. 
However, Goswami & Brown (1995) have recently found very different renihs that 
senously question such a structural explanation of analogical dwelopment. They presented 
children with pictorial analogies in the traditional format (ie., a:b::c:d) using very famiiiar 
relations that have been sbown to be important in young children's knowledge structures 
(e.g., the relation 'lives m). These mocWcations to item dif5cuIty and mode of presentation 
were sufncient to demonstrate that even children as young as four years of age were able to 
understand the relations upon which an analogy is based. Moreover, the chüdren were not 
innuenced by a smipler associative understanding of the analogy. Similarly, other research bas 
demonstrated success with young children sohring geometric analogies, as well as 
improvements m analogical reasoning fonowing training m component processes (Alexander 
et.&, 1989). 
The development of analogical reasoning is viewed by Gentner as Smilar to 
Sternberg's structural explanation of analogical development. Genmer (1983, 1989) 
postdates a "relational shift" m analogical processing fiom a focus on cornmon object 
amibutes to a focus on common relations. This devdopmentd shift may be due to a 
competence deficit (a structural view) or limitations m domain knowledge. 
Evidence for the relational shift was found m a test of children's dwelopment of 
systernaticity m a story mapping task (ûentner & Touph, 1986). Chüdren aged 4 to 6 years 
and aged 8 to 10 years listened to a story read doud, then acted out the stoiy using toy 
animals. They were thm asked to act out the story again with new anmials. The animals 
differed f?om the story to test phase according to whether the animals were nmilar or different 
in appearance to the original characters or whether they played the same or Werent role 
@ero, fiiend and vülain). This resuhed in three mappmg conditions that teaed the influence of 
surface simiianty: high transparency ( M a r  characters and roles, e-g., dog - cat), medium 
transparency (Merent characters and s i d a r  roles, e.g., dog - camel) and low transparency 
(siniilar characters and different roles, e.g., dog - seagd). TranGer (accurate re-teIlhg and 
acting o u  of the story) was expected to be easier when the new animais looked similar, and 
more difncult when they looked different, and the moa difncult when they looked nmilar but 
had different roles (Le., a cross-mapped condition). Also, systematicity was manipulated by 
the inclusion of a moral m halfof the stories. The moral provided a higher-order relation in 
the story, and it was predicted that the use of systematicity should make analogical mappmg 
easier. The results mdicated that transparency or surnice simiIarity strongly influenced 
accuracy m transferring the s toq  for both age groups, with performance falhg signincantly 
with decreasing transparency. There was also a strong effect of systematicity for the older age 
group ody. Thus, the older children were able to bene& fiom systematicity m the mapping 
task while the younger children's performance was not affected by the inclusion of a moral. 
Gentner & Toupm concluded that for andogical mapping, surface similarity appears early in 
development while syçtematicity may appear later. They suggea that this may be due to a 
competence deficit (ie., children Iack the processing ability to map whole relations) or a Iack 
of knowledge of higher-order relations. Once again the issue is raised about the influence of 
process versus knowledge in reasoning. 
Holyoak, Junn & Billman (1984) explored the development of analogical reasonhg by 
asking children f?om 4 - 6 years and 11 - 12 years to solve a problem of how to move balls 
fiom one bowl to another out of reach, after listening to a story that contained an andogous 
problem and solution. Two story anaiogs were used that desmbed how a genie sohred a 
problem of how to move jewels fiom one bottle to another bottle by using either his magic 
stafFto pull the bottle over (the 'magic staff' analog) or commanding his magic carpet to roll 
mto a tube and rolling his jewels mto the other bottle (the 'rnagic carpet' analog). The target 
problem mvolved dwismg as many ways as possible to move b a h  fiom one bowl to another 
out of reach using a variety of materials, including a large sheet of papa (the analogous 
solution to the magic carpet story) or cane (the analogous sohtion to the magic aaEstory). 
A hint was provided to use the story ifthe children could not corne up with an analogous 
solution. Results mdicated that the younger children were able to use the magic staff analogy, 
but not the ma& carpet analogy, while the older children were able to use both analogies. 
Holyoak et. al. concluded that, given the stronger d c e  similarity between the ma& staff 
and cane, yomger chüdren may ody be able to use analogy m the presence of surfàce 
similanty cues. This agah suggests a coqetence deficit view of development. 
Brown, Kane and Echols (1986) investigated these results M e r  in a variation of the 
rolling aaalogy m the stoiy-mapping paradigm Chüdren were presented with the magic 
carpet version of the genie story followed by a problematic story that required transfer of the 
solution of rolling a flat object mto a tube (an Easter bunny moving eggs, or a fanner movhg 
chemes). They found the same resuits as Holyoak et. al. when the children had to figure out 
the similanty themselves. However, perfomiance on the problematic story improved 
signiticantly (70% transfer) when the structural similarity of the base story (ie., protagonist, 
goal, obstacle and solution) was highlighted. Smiilarly, m another variation of the Brown et. 
al. ( 1986) study, B r o g  Kane & Long ( 1989) agam helped children focus on the analogy. 
They asked chiIdren to sohe the genie problem, and ifthey were unsuccessfùl the 
experimenter helped them sohe an analogous problem (the b m y  or fàrmer problem), then 
the gaie problem was re-introduced with an explicit hint that the bunnyffhner problem may 
help. Transfer performance bqroved significantiy (about 50% compared to 20% in the 
control condition), and almoa d subjects were able to sobe the analogous story. Thus, 
cbildren were able to focus on relational ';imiiarities even without surface similar'rties. These 
results do not support a competence deficit explanation of the relational shift. 
Brown and Kane (1988) mvestigated the relational shift hypothesis in a reasoning ta& 
. . 
m which 3 year-olds were taught the requted domain howledge about previously imfamllisr 
relations about animal defense mechanisms (ie., mimicry, chmghg color, and changing 
shape). Mer listening to stories about animals, children were asked transfer questions about 
the defense mechanisms. They found that ahost all cbildren demonstrated txansfer by the 
thkd problem set despite differences m the defense mechanisms and the appearance of the 
animais. Therefore, d e r  teaching the necessary knowledge about defense mechanimis, pre- 
schoolers were able to identify the relational similarities. 
These stuclies suggest that the stnicnirai view (Sternberg & Nigro, 1980) or the 
relational shift (Gentaer, 1983) is more a resuh of children's knowledge than a competence 
deficit. Howwer, a strictly kmwledge-based view is not SuffiCient to explam why children m 
control groups in the story-mappmg analogies (e.g., Brown et. al, 1986) showed no 
analogical trançfer d e n  the performance of children m the experimental groups suggested 
that they have the requisite howledge. 
Goswami (1991) suggests that young children are able to reason by analogy, but 
changes m the nature of analogical reasoning occur later m development. Research suggests 
that the nature of this change is that chüdren are able to reason by analogy wah hints or 
surface similarity mes. However, research with adults has shown that they aiso benefit fiom 
hints (e.g., Gick & Holyoak, 1980) as welI as surface siniilarity in tasks (Holyoak & Koh, 
1989). An alternative exphnation is that metacognitive skiU is that aspect of competence that 
iniproves with development (Brown, 1989; Goswami, 199 1). A metacognitive explanation 
suggeas that, with development, cbildren become better able to reflect on their own 
knowledge and actively seek out relational similanties m analogies. 
Howwer, retuming to a somewhat more structural view, Holyoak and Thagard (1995) 
recently reviewed research that they feel demonstrates a developmental progression in the 
degree of sophistication m analogical thmkmg in the eariy years of Me. Holyoak considers 
analogical thinking to dwelop m stages: 
* by 18 months of age: mapping of s h d a r  amibutes, 
* by age 3: mapping of similar relations, 
* by age 5: rnappings are be-g to invohre reasoning about higher order relations. 
Holyoak and T'hagard recognize that the lmowledge of the relations is important at all lwels 
of development before children are able to demonstrate andogicai reasoning. However, m 
addition to the role of lmowledge, they emphasize the devdopment of reasoning about 
undersmg relations and mappmg, and credit chïidren with analo@cd skills much earlier than 
the structural or relational &.if€ Mews. 
Thus, research has dernonstrateci that children are able to demonstrate analogous 
thmkmg at a much earlier age than was prevbusly found. Dwelopmental explmations of 
reasoning by analogy highlight the importance of possessing the requisite knowledge of the 
relations as well as process variables. Whether age dineratces arise nom a developmg 
understanding of the analogical process or metacognitive processes (or both) are as yet to be 
determined. 
In summary, the theories of analogical reasonhg are differentiated largely by what 
mformation is mapped Genmer (1 983, 1989) postdates a structural mapping based on 
higher-order relations that is domain-general Holyoak (1985, 1989) proposes that the 
mapping process is guided by p k ~  and goals. Ross (1989) suggests that both specifïc and 
abstract idormation are mapped, and moreover, specific idionnation is focused on over 
abstract information. Thus, the theories ditfier largely in their focus on mappmg abstract 
principles versus specific content, and whether the mapping is pureu st~~cturai or goal-driven. 
The developmental studies examined the issue of what exactiy dwelops with age - 
coqetence m analogical reasoning or the knowledge base. Neither exphnation appeared to 
account for performance variations at different ages. Whüe awaiting further mvestigation, the 
research to date suggests that young children are able to reason analogically, but t is the 
nature ofthe reasoning that changes with development. Brown (1989) and Goswami (1991) 
suggest that metacognitive processes account for performance differences in analogous tasks 
m children as weU as addts, while Holyoak and Thagard (1995) feel that the process of 
reasoning analogically develops with age. Further research is requked to test these proposais. 
Thus, we retum to the issue of the importance of a process account of analogical reasoning 
ski& whüe acknowledging the necessity of relevant content knowledge. 
General Processes vs. Knowledee - the Social Domain 
h the social literature, little attention has been paid to the issue of the relative 
importance of general processes versus domain-specific knowledge. However, Crick and 
Dodge (1994) do agree that both aspects of cognition are important. They hypothesize that 
social idonnation stored in memory and schemata have an impact on behaviour by guiding 
on-line processiug. They therefore propose that two types of mental processes are @ortant: 
1) latent mental mctures (Le., mental representation of past events stored m long 
t e m  memory), and 
2) on-he processing actions. 
Moreover, Crick and Dodge (1994) point out that, while social research has focused on 
cognitive outputs (Le., w'hat children think), there is a need for studies of cognitive process 
(ie., how children think). Thus, research uçing a process approach is needed to examine the 
"mental actions" a child engages in when mterpreting social information. 
Thinkinp Skiils Promams Revisited 
ThinLmg skiIls trainmg programs have also been mvohed in the 'general processes 
versus domain-specific lmowledge' debate. Such programs, popular m the 70's and SO's, were 
based on the assumption that teachmg generatized processhg skiils would promote leanMg 
and transfer across disparate domains. However, fess than &pressive results from training 
midies utiüPng these programs have been taken as support for the view that the acquigtion of 
information specific to a content area is the critical aspect that determines success Ïn problem 
sohring. On the 0 t h  hand, &en the accumuiatmg evidence that general thmkmg processes 
warrant M e r  consideration, it is necessary to re-consider why such theorimig was originally 
cnticized and largely abandoned over the past decade. For th& a bnef review of thmk8ig 
skills programs and th& 'promise' is provided. 
Thnikmg sküls programs are procesoriented cwricula. That is, they operate under 
the assumption that there is a certain set of skilis or general processes that are common to 
thmkmg. The main objective of these programs is to teach these processes. Many programs 
have been developed to promote thrmang skilis, and they fkll into two general categories. 
Some programs reiy on abstract materiais (e.g., geometric figures, dot mamces) to promote 
thEkEig &Us (e.g., mstnim Il= entai Enrichment", Feuerstein, 1980; "Intuitive Math", Burke, 
197 1; "Thmk", Adams, 197 l), while other programs utilize real-world problem s o h g  (e-g., 
"CoRT Thmking Materialsu, deBono, 1975; "Phüosophy for Children", Lipman, Sharp & 
Oscanyon, 1980; "Productive Thinking", Covmgton, Crutchfield, Davis & Ohon, 1974). The 
programs are not m u t u a  exclusive, and other programs mtegrate abstract and real-world 
experiences (e.g., "Odyssey", Adams, 1986). 
The programs are similar m tbeir focus on teachmg cntical and analytic thinking. 
Unfoxtunately, evahiations of programs, when data do enst, have often been fiawed in design 
and content, and straightfoward cornparisons are diflicult. On a positive note, every 
evahiation has hcluded evidence of some gains, and there are some extremely positive resuits. 
However, all evahations have demonstrated at leaa one of the following limitations: 
a) trander: Substantial gains tend to be found o d y  on tests that are closest m structure and 
content to the course &sel£ 
b) mdividual differences: Only some nudents appear to benefït fiom teaching problem 
s o b g .  
A more recent thmking skiIls program has endeavored to train thinking sküls in the 
learning environment (Manchi, Short, Mulcahy & Andrews, 199 1; Andrews, Peat, Mdcahy 
& M d o ,  1990). In SPELT, or "Strategies Program for Effective Leamhg and ThinkBig", 
generalized thmkmg skills are taught m the context of domain-specific knowledge. Moreover, 
both social and non-social thinkmg and reasonhg sküls are addressed in this program. It is 
assumed that the same cognitive and metacognitive processes underlie both social and non- 
social (academic) tasks. The expectation is that trainmg general processing strategies within 
specific content areas will facilitate transfer of leaming to novel areas. While m-depth 
evaluations are still needed, the snidy is of parti& mterest to the present mvestigation 
because of it's specific targeting of both social and non-social domains, and it's assumption of 
similar underlyiug processes m the two domains. Indeed, others have supported the notion of 
the importance of trainmg general processes m the context of leamhg specific howledge. As 
Brown, Colins & Hamis (1978) pomt out, teaching underlying domain mdependent cognitive 
processes dong with learning strategies provides -dents with a basis for acquiring new 
knowledge and provides them with tools to &ce problem situations. However, the SPELT 
program and most other thinking ski& programs have op erated under an assumption about 
general processes that has not received strong empirical support. For a program to be 
successful in promoting transfer, successful strategies need to be identified fïrst. It is only 
then that identified strategies may be taught successfuyl to children. There has been some 
evidence that this is the case (e-g., Palincsar 8r Brown, 1984; Bereiter & Scardamalia, 1987; 
Schoenfield, 1985). CertainIy more research is required. The rehtive success of teachmg 
general processes versus domah-specinc knowledge m thmking skills programs remahs 
unclear. 
The Present Res - xch 
Earlier in this paper the theoretical models underiymg cognitive and social-cognitive 
problem solvmg were compared and Srnilarites were drawn. Considerable overlap in 
theorizing about the underlying processes was found. Thrmong skills programs, m particular 
that of Mulcahy and colleagues (e.g., Andrews, et. al., 1990; Mancini, et.aL, 1991), have also 
operated under the assumption of similar undermg processes m the academic and social 
domains. Similarly, studies of children's competence have demonstrated strong, positive 
relationships between academic and social competence (e.g., Dishion, 1990; Wentzel, 
199 1,1993). However, while various theoretical and empincal sources either assume or 
suggea nmilanties m processing across the academic and social domains, there are no hown 
studies that have spedically examined these assumptions for academic and social problem 
sohring. Thus, research is needed that dire* investigates the assumption of similar 
underlying processes in the two domains. Such research would inevitably also address the 
issue of the influence of specific knowledge and general processes on academic and social 
performance. The present mvestigation seeks to explore these issues by examining how the 
mental process of analogical reasoning relates to competence m the academic and social 
domains. 
Three studies were conducted, a Pilot Study, and two major midies, Study One and 
Study Two. The Pilot Study examined a vaiety of problem s o h g  tasks for possible 
inclusion in subsequent studies. As a r e d t  of the pilot, a sorting task was found to warrant 
M e r  mvestigation. The materials m the sorthg ta& were expanded for use in Study One. 
The adequacy of employing the materials to address the issues of the idluence of analogical 
reasonhg skiii versus specific imowledge on performance, and whether children's ab* to 
thmk by analogy is related to competence in both the academic and social domains, were 
assessed in Study One. Causal relationships among the variables were also explored. The 
rehtionships between competence and analogical reasoning found m Study One were 
examined m Study Two. In addition, mter-rater reliabiüty of the analogicai reasoning materials 
was assessed. and two causal models were tested, 
In the sorting task, children sorted four academic and four social themes. For each 
theme, children categorized a senes of nine, brief scenarios into three related piles. Of 
mterest, was whether the children focused on underlying principles (ie., abstract concepts 
inferred by the content) or suxfàce features (ie., explicirly stated detaüs), and how success at 
identifjing analogous, underlying principles relates to academic and social competence. 
In ai l  three stuclies, multiple tasks were used to assess competence fiom a 
variety of perspectives. In this manner, the tasks provided converging data that 
together would more accurately reflect the general constr~cts of academic and sociai 
competence. Certamh, an optimal assessrnent of social competence would hchide 
observations of problem s o h g  m real-Me social interactions. However, gathering 
direct observations was beyond the %ope of the present research. In the absence of 
observational data of on-going social competence, the best ahmative is to gather 
Hiformation fiom several daferent sources and m different ways (see Butler & 
Meichenbaum, 1981). Thus, for both domains, teacher rathgs and seifperception 
ratings of competence were employed. In addition, an achievement test of academic 
competence and sociometric ratmg scaies of peer ratings of social competence were 
urilized. In the academic domain, achievement tests and teacher ratings are commoniy 
used methods to assess academic competence, and are closely related. In the social 
domain, peer and teacher rahgs  are also common indices of social competence (e.g., 
Crick & Dodge, 1994). Selfreport ratnigs of a child's perceived coqetence were 
also mcluded as a chüd's perceived competence has been found to be a prediaor of 
behaviour (eg., Maddw Nolton, & Stoltenberg, 1986). It is thought that a person's 
beliefk about their capabilities help determine what he/she does with the knowledge 
and sküls he/she has thereby infiuencing how he/she behaves (Bandura, 1986). 
CHAPTER 2: STUDY ONE 
Overview 
Given the absence of research directly cornparkg academic and social problem 
s o h g ,  it was necessary to develop appropriate materiais to p d o m  this ta&. Tasks and 
methodologies m the existing literature were adapted and modified to d o w  cornparisons 
across the two domains. These materials were then tested in a pilot study, *ch is descnibed 
m detail m Appendix A and brie* SUII1InaiiZed below. 
The Pilot Studv 
Severai tasks were developed nom experimental tasks used in the cognitive and social- 
cognitive problem s o h g  literature. Each ta& was believed to assess analogous processes m 
the academic and social domains that are thought to occur m the early stages of problem 
s o h g .  Also mcluded was an waixation of several indices of academic and social 
competence. Thus, the pilot study represented an indial step in exploring the relationship 
between problem s o h g  skiü and overall competence m a gken domain. 
Of the problern solving tasks midied in the pilot, the Sorting task was found to 
wmant further investigation. The Sorthg task comprised two sets of themes (one academic 
and one social), each containhg a senes of bnef passages. The themes were adapted fiom 
Brown and Kanets (1988) analogies descnbmg animais' use of defense mechanisms, and 
Bream's (1989) hypothetical-reflective Stuations of possible peer codict. The academic and 
social passages were modified in the pilot study to create a senes of bnef passages wbich 
contained the underlying principles or general concepts used by Brown and Bream (ie., 
animal defense mechanisms of camo&ge, visual mimicry, and naturd pest control, and 
p O ssile codict invohing physicd provocation, embarrassment, and rejection, respective@). 
In addition, cornmon çurface features or details explicitly stated m the passages were included. 
Subjects sorted the passages mto related piles, and desmied their rationale. How the cbildren 
categorized the scenarios was taken as an mdicator of their sengtMty to analogous 
information (underiymg principles) or conversely, specific details (Surface features) in the 
passages. Analyses of the relationships among the problem solving tasks and between the 
problem solving and competence tasks m the pilot study indicated that children's analogical 
reasoning ability m detecting undermg principles m the Sorting Task was the most broadly 
related to competence and other problem s o b g  activities. Thus, the pilot study identified an 
analogical reasoning task (the Sorthg Task) as h a h g  potential value in cornparisons of 
academic and social problem sohring, and competence. 
The Present Studv 
Several issues, explored in a preliminary fàshion, are addressed in the present study. 
This investigation sought: 
* to examine the use of analogical reasoning (a general problem s o h g  
process) m two highly disparate domains (namely, the academic and social 
domains), and 
* to detemine whether the use of analogical reasoning sküls E tasks 
containhg academic and social content is related to academic and social 
competence. 
Examination of the relation@ between analogical reasoning and competence in the 
academic and social domains addresses the issue of whether problem s o h g  by analogy is a 
general process that inûuences performance in both the academic and social domains. 
In addition, a howledge test was created that assessed children's understandhg of the 
specinc content knowledge of the presented themes. Altbough the themes were created such 
that Grade 6 and Grade 8 chüdren would be generally acquainted with the idionnation, the 
data fiom the knowledge test were used to statisticdy control for diffaences in content 
howledge. In this manner the results would more clearly demonstrate the maUence of 
analogous thinking and competence. Ako, mformation was obtained that addresses the 
infiuence of generai processes as opposed to domain-specific knowledge m problem solving m 
two veq different domains. 
And ha&, the present midy utilized two grade levels, Grade 6 and Grade 8, to 
kvestigate possibe developmental differences. Within Case's (1992) stages of cognitive 
development, he hypothesizes and has found evidence of substages that reflect mcreased 
understanding of the complexity of the relations among concepts. Thus, discemible 
Merences m children's use of analogous thinking çkiUs as opposed to surface details may be 
evident even w i t .  the two year gap present in the sample employed here. 
Specifically m this study, groups of Grade 6 and Grade 8 -dents were seen over a 
penod of three sessions. Initiaiiy they completed an achievement test, rated aatements 
conceming how they feel about their own academic and interpersonal skilis, and rated each of 
their peers' ability to get dong with others. During this time the students' teachers also rated 
each -dent on aspects of academic and social competence. During the subsequent two 
sessions the students sorted the eight themes - four academic and four social, and recorded 
their rationale for sortmg the scenarios. A Knowledge test was then completed by the 
students that assessed their understanding of the underlying principles presented m the themes. 
A variety of statistical procedures were used to analyze the data (e-g., descriptive statistics, 
graphs, t-tests, Eictor analyses, and correlations). Once the adequacy of the tasks was 
eaablished, the relationships between competence and analogical reasonhg were explored. 
That is, the data were examined to determine whether success in academic a d o r  social 
competence tasks is related to success m identifymg analogies m short passages containhg 
academic and social content. Correlational analyses were used to examine these relationships. 
Exploratory path analyses were also employed to buüd a mode1 of the possible causal 
relationships among competence and analogical reasonhg. 
Subjects 
One hundred eighteai children sexved as subjects, 54 fkom Grade 6, mcludmg 3 1 
males and 23 females, wiih an average age of 12.0 years, and 64 nom Grade 8, inchidhg 37 
males and 27 females, with an average age of 14.0 years. The subjects were drawn fkom three 
classrooms at each grade levei, all in one school m the Peel Board of Education. Participatkg 
classrooms were chosen by the Principal to represent a wide range of ab- leveis. Subjects 
who participated in the study were al1 chüdren d o s e  parents gave -en permission. In 
totai, 8% of the students m the three classrooms were not gramed permisgon to participate m 
the study. Ofthe remahhg students, the data fiom 10% ofthe -dents were not used due to 
absenteeïsm, mcomplete data, or a studentts mability to cope with the reading and writtm 
demands of the tasks. These latter students ( ~ 3 )  were identified by th& classoom teacbers 
as having signincant learning difliculties or an ESL background. Teachers also mdicated that 
the subjects were fkom middle ciass M e s .  The sample was largely Caucasian, with a 
mhority of shidents (less than 5%) of Black and Asian races. 
General Procedure 
Data were gathered in late spring, during regular class sessions. Subjects were told 
that aIl of their answers would be coddéntial, and that they did not have to participate ifthey 
did not wish to. Teachers remained m the ciassroom during the sessions, and completed the 
academic and social competence items of Harteis "Teacher's Rating Scale for the Self- 
Perception Profile for Children" (Harter, 1982) for each child participahg in the study. 
Three, one-hour sessions were needed to complete the collection of the data. Subjects were 
tested as a group m their classes. 
During the fbst session, subjects were @en the academic and social competence items 
of Harter's "SewPerception Profile for Children" (Haaer, 1982). Each item was read aloud 
by the experimenter while the subjects read silently. Then they recorded their answers. 
Subsequentiy, they completed the Otis-Leanon School Ability Test (OLSAT; Otis & Lennon, 
1979), followed by the two sociometric rating scdes. 
For the second and third sessions, the analogicd reasoning materials were presented. 
Four themes were presented duhg  each session, for a total of eight themes over the two 
sessions. Subjects were asked to sort the nine, brief passages (or scenarios) withm each theme 
twice. They were asked to sort the scenarios mto piles according to which ones "go together 
the best". Each subject received a random ordering of the eight themes, altemathg themes 
contaiuing academic and social content. Afler coqle thg the two sorts for each theme, the 
experimenter checked each subject's response sheet to ensure that 1 nine scenarios had been 
sorted and m e n  comments were provided on the response sheet. 
At the end of the third session, after alI the scenarios had been soned, each subject 
completed the Knowledge Test. The Knowledge Test assessed subjects understanding of the 
underlying principles (ie., the analogies) presented m the themes. One h a 1  vis3 was typically 
required to d o w  the few subjects absent fiom one of the three sessions to compiete the 
missed actkities. 
The following sections descnie the cornpetence ta&, analogical reasoning materials, 





Subjects' academic abilmes were assessed using the Otis-Lemon School Ability Tea 
(OLSAT; ûtk & Lennon, 1979), a group-administered, multiple choice, standardized test. 
Both verbal and pictorial analogy items (of the f o m  'A' is to 'B', as 'CI is to ) are 
included m the OLSAT. Subject's performance on the OLSAT provided Eformation about 
overd ability, as well as reasontng with analogies. 
Teacher ratinns. 
Teachers rated each subject on those items of Harter's (1982) "Teacher's Rathg Scale 
of W d l s  Actud Behavior" that assess teacher's perceptions of a chiid's academic competence 
(see Appendix B). For each item (three items m total), opposhg staternents were presented 
on a 4-point Likert-type scale. For example, teachers had to decide which of the foUowing 
statements best descn'be a student and hdicate ifthe chosen aftemative is "sort of me" or 
"rea.Uy mie" about the student: 
"This chüd is redy good at hidher school work 
OR 
This child can't do the school work assigned." 
Child selfreport. 
Each subject completed three items related to his/tier perception of M e r  own 
academic coqetaice, on Harter's (1982) "Self-Perception Profile for Children". Subjects 
were asked to rate statements conceming how they feel about their academic ab* and actuai 
performance Hi school on a 4-pomt Likert-type scale (see Appendix B). This scale parallels 
the content and format of the academic competence items of the teacher rating scale, 
descnbed above. For example, chüdrai were asked to decide which of two statements bea 
d e s d e  how they feel about themseives, and to mdicate ifthey felt the chosen staternent was 
"sort of true for me" or "really true for me": 
"Some kids feel that they are very good at their school work 
BUT 
Other kids worry about whether they can do the school work assigned to them" 
Social Cornpetence 
Sociometric ratmg d e s .  
Each subject rated each of M e r  classmates on a 5-point Likert-fype rating scale, 
according to two different criteria: 
1) ". .. how well that person gets dong with other peopleu. (Subjects then rated their 
peers on a scale fkom 1 - pooriy, to 5 - great). 
2) "... how much you like to h g  aromd that person". (Subjects then rated their 
peers on a scaie fiom 1 - not very much, to 5 - very much). 
The first criterion was felt to reflect peer perceptions of subjects' general cornpetence in social 
situations. The second criterion was thought to reflect subjects' preferred peer group. For 
both ratmg scales, each subject received an average score (out of 5) fkom the ratings of same- 
sex peers. 
Sociometric measures have been found to be hi@ reliabIe (especially using the rating 
scale technique), demonmate hi& test-retest correlations (e.g., Oden & Asher, 1977), and 
show good predictive validity m temis of dernonstrating a relationship to later life adjustment 
(Asher, 1977). 
Teacher ratings. 
Teachers rated each subject on the social competence items (six m d) of Hartds 
(1982) "Teacher's Rathg Scale of Child's Actual Behavior" (see Appendix B). For each item, 
opposing statements were presented on a 4-point Likert-type scaie. As with the teacher 
ratmgs of academic competence, teachers had to decide which of the folIowing statements 
bea d e m i e  a subject and mdicate ifthe alternative chosen is "sort of tme" or "really tme" 
about the subject. An example follows: 
"This child h d s  it hard to make fiends. 
OR 
For this child it's pretty easy." 
Chiid selfreport. 
Each subject completed the three items related to social competence on Haxteis 
(1 982) "SeKPerception Rome for Cbildren" (see App endix B). Subjects rated statements 
descrifimg how they feel about their popuhity and fiendships on a Cpomt Likert-type scale. 
An example follows, and illustrates how this scale pardels the content and format of the 
social competence items of the "Teacher's Rating Scale". For each item, children were asked 
to decide which of two statements best desmies how they feel about themselves, and to 
Hidicate ifthey felt the chosen aatement was k a  of true for me" or "re* tme for me": 
"Some kids fhd it hard to make fiends 
BUT 
ûther kids fmd ifs pretty easy to make fnends." 
Instructions 
The academic and social competence tasks were presented during the fjrst session. 
The session was mtroduced as foliows: 
"Hi My name is Lmda, and 1 would like to start off by thrnking you for hebing me with my 
study. I'rn a student at the University of Waterloo, and 1 am studying how kids leam and 
thmk What W like you to do is to help me leam what kids m grade 6/8 know, and how you 
thmk about different actMties 1 give you. For today, we are gomg to look at thmgs you h o w  
and 1 would also E e  to leam about how you get dong with each other. Are there any 
questions?" 
Subjects were then &en the academic and social competence items of Harter's "Self- 
Perception Profile for Children" (Harter, 1982). Each item was read aloud by the 
eqerimenter whüe the subjects read dently, then they recorded th& m e r s .  The subjects 
then completed the Otis-Lennon School AbJisr Test (OLSAT; Otis & Lennon, 1979), 
followed by the two sociometric ratmg scales. 
Academic Com~etence 
The academic competence tasks were scored by the author. An raw scores were 
converted to percentage scores. For all tasks, higher scores mdicated greatersuccess. Thus, 
scores on the OLSAT were the percentage of items answered correctly (Le., # items correct 1 
80 x 100). For the academic teacher and seifreport rating scales, subjects received a score 
out of four for each item, and scores were summed over the three items for a total raw score 
on each rating scale. Raw scores were then converted to percentages (Le., total score 1 12 x 
LOO). 
Social Cornpetence 
The social competence tasks were scored by the author. Again, higher scores 
mdicated greater success. For the social teacher and selfreport rating scales, subjects 
received a score out of four for each item, and scores were summed over the three items for a 
total raw score on each ratmg scale. Raw scores were then converted to percentages (ie., 
total score 1 12 x 100). 
For the sociometric rating scdes, ratings fkom same-sex and opposite-sex subjects for 
a given subject were summed and an average same-sex score and an average opposite-sex 
score was obtained for each subject. Given the cautions by Asher & Hymel(1981) about 
oppogte-sex bias and same-sex preferences possily affecting sociometric rating scde data, 
preliminary analyses were undertaken to determine whether such differences, if found, 
warranted the use of same-sex ratings only in subsequent data analyses of the sociometric 
data. Analyses using t-tests examinhg the differaces between same-sex and opposite-sex 
ratmgs for the  HO sociometric rathg scales mdicated significant ditferences (Gr. 6 - t(df 53) = 
8.70; pC.00 1: Gr. 8 - t(df63)= 7.06;p<.OO 1) for both grade 6 and grade 8 subjects. These 
results suggea that there was opposite-sex bias in the sociometric ratings, such that males and 
fernales rated their oppoçite sex peers lower on the sociometric scales. Same-sex ratings were 
therefore used m subsequent analyses. 
The sociometric ratings were summed across samesex peers for each subject and 
average scores (out of iïve) were computed for each rathg sale (ie., general competence in 
social interactions, and preferred peer groap). For example, for female subjea 'il rated on the 
first rathg sale, fil), her score was computed as: 
qi,l) = [@i,lp ...+ fli-l,l)tr(i+l,l)+ ...flq l)]/(n-1), 
(n = number of females) 
That is, the ratings by ail of the females for subject 'il were summed and dMded by the total 
number of fernales, exchding subject 'it. 
An average rathg combinhg both sociometric rating scales was also computed for 
each subject. In the example above for fernale 'i' this would mean: 
6 ( i  la) = CG 1) + a211/2 
That is, the average ratmg nom each of the separate ratmg scales w a s  summed and dMded by 
two. As with the other social competence tasks, higher scores mdicated higher ratings of 
social competence by peers. 
Preiiminarv Analvses of Academic and Social Corn~etence 
des cri^ tive Statistics 
Anaiyses of means, standard deviations, skew, and kurtosis (see Appendix F), and 
visual mspection of stem and leaf plots suggested that the disai7utions of the scores nom the 
academic and social competence tasks approximted a normal distribution. These results 
were observed for both the Grade 6 and Grade 8 data. There was some tendency for the 
scores to be siightiy skewed to the left, mdicatïng that subjects obtahed scores or were rated 
toward the upper end of the scales (ie., more successfiü) on the academic and social 
competence tasks. 
Grade and Sex Differences 
There were no differences in the academic or social competence scores as  a fùnction 
of grade or sex, as d e t e d e d  by t-tests of the differences between the means (see Appendix 
G). The QI@ exception occurred on the achievement test. As expected, the Grade 8 subjects 
performed siificantly better than the Grade 6 subjects (t(df 1 17) = 6.48; pC.00 1). 
Sociometric 
Subjects rated each of their peers on two diffèrent criteria, demiing their perceptions 
of each peers' generai interpersonal cornpetence, and th& prefmed peer group. Each 
criterion was thought to reflect somewhat mi r en t  aspects of peer perceptions of social 
competence and therefore had the potentid to provide more information about social 
competence than either scde aione. Pearson product-moment co~~elations mdicated that 
scores on the two sociometrics were highly related (r = .90, pC.00 1, Grade 6; r = -84, pc.00 1, 
Grade 8). Also, hctor analyses of the competence tasks (discussed below) demonstrated hi& 
loadings of both d e r i a  on a Social Competence factor. Thus, givai the high degree of 
s h i k i t y  between the two scales, the combmed data fkom both criteria (ie., scores fiom each 
scale sunmied and divided by two) were used in subsequent anaiyses. 
Inter-relationshins Amone Academic and Social Competence Tasks 
Correlational Analyses 
Pearson product-moment correlations ushg scores fkom the Grade 6 and Grade 8 
groups indicated signincant relationships arnong the academic competence scores and among 
the social competence scores (see Table 2). Very few correlations between the scores for the 
academic and sonal tasks reached significance. The few that did reach significance 
demonstrated weak relationships only (Le., conelations of .2 - .4), with no notable pattern 
withm or across grades. The patteni of intercorrelations was similar when 
male and female data were considered separately (see Appendix H). 
Eactor Analvses 
Principal Component factor analyses ushg a varimax rotation were conducted on the 
intercorrelations between the academic and social competence scores to detemine the degree 
to which these variables were measuring mnüar constmas. The mtercorrelations of the 
TABLE 2 
Pearson Product-Moment Correlations Between Academic and Social Competeoce Tasks: 
Grade 6 (above ) and Grade 8 (below) , Study One 
AC ADEMIC ACADEMIC SOCIAL 
ACHIEVEhENT TEACHER RATINGS SELF REPORT SOClOMETRlC TEACHER RATINGS 
ACHIEVEMENT 
ACADEMIC .47*** 
TEACKER RATMGS ,50"' 
ACADEMlC .43" 
SELF REPORT .3i" 
SOC[AL -.O0 
TEACHER RATlNG - . l S  
SOClAL -.15 
SELF REPORT -. 10 
scores on these variables with the academic, social and overall scores on the Knowledge Test 
(see below) were also mcluded. nie Knowledge Test variables were included in order to 
detemine wfiether they demonstrated differential relationships wah the other competence 
ta&. The factor loadings for the Grade 6 and Grade 8 groups are presented m Table 3. 
Three factors were identified that accounted for a total of 75% (Grade 6 )  and 70% 
(Grade 8) of the explained variance. The variables having the highest rotated fàctor loadhgs 
on each fàctor suggested the following descriptive labels: 
Factor 1: General Knowledge. The Knowledge Test variables al1 loaded highly on this 
fàctor. This was expected Snce the academic and social items on this sale are a subset of the 
total test items (see below). Wi the Grade 8  FOU^, the achievement test and teacher ratings 
of academic competence moderately loaded on the factor. With the Grade 6 group, ody the 
achievement test had moderate loadings. For the Grade 6 and Grade 8 subjects, this fàctor 
accounted for 25% and 29% of the explained variance, respectively. 
Factor II: Social Compet ence. The sociometrîc ratings, and teacher and self-report 
rating of social competence ail loaded highly on this hictor. For the Grade 6 and Grade 
8 groups, this fàctor accounted for 29% and 25% of the eqlained variance, respectively. 
Factor Ill Academic Competence. The achievement test, and teacher and seKreport 
ratings of academic competence loaded highly on this fàctor. For the Grade 6 and Grade 8 
groups this fàctor accounted for 2 1% and 15% of the eqlained variance, respectively. 
Thus, correlational and fâctor anaiyses suggest that the academic tasks assess an 
academic competence construct, and the social tasks assess a social competence constnict. 
Also, the academic and social competence tasks are separable fiom each other. Fmally, the 
Knowledge Test was distinct fiom academic and social competence but did show some 
moderate associations with academic competence. 

The Analogical Reasoning Task 
From the pilot sîudy, several modifications were considered to be necessary before 
employing the Sorting task in Shidy One. These mchded ensuhg that the readmg level of 
the materials was not too diffïcult for the grade levei, mcreasing the number of academic and 
social themes such that the Sorting task was no longer a one-item test, providing two 
opportunities to categorize the themes, and controlling childrents variations m content 
knowledge of the themes. 
Ma teriais 
Subjects were presented with a total of eight difEerent themes. Each theme contihed 
nine scenarios, or nine brief, three-sentence paragraphs. Each scenarîo was presented on a 
separate car& and subjects were asked to sort the nine cards into three piles. The content of 
each theme or set of scenarios was created to allow categorization into three equal piles m 
terms of simüar underlying principles (UP), and three different (again equal) piles io tenas of 
similar surface features (SF). UP refer to abstract concepts that axe mferred by the content of 
the scenarîos. The ab* to correctiy categorize cards containing the same UP is taken bere 
to be a measure of analogical reasoniug ddl SF refer to concrete details that are explici@ 
stated m the scenarios. 
ûfthe eight themes, four contained academic content (ie., "Biological Rinciples", 
"Environmental Waste Control", "Aritfimetic Word Problems", and 'Water Rmciples"), and 
four descnbed social situations (i e., "Potential Peer Connict", "Social S W J ,  "Rejection 
Situations", and "Unsuccessful Personal& Types"). In the academic themes, the "Biological 
Rmciples" theme was adapted from Brown and Kane's (1988) 'biological themes', *ch 
these mvestigators used to demonstrate the use of analogical reasonhg by yomg children. 
Seven of the animals used by Brown and Kane were used to write scenarios demimg UP of 
visual mimicry, camouflage and natural pest control Two additional aaimals (the seahorse 
and the charneleon) were mchided by the author to create a balance of three scenarios for each 
UP (totaling nine scenarios). The remaining three academic themes were created by the 
author. From in fond  discussions with teachers, topics were selected that allowed a 
samphg of various subject areas thst children would be expected to h o w  by grade fwe. The 
academic themes therefore reflected content leamed m social shidies (Environmentai Waste 
Control - waste management principles of recycling, compostin& and IandfilI waste), 
mathematics (ARthmetic Word Problems - problems of addition, subtraction, and 
muhiplication), and science (Water Principles - concepts of smking, floating, and displacement 
of water). 
In the social themes, the "Potential Peer Conflict" and "Rejection Situations" themes 
were derived nom situations of potential peer confüct and mtentionality in rejection situations, 
respective&, created by Bream (1989) in her study of childreds social problem s o h g  skills. 
Several of Bream's passages were selected and modified by reducing the passages to three 
sentences and rewordhg whai necessary. Thus, for the "Potential Peer Connict" theme, 
passages describmg potentially aggressive, embarrassing, and rejecting situations were 
modified For the "Rejection Situations", passages descri'bmg accidental (Le., it was an 
accident that he was rejected), intentional - juçtified (ie., he was rejected because he was 
mean), and mtentiond - not justified (ie., he was rejected unjustly) rejection situations were 
rnodified The remaihg themes of "Social Slolls" and "Unsuccessfid Personaiïty Types" were 
created by the author to reflect general themes descnbed in the literature on chüdrenfs social 
coqetence. That is, the UP m the " S o d  Ski&" theme of participation, cooperation and 
communication are key concepts taught in many social sküls training programs (e.g., 
Weissberg, et. aL, 198 1). Similariy, the UP m the "Unsuccessful Personality Types" theme of 
aggressive, wittidrawn and selfish childrén, are behaviors that concern many researchers that 
study aggression and rejection m children (e.g., Dodge, 1985). 
Halfof the academic and halfof the social themes presented unresohred problem 
situations ('probIematicl), while the remahhg themes were descriptive m nature 
('descriptive'). This comparison was mcluded to mvestigate whether problem situations (as 
opposed to descriptive passages) promote more active problem sotvmg. The underiying 
principles and surface features for the eight themes are presented in Table 4. The eight themes 
are presented m th& entirety m Appendix C. 
Each scenario was written such that one sentence contahed an underlying principle, 
one sentence contained a surface feanire, and one sentence was a 'fillei or neutral statement. 
M e r  the scenarios were Wriffen, sentences were scrambled such that the order of presentation 
of the UP, SF and fïller sentences was baianced across the nine scenarios. Table 5 shows the 
scenarios for one theme, "Environmental Waste Contrai", and the breakdown of UP, SF and 
mer sentences for each scenario. 
The scenarios were written at a grade 415 level of readability, as measured by The Fry 
Readability Graph (in Cheek & Cheek, 1980). This ensured that the majority of children m 
the sample would be able to read the passages wah ease. Given normal variabüity of 
performance within a grade, the passages may pose some challenge for a smd  group of 
subjects in grade 6, but this was not expected for the grade 8 subjects. Any data Born children 
who, in their teachefs opinion would have difiïculty wah the reading level of the task, were 
excluded fkom the analyses. The data fiom 3 subjects were so excluded. 
Table 6 presents the "Biological Rmciples" theme and an example of how it was 
sorted by one subject mto underlying principles and h c e  features. As for every theme, 
this subject was givm a packet of 9 cards, labeled as cards 'A' to 'P, and this subject sorted 
the cards mto three piles, as shown. Here, cards D,G,I were mcluded in one pile, cards qE,H 
m another, and cards ByC,F m the third pile. The subjects written comments are presented 
below the piles in quotations. Below this, is the underlying principle or surface feature 
designation. The ka pile contained the SF of what the animal feeds on, the second and third 
piles contained UP of visuai mimicry and camoufiage, respectiveiy. As indicated, card H (UP 
- naturd pest control) was erroneoudy included in the second pile. 
TABlLE 4 
Summary of the Underlying Rinciples and Surface Features In the Eight Themes: 








natural pest control 
floatation 
siaking 
































form a group 
weekend 
TABLE 5 
Envionmental Waste Control Scenarios and the Corresponding Underlying Rinciples 
(UP) aad Surface Features (SF) 
Card A: 
(mer) Tin cans keep foods that go bad quickly, tasting good. 
( UP-reqchg) Th cans are made of meta and after they have served their 
purpose, they can be melted d o m  for more cans. 












Disposable diapers are very common to use because they can be 
tllro\w out. 
People are starhg to use cloth diapers more so we do not 6.U 
garbage dumps with disposable diapers. 
Babies go through many diapers each day. 
G l a s  bottles are good to hoid and store liquids. 
People have been using glass bottles for a long the .  
When a glas bonle is empty it cm ofken be sent back to the 
compmy and re-fille& 
People do not like the çmell of manme, but still use it on their 
lams. 
Usbg rnanure is a common way to help plants grow. 
Manwe cornes corn animal droppings and is helpflll in ail h d s  
of gardens, fkom a snaU patch of gras to a large field. 
Once a newspaper is not of any use, it cm be &ed with water, 
clrie4 and made into newsprint. 
Lots of Gds have a job delivering papers. 
nie news heIps to keep people in touch with the world around 
them. 






Some scientists have the job of shidying strong chemicals. 
Many are part of our da* needs, Uie the chernicd that keeps a 
fiidge cold. 
Some are so harmful, that once we are done with tlmq we can 
not get rid of th- 
In good weather, a lawn must be cut once a week 
Leaving the cut gras where it falls on the lawn is good for the 
gras% and it d e s  g r a s  cutting an casier job, too. 
Lots of kids have a job nitting g r a s  and get paid for each 
lawn cut. 
Fruit that is left on the ground di rot, and is healthy for 
the mil. 
F d s  are a very common part of a good diet. 
You should not make a mess: but Ït's okay to throw pieces of 
fhit (like apple cores) on the ground. 
When plastic containers are tbx-own out they will aay in one 
place and wüi not rot for years and years. 
They can hold and you can store most thmgs in them 
The containers are cheap to rnake. and have many uses. 
TABLE 6 
Example of one Subjects' Categorization of the "Biological P ~ c i p l e s "  Theme and use 
of Underlying Principles @Ji?) and Surface Features (SF) 
Pile #1 
The AupIe Martin feeds on 
mosquitos. In the p h  where 
they live, rnosquitos are much 
l e s  d a  M e r  to people. It is a 
kind of bird 
The Manatee eats the weeds that 
Pile X2 
If a dangerous animal is near, the 
Capficorn Beetle opens it's wings 
tolookLikeawsp. Itisatypeof 
iasect, It has 2 SM outer wings 
and 2 wings hidden undemeath. 
The Hawlaaoth Caterpillar is a Iong 
Pile #3 
The Seahorse's head looks Lice a 
horse. It can hide fkom danger 
because it can mtach ai l  back- 
ground colors. It has a long snout 
on it- 
Gray in summer and white in the 
cIog the river and hinder pleasure worm-üke larva. It is seen most winter, the Arctic Fox blends into 
boating It is a large m e r  &en in South Amena. It tum over it's surroundings. It is fiom the 
mammal. It is seen most d e n  in to show marks on its underside that dog family. It is most &en seen 
Flonda's m e r  wrcys. look Iike a poisonous snake. up north in the Arctic. 
The Crested Rat feeds on almost The Laâybug is part of the beetie The Charneleon is a type of Iizard 
anythmg that can be eaten. It M y .  Its sheli bas bright colors It feeds on irisencts. It is able to 
parts it's hair to show skunk-Iike on it. It kiiîs little white bugs change color, so thaî it is very bard 
markings to protect itsel£ It is in called aphids that grow on and can to see in the shadows of the forest. 
the rodent fàmüy. ruin hops and orange crops. 
Subjects' written comments: 
' m a t  these anmials eat." 'Wow the animals protect "How the animal blends mto 
themselves fiom the eneq." the ~~~"l~oundings." 
Designatioa (UP or SF): 
SF - what it feeds on UP - visual mimicry UP - camouflage 
(card "IF' was mcorrectly 
placed m this pile 
Instructions 
During the second and third sessions, the experimental materials were presented Four 
themes were completed m each session, for a total of eight themes over the two sessions. The 
task was explained as follows, with demonstrations where appropriate: 
"Today, 1 would like to look at how kids in grade 6/8 think about mformation. You will be 
&en a small packet with 9 cards m each. Each card will contain three sentences. 1 want you 
to read dl of the cards then sort them into 3 piles accordmg to which ones seem to go 
together the best. There is no right or wrong answer, 1 pst want you to thmk about how the 
themes m the cards are simikir, remembering that I want 3 piles There may or may not be an 
equal number of cards m each pile. Do wtiatever makes sense to you When youlve done 
that, take the answer sheet 1 have &en you, and record the letters of the cards m each pile on 
the sheet and write a few words or a sentence or two descriimg why you put these cards 
together m this manner. Next, 1 want you to shuflle the cards together so that they are once 
again m a mixed up order, and sort them a second time in a Werent manner. As you did 
before, record each pile and your reasons for sorting them Remember, there are no right or 
wrong answers &ce there are many different ways to sort the cards. Ijua want to know 
what similarities you see when &en these cards. Let me review the procedure once more ....If 
there are any questions, just a&. When you have fmished both soaç, put up your hand and 1 
will give you another set of cards." 
The subjects quickly understood the ta& once they started workmg with the cards. Each 
abject received a random ordering of the eight themes, altemating academic and social 
themes. M e r  complethg the two sorts for a theme, the experimenter checked to ensure that 
ail nine cards were listed and comments were provided on the response sheet. At times, the 
subjects were unable to make comments, even with encouragement to do so. 
Subjects sorted each theme twice, in order to provide hvo oppominities to 
demonstrate sen- to both UP and SF. This manipulation difEered fiom the single sort 
presented in the pilot study, and was added due to concems that subjects may be aware of 
both types of information (UP and SF) but siqly choose one over the other. GNen that each 
theme contaioed a variety of possible UP and SF, it may be the case that two sorts are not 
enough. However, comments fiom subjects and analyses of protocols indicated that it was 
veiy difficult (and for some, at times impossible) to sort the materials a second time. Thus, it 
appeared that additional sorting oppominities were not warranted. 
Scoring 
Subjects' responses on the problem s o h g  thernes were scored accordmg to th& use 
of UP and SF. &en the-varyiug content of the scenarios withgi the themes, t was clear that 
the passages couid be soaed in a variety of different ways, and not siqb accordhg to the 
orighally designated UP and SF. Other UP or SF identiiïed by a subject that Mered fiom the 
UP and SF originaIly built mto the themes also needed to receive credit. Consequently, it was 
necessary to incorporate the various possible combhations of UP and SF mto the scoring 
system Reüminary analyses of responses f?om a pilot group of Grade 6 and 8 subjects and 
an adult sample, as weII as dose scrutiny of the themes, renilted in a scoring key containing a 
M y  exhaustive list of possibe combmations of UP and SF (see Appendix D). 
In scoring subjects' categorization of UP, both Categorical and Quantitative scoring 
systems were employed. "Categoricai" scores hdicated whether subjects were sensitive to 
Merent categories of UP or SF. For each theme, each UP or each SF identified received a 
score of one, resultmg in scores that ranged fiom O to 3 (the total number of piles possiile). 
This scoring system was identical to that used in the Pilot Study (see Appendix A). Scores of 
'omission', where subjects were unable to, or iocorrectly categorized a pile as eaher an UP or 
SF, were also tabulated. "Quantitative" scores included the total number & scenarios 
conectly soxted. That is, each mdivïdual scenario sorted appropriately as an UP or SF 
received a score of one. This resuited in UP and SF scores ranging ftom O to 9 (the total 
number of scenarios) for each theme. By u h g  these two scoring systems, it is possible to 
distinguish a subjects' abiliry to detect general categories of relationships w i t b  a theme 
versus each instance of a speciûc category. For example, a subject may have been aware of 
many instances of a p a r t i a h  category (ie., he/she cornecth/ sorted many scenarios m a pile), 
but was not aware of many different categories (ie., ody one or two piles correctiy reflected 
UP ancilor SF). In this case, quantitative scores wouid be relative& bigh and categoncal 
scores would be relatively low. Conversely, a subject may have been aware of Werent 
categories, but had dBiniity correctiy sortmg the scenarios withm a category. Here, 
categorical scores would be relatively high and quantitative scores would be relatively low. 
To fiirther ilhisîrate the scoring systems, the nine scenarios of the "Environmental Waste 
Control" theme soaed by one subject and the two scoring çystems are shown m Table 7. This 
subject sorted the nine cards and provided the d e n  response for each pile, as shown. The 
categorical scores were obtained by nimmmg each pile that contained an UP, a SF, or an 
omission. Thus, the first pile identifïed an UP, the second pile identified SF, and the thud pile 
was too general and was therefore scored as an omission, resulting m scores of one each for 
UP, SF, and omission. The quantitative scores were obtained by s u h g  the total number of 
scenarios sorted corredy m the UP and SF categones. Thus, the UP score was 3 fiom the 
first pile and the SF score was 3 fiom the second pile. One card was mcorrectly placed m the 
fkst pile, and the third pile was too generai to score. Consequently, this subject could not 
receive credit for these cards. 
Performance on the first and both (first and second combmed) sorts was also 
analyzed. Responses on the first sort allowed an investigation of the salient mformation 
initially obvious to each subject. Responses on both Som allowed an mvedgation of how 
subjects performed &en M e r  consideration of (or two attempts with) the materials. An 
example of the first and both sorts of two subjects used for anaiysis is provided m Appendix 
D. 
Subjects responses were scored for ül? and SF. SF scores were mcluded in order to 
calculate omission scores with the Categorical scoring system The goal of the present study 
was to an- subjects sensitMty to UP, taken here to be a measure of andogical reasonhg. 
TABLE 7 
Example of the Categorical and Quantitative Scoring Systems (icluding Omission 
Scores) for one Subjects9 Sorting of the YEnvironmental Waste Controln Theme 
Disposable diapers are very wmmm Tb caas keep food tht go bad quickly, 
to use b u s e  they can be thrown tasihg good. Tm cans are made of metai, 
out. People are siadhg to use cloth and after they have served their purpose, 
kbpers more so we do not fil1 they can be meited down for more caos. 
prbage dumps with disposable 'ihey are a great way to hold and store 
diapers. Babies go through maay food for a long tima 
diripers each day. 
B A 
People do not like the smeii of G l a s  boîîies are good to hold and store 
manure, but still use it on their iawns. iiquids. People have ken using giass 
Usmg manure is a wmmon way to boales for a long time. Whai a 
heip planl grow. Manm cornes bottle is empty, it can o h  be sent back 
h m  animal droppmgs and is heipfid to the company and refiiid 
m aiI kin& of gardeas, h m  a smali 
patch of grass to a large field 
D C 
h good weather, a lawn must be cul When pastic containers are thrown out 
once a week. Leaving the cut grass they will stay in one piece and will not 
whem it falis on the lawn is good for rot for years and years. The can hotd and 
the gras, and it makes gras cuüing you c m  store most t h g s  in thein, The 
an easier job, too. Lots of kids have containers are ch- to make, and bave 
a job cuttm ggrass and get paid for many uses. 
each lawn cut. 
G 1 
Fnut that is left on the ground wiU 
rot, and is healthy for the soii F d t s  
are a very common part of a g d  
diet You should not make a mess, 
but it's okay to throw pieces of 6uit 
(like apple cores) on the gound. 
H 
"How certain abjects are food Wow certain containers hold 
for the soil, lawns, etc." dinerent abjects." 
Score: (Underlying Principles - UP; Surface Features - SF) 
Once a newspaper is not ofasy use, iî 
can be mixed wiîh water, dried, and 
made mto newsprint Lots of kick 
have a job delivering papers. The 
news helps to keep people in touch 
with the world around th- 
Some scientists have the job of study- 
mg stnmg chemicak Many are part 
ofour daily neds, iike the chernical 
that keeps a fiidge col& Some are so 
harmful, that once we are done with 
them, we can not get nd of them. 
"How each one is a big part 
of our lives." 
Categorical Uf 1 O O 
SM- SF O 1 O 
Omission O O 1 
Quantitative 3 O 0 





Preliminary analyses of the SF data did not mdicate any significant relationship between 
analogical r e a h g  and competence. That is, subjects' ab- to identify sudce  features in 
the themes was not foimd to be related to competence (either academic or social). Thus SF 
data were n a  mchided in subsequent data analyses. The UP scores win be refmed to here as 
analogical reasoning scores (AR). 
Categorical and quantitative scores on the fist and both sorts were obtained for each 
mdividual theme. Scores were then summed across the mdividual themes to obtain separate 
scores for the descriptive and problematic themes (two themes each), academic and social 
themes (four themes each), and total themes (ail eight themes). These groupmgs of themes 
are shown in Figure 1. 
The reliabiiay of the eight themes was assessed using the split halfmethod. The eight 
themes were divided in two hakes, each containmg two academic and two social themes. 
Scores fiom the two hahes were correlated and the Speamian Brown formula (Ferguson, 
1976) resulted io reliability estimates of -58 and -52 ushg scores fiom both sorts for the grade 
6 and grade 8 data, respectively. 
The Knowledge Test 
Materials 
A multiple choice test format was used in the Knowledge Test, wah each Rem 
measuring knowledge of a sÏngle UnderMg Rinciple (UP). Thus, for the eight analogical 
reasorhg themes, each containing three different UP, 24 test items were created. Twehre test 
items contained academic content and twehe items contained social content. Each item was 
scored as either correct or mcorrect. The 'Xnowledge Test" is presented m Appendk E. An 
example of a question fiom the 73iological Rmciples" theme assessing knowledge of the UP 
of 'visual mir;iicry9 follows: 
F'rGURE 1 
Grouphgs of the Themes for Anaiysis: 
Inchidhg ail 8 Themes Combined (TOTAL), the 4 Academic (ACADEMIC) and Social 
(SOCIAL) Themes Combined, the Descriptive (DESCR) and Roblematic (PR0B)Themes 
Combined (4 groups of 2 themes), and the 8 Individual Themes (TH, 
ACADEMlC (4) SOCIAL (4) 
DESCR (2) PROB (2)  DESCR (3) PROB (2) 
Some animais cm make themsefves look like a more dangerous anmial d e n  they are 
about to be attaçked. They do this to: 
a) hide fiom the attacker 
* b) try and scare away an attacker 
c) be seen easier so other animals will corne and save them 
d) wam other animais to go and hide 
As can be seen fiom this example, the Knowledge test is not siniply a test of f'actual 
knowledge. An understandmg of underlying principles requires reasonhg about the 
principles. Thus, the types of questions posed m the Knowledge test require knowledge of 
facts reasoning to demonstrate an understandmg of the underiyhg prhciples in the 
themes. 
Instructions 
Near the end of the third session, after each subject had x ~ e d  alI eight themes, he/she 
was asked to complete the Knowledge Test by circbg the best answer to each question. 
Scoring 
The Knowledge Test was scored by the author. Subjects received scores for the 
number correct for the total test (#correct/24), academic items on@ (#co~ect/l2), and social 
items only (#conect/l2). AU raw scores were converted to percentage scores. 
Preliminarv Analyses 
Descri~tive S t .  tis tics 
The inclusion of the Knowledge test was originally expected to be a mere formahty to 
ensure that analogicai reasoning s k .  and n s  Merences in abjects' knowledge of underlying 
principles can account for the observed relationships with coqetence. C e h g  scores were 
anticipated since the content of the themes and consequently the questions on the Knowledge 
Test were thought to be highly fhdk m a t d  to ail subjects. Ifonly a d percentage of 
subjects did not receive perfect scores on the test, the ongmal plan was to omit the data fiom 
these subjects m subsequent anaiyses. However, ceiling scores were not obtained for the 
majority ofsubjects, ahhough the scores of the Grade 6 and 8 subjects on the Knowledge Test 
were quite high. Scores ranged £kom 58 to 100 and 62 to 100 percent correct for the Grade 6 
and Grade 8 groups, respective@. Appendiv F summaxks the means and standard deviations, 
and shows the considerable skew (to the lefi) of the scores. Stem and leafplots connimed 
that the scores approached, but did not reach c&g. The mors subjects made were evenly 
scattered across themes, with no specinc content items posing particular difFiculty. Thus, as 
the majority of subjects did not receive perfect scores on the Knowledge Test, it is possible 
that differences in knowledge of the imderiying principles in the themes may influence the 
results. Consequentiy, it was necessary to control for knowledge diffaences by partialling out 
of the analogical reasonhg scores that part of the variance that is attn'buted to knowledge 
(this statistical procedure is eqlained m the c%coring" section which iç subsumed under the 
headîng "Analogical Reasoning Tasks"'). 
Grade and Sex Differences 
t-tests of the Merences between means for grade and sex (see Appendix G) did not 
idenafy any diffaences as a fimction of sex, but did show Sgnificant differences m 
performance between the two grades. The Grade 8 group was relatively more successful on 
the total and social items (pC.05) of the Knowledge Test. 
Inter-relationshi~s Between Comtletence Tasks and the Knowiedee Test 
Correlational Analvses. 
Pearson product-moment correlations were calnilated between scores on the 
Knowledge Test and the academic and social competence tasks Scores on the Knowledge 
Test were found to be significantly correhted with pdormance on the academic but not 
social competence tasks (see Table 8). A similar pattern of results was observed for both 
TABLE 8 
Pearson Product-Moment Correlations Between the Knowledge Test 
and Competence Tasks - Grade 6 and Grade 8, Study One 
KNOWLEDGE TEST: total 
Gr. 6 Gr. 8 
KNOWLEDGE TEST: academic KNOWLEDGE TEST: social 












male and female data (see Appendix H). Once ag* these resuhs demonstrate the 
separab*ty of the academic and social competence tasks. 
Factor Analyses. 
Priacipal components factor anaiyses ushg a varimax rotation arnong the competence 
tasks and KnowIedge Test (desmied earlier) also hdicated that the Knowledge Test was 
distinct fiom the competence tasks (see Table 3). That is, the Knowledge Test variables 
(total, academic, and social items) loaded hi&$ on a ûeneral Knowledge fbctor, and only 
demonstnted modemte loadhgs with academic coqetence. In considering the academic and 
social items of the Knowledge Test, the academic items did not show différentid loadings on 
the Academic Competence fàctor, and the social items did not show diffierential loadings on 
the Social Competence fàctor. Thus, the content of the themes did not show distinctive 
relationships wah academic and social competence. 
Controlling for Knowledge Differences 
In order to control for Werences m lmowledge of the underlying principles m the 
themes, it is necessary to compte a set of derived scores (ARr) m which the variance m the 
scores amibuted to content knowledge has been partialled out of the analogical reasoning 
(AR) scores. Thus, for each subject on each theme, the variance m the AR scores can be 
considered to have two components: one that is predicted fiom the hear regression of AR 
on knowledge (A-), and the other that is not prediaed h m  the linear regression of AR on 
knowledge (ARr), ie., the residual component. In computationd terms: 
AR =ARp + ARr (1) 
This equation was sohred in the following m e r .  First, standardized (2) scores were 
calculatecl for scores on the lmowledge test (KN) and analogical reasoning scores for each 
mdnidual theme, resuhmg in Z o  and Z(AR), respective&. The predicted analogical 
reasonbg scores (ARp) were then computed fiom the product of the standardized knowledge 
test scores (Z(KN)) and the correlation between the analogicd reasoning and knowledge test 
scores (r(Al2,KN)). That is, 
ARI, = z w  x w u w  
By substituting ARp mto eqyation (l), it was possile to sohe for AR,. Thus, the remkant 
residual analogical reasonhg score (ARr) partials out of analogical reasoning (AR) that part 
of the variance that is attn'butable to content howledge. 
Reliminary Analyses of the Problem Solving Task 
The problem s o b g  data were analyzed by examinmg the djfliculty level of the 
themes, grade and sex differences and the Werences among the themes (ie., individual, 
descriptive and problematic, academic and social themes). The analyses were perfonned ushg 
the different scorhg variations (ie., fiill and reduced data sets, k t  and both soas  categorical 
and quantitative scoring, and original and residual data). The various manipulations of the 
data were examined to determine whether they were informative and therefore worth pursuing 
in subsequent analyses. 
Difficultv Level of the Themes 
Anaiyses of performance comparing mean scores on the mdividual themes hdicated 
that the themes differed in ~Wculty (see Figure 2). Most notabhl, the mean analogical 
reasoniug scores (mean AR) for themes 4 and 5 (Le., 'Water Principlesyy and "Social S W ' )  
were less than scores on the rem-g themes for both grade levels. t-tests of the differences 
between the means of the mdkiduai themes supports this observation, as significant 
dineremes were evident between either theme 4 or 5 and all other themes (see Appendix G). 
Consequently, in order to determine whether the data were distorted in some way by these 
more diflicult themes, in subsequent analyses the data were analyzed ushg the full set of eight 
themes, and a reduced set of six themes that exciuded themes 4 and 5. Since the 
di£ficuIt themes hchided one academic and one social theme, the total d e r  of academic 
and social themes remained equal in both the fiül and reduced data sets. 
THEME 1 
FIGURE 2 
Means of Individual Themes - Grade 6 and Grade 8 
THEME 2 THEME 3 THEME 4 THEME 5 THEME 6 THEME 7 THEME 8 
Scorin~ Variations 
Pearson product-moment conelations were conducted to an+ the Werent scoring 
manipulations, correlating scores 6om the; 
- Fust and Both Sorts 
-Quantitative and Categorical scoring systems, and 
- F a  and Reduced set of themes. 
These correlational &ses were canied out for both grade levek with the data fiom all 
themes combined and for the academic and social themes separate@ The resuits mdicated 
that, whether these correlations were calculated using scores Born the 
Quantitative/Categoncal scoring systems, F0ust/i3oth sorts, or FulYReduced data, all 
correlations were signiscant (ail r's >.95, p<.001). Moreover, employhg any of these pairs of 
scores in subsequent analyses yielded the çame pattern of results, regardless of which scores 
were used. Therefore, to srnipl* the reporthg of results, only the analogical reasoning 
scores fiom 
-Both sorts 
-the Quantitative scoring system, and 
-the F d  set of themes 
are reported m what follows. These variables were chosen because they inchded the most 
data. 
Descriptive S tatistics 
In general, the standard deviations of the analogical reasonhg scores (AR) for the 
infidual themes were large (see Appendix F). Stem and leaf plots demonstrated a chutering 
of scores in the lower range of values (ie., few underlying principles identified), with 
relatively few subjects with higher scores. Distributions were typicaUy skewed to the right, 
particulariy for the Grade 6 subjects. 
When an individual subjects' scores were summed over the academic, social and 
overd themes, the standard deviations of these composite scores were relativehl srnaller than 
for mdnridual themes (see Appendix F). Composite scores were distributed across a broader 
range of values. Stem and Ieafplots showed a cluster of scores m the lower range 
(demonstrating how the majority of subjects identified ody a few under1ying principles), and a 
cluster of scores m the upper range, (demonstrating how a mino* of subjects were able to 
ident@ most of the underiying principles). Thus, these patterns of scores more closely 
resembled a bimodal distri'bution. 
Grade Differences 
The data were examined using t-tests of the difEerences between the Grade 6 and 
Grade 8 means for each problem s o m g  theme (see Appendix G). Significant differences 
fàvorgig the grade 8 subjects were found for the themes of 'Znvironmental Waste Control" 
@<.05), "Social S W '  @<.05) and "Potential Peer Confiict @<.001), and for the academic, 
sociai, and total theme groupmgs @<.O 1). ui general, identification of underlying principles 
(Le., analogical reasoning) appeared to miprove across the grades. 
Sex Differences 
Examination of t-tests of the differences between the means of boys and girls on each 
analogical reasoning theme did not idente any differences as a hinction of sex (see 
Appendix G). The only exception to thiç occurred on the 'U~nccessful Personality Types" 
theme for the Grade 8 group, m which girls obtained higher analogical reasoning scores (AR) 
tha. boys (pC.05). One possible reason for this difference cornes fiom observations of the 
correspondmg item on the Knowledge Test, in which the boys appeared to identify physically 
aggressive boys as problematic less often than the girls. Ahernatively, this sex merence may 
not be statisticdy valid given the high degree of variance among the scores on the individual 
themes (see Appendix F). 
Descriptive and Problematic Themes 
Orighally, the mat erials were creat ed/adapted to allow cornparisons between 
descriptive and problematic themes. Of mterest, was whether subjects differed in their 
identifkation of underiymg principles when presented with the potentiany more 'passive' 
actMty of reading short descriptive passages, versus the potentialh/ more 'active' problem 
sohring ta& of reading unresohced problem situations. However, it was not possible to make 
comparisons on this descriptive/prob1ematic dimension because the two most diflicult themes 
(ie., theme 4 - problematicfacademic, and theme 5 - descriptive/social), discussed earlier, 
created an imbalance in comparing the four groups. As a reçuh, it was not possible to 
determine wfiether differences in subjects' performance on these themes were due to the 
descriptive/prob1ematic manipulation or the i m b h c e  imposed by the diftïctdt themes. 
Therefore, it was felt that the descriptive/problematic disîinction was not a usefùl cornparison, 
and could not be utiüzed as a variable in subsequent anaiyses. 
Individual Themes 
In order to determine wtiether performances on the mdividual themes were related, 
pdcularly withm the academic and social groupmgs, Pearson product- moment correlations 
were calculated ushg the scores on the EdiMdual themes. For the majority of correlations 
low, non-sipihant correlations were foimd among the mdividual themes for both grade 
levels (see Table 9). While some correlations were fomd to be signincant, there was no 
discemible pattern among these conelations. More specifically, correlations were not hi&er 
among the academic themes or among the social themes. Thus, there was no indication that 
performance on the themes was differentiany related based on academic or social content. 
To W e r  explore the relationçbips m performance among the individuai themes, 
Principal Components factor analyses ushg a varimax rotation and eigenvahe set at one, were 
conducted on the correlations among the themes at each grade level (see Appendk I). For 
both the Grade 6 and Grade 8 data, the resuhant factor loadings did not rweal any notable 
dustering of themes, but rather yielded eight separate factors, one for each theme. When a 
two-fàctor sohtion was forced, the loadmgs were not Werenthted based on the 
academic/social distinction, but rather, were based on the di£Eculty level of the themes, 
partidarIy for the Grade 6 subjects. That is, the more diflicult themes (four and f i e )  had 

higher loadmgs on one fiictor, while the remainhg themes had higher loadings on the other 
fàctor. 
Academic and Social Themes 
Pearson product-moment comelations between AR scores based on groups of themes 
(with scores summed across the individual themes) indicateà signiscant cotfelations between 
AR scores based on academic and social theme groupings (r 545, p<.001, Grade 6; r =.46, 
pc.00 1, Grade 8). Although signi.ficant, these correlations mdicate that the shared variance 
is ody 20 - 25%. Also, fàctor analyses of the mdividual themes (descnbed above) did not 
differentiate academic and social themes. Overall, the results nom these anaiyses do not 
support the calculation of separable scores based on the academic and social themes, and 
suggest that &l themes may conmiute to an overail analogical reasonkg score. Howwer, 
the content of the themes was chosen fkom the literature to capture academic problem sohring 
on the one band and social problem sotving on the other. Therefore, for a oriori reasons, in 
subsequent analyses scores were cdnilated so as to provide separate academic (Ab)  and 
social (ARS), as well as total (ARt) measures of analogical reasoning. 
Cornpetence and Analogical Reasoning 
Investigations mto the relationship between cornpetence and analogical reasoning 
employed Pearson product-moment correlations and causal anaiysis. As noted earlier, given 
the redmdancy among different variables the fiill data set with quantitative scoring for both 
sorts, were used. Also, analyses were conducted on the data with and without statisticaIly 
controlling for Merences in subjects' content knowledge (i e., the 'origmal' and 'residuai' 
data). Fmaily, although statistics did not indicate that separate analyses for academic and 
social themes were warranted, the data were andyzed using scores based on the total, 
academic and social themes for a orion reasons desmibed above. 
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients were calculated mterconelatmg the 
scores fiom the coqetence and analogical reasongig tasks, and these correlations are 
presented in Tables 10.1 and 10.2 for the Grade 6 and 8 groups, respectively. 
Academic Com~etence and Analo~ical Reasoning 
For the Grade 6 subjects, the correlations in Table 10.1 indicate that analogical 
reasoning scores Tt e., academic (Ah);  social (ARS); total (ARt)] were significantiy positiveiy 
correlated with scores on the academic competence tasks (Le., achiwernent ACHT; academic 
teacher ratings, TRC; and academic selfreport, SPC). The ody correlations that did not 
reach significance was the correlation between SPC and ARS. t-tests of the iliffierence 
between correlations mdicated that correlations betweai ARt and ACHT, and between ARa 
and ACHT, were signincantly Iarger than correlations between ARt and SPC, and between 
ARa and SPC (see Appendix J). The correlations that mcluded TRC r~e.,  r(TRC,ARa), 
r(TRC,ARs), r(TRC.ARt)] did not diEer siificantly ftom either the correlations with ACHT 
be., r(ACHï,ARa), r(ACHT,Ah), r(ACH'ï&U)] or SPC Be., l(SPC,ARa), r(SPC,ARs), 
r(SPC,ARt)J Thus for the Grade 6 subjects, analogical reasoning (AR) scores were found 
to be significantly related to performance on the academic competence tasks, and these 
relationships were sipnincantly larger with achievement than academic selfreport. Self 
perception of academic skiIl was on& weakly related to analogical skin. mese 
correlational anaiyses were conducted for male and female data separately, and the same 
pattern of resuhs emerged for both male and female subjects (see Appendix H).] 
For the Grade 8 subjects AR scores were also found to be signScantly positiveiy 
conelated with scores on the achievement test and teacher ratings of academic competence 
(see Table 10.1). Correlations between AR scores and self report of academic compet ence 
were not significant. Correlations between AR (ARt, ARa, and ARS) and ACHT were 
generally larger than correlations between AR (ARt, ARa, and ARS) and TRC. Howwer, 
TABLE 10.1 
Pearson Product-Moment Correlations Behveen Analogical Remonhg and 
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t-tests of the ciiffierences between correiations mdicated that the correiations of the AR scores 
with ACHI' were not Sgnificantly larger than th& comelations with TRC (see Appaidix J). 
Both the correlations of AR with ACHT and correlations of AR with TRC were Sgnificanth, 
larger than the correlations of AR with SPC. Thus? for the Grade 8 subjects, analogical 
reasonhg scores were significan* reiated to performance on both achievement and tacher 
ratings of academic coqetence but n d  to subjects' perception of their own academic 
competence. Once again, despite expectations to the contrary, criildren's selfperceptions of 
academic sloll were not related to analogical reasoning siaa [As with the Grade 6 group, the 
same overaii pattern of re&s was obtained when the data were adyzed separately for males 
and females (see Appendix H).] 
Controhg; AR for Knowledge 
For the Grade 6 subjects, aller controbg for subjects' howledge of the underiying 
principles in the themes, analogical reasonhg scores (mchiding ARa, ARS, and ARt) were 
again significantly positively comelated with the academic competence tasks (see Table 10.2) 
As with the original scores, correlations with AR were largest with ACHT and sigdicantly 
d e r  (using t-tests of the clifference between correlations; see Appendix J) with SPC 
Examination of t-tests of the Merences between correlations mdicated that correlations of 
AR wab TRC Wered Sgnificantiy Born comelations of AR with SPC but not AR with ACHT 
(see Appendix J). Howwer, whüe the pattern of r e d s  was similar to the previous hdings 
(before controhg AR for knowledge Merences), the size of the correlations decreased after 
controhg AR for knowledge. t-tests of the difference between comelations comparing the 
original and 'knowledge controiled' data mdicated that correlations using the controlled 
scores were sigaincantly lower, particularly for the comelations of AR with ACHT and AR 
with TRC (see Appendix J). Thus, whüe analogicd reasoning continued to demonstrate 
rehtionships with academic competence &er controliing AR for knowledge differaices, these 
relationships decreased in size. [There was no d.Bermce m the pattern of the resuîts when 
the male and female data were anaiyzed separately (see Appendix H).] 
Similariy, for the Grade 8 group, the Sze of the correlations between andogical 
reasoning and academic coqdence after controhg AR for knowledge differences was 
d e r  when compared to the onginai data (see Table 10.2). Exmination of t-tests of the 
merence between correlations of AR with and without controliing for knowledge Herences 
mdicated a significant decrease m the size of correlations, especiaily for the 
achiwement and academic teacher ratïngs (see Appendix J). In contrast to the Grade 6 data, 
the correlations between ARt and AC= and ARa and ACHT, and between ARt and TRC 
and ARS and T E ,  did not reach Sgdicance. The O* exceptions o c m e d  for the 
correlation between ARS and ACHT and the correlation between ARa and TRC. Howwer, 
even these correlations, &ou& Sgnincant, were small. Moreover, the significant 
relation@ between analo@cal reasoning scores and performance on the academic 
cornpetaice ta& essendany disappeared der controhg AR for knowledge ciiffierences m 
the data fiom the Grade 8 group. [The same pattern of resuhs was found when the male and 
f d e  data were analyzed separatehl (see Appendix H).] 
For the Grade 6 group, Table 10.1 shows that no significant correlations were found 
between AR (ARt, ARa, or ARS) and social competence (i e., the sociometxic, SOCIO; 
social teacher ratsigs, TRS; and self report of social competence, SPS). [This was true for 
both male and fernale subjects (see Appendix H).] Thus, no relationship was found between 
subjects' ab* to reason analogicayl m their identification of underlyhg principles m 
themes, and their competence m social situations as assessed by peer, teacher, and selfratings. 
Similarly for the Grade 8 group, no significant correlations were found between scores 
on the analogical reasoning and social competence tasks (see Table 10.1). pattern was 
&O found for both males and females (see Appendix H). The only exception ocairred with 
the girls m the Grade 8 sample. Significant, negative correlations were found between SPC 
and A&, and SPC and ARa. That is, females more sl<ined at identifymg underlyhg principles 
tended to rate themsehres lower m terms of their perception of theû own mterpersonal skiIls.1 
Controlling: AR for knowledge 
The same pattem of resuhs was obtained d e r  controhg for knowledge differences 
m the AR for both the Grade 6 and Grade 8 subjects (see Table 10.2). Again, no Sgnincant 
relationships were foimd between analogical reasonhg and social competence tasks. The oniy 
exception was a negative relationship between analopid reasoning and social seifreport for 
the Grade 8 f i e s .  Again, Grade 8 female students more skilled at analogical reasonbg 
rated themsebes as less competent m social situations. 
Surnmarv 
in sunnnary, correlational analyses mdicate that analogical reasoning skill is related to 
academic competence at both grade lewek. This was parti&& evident with the 
achievement test and teacher ratings of academic competence. Children's self perception of 
their own academic competence showed only a weak relationship with analogical reasoning m 
the Grade 6 group, and no association in the Grade 8 group. 
Statisticaiiy controlling AR for differences m subjects' knowledge of the underlying 
principles in the themes produced a Smüar pattern of si@cant relationship s between 
analogical reasoning and academic competmce for the Grade 6 group. However, for the 
Grade 8 group, the relationship between analogical reasoning and academic competence no 
longer reached signifïcance &er controhg for content knowledge. Thus, for the younger 
subjects, both content lmowledge and analogical reasoning skül were related to academic 
competaice. For the older subjects, diffèrences m content knowledge appeared to account for 
the S@cant relationslip between analogicai reasoning and academic competence. 
In contraa, there was a complete absence of any relationship between succeu m 
analogical reasoning and social competence. Peer, teacher and children's self perception of 
social competmce all fàiled to demonstrate any relationship with skill at identifjing tmderlying 
principles m academic or social themes. The only exception occurred with the Grade 8 girls, 
with whom success on the analogical reasoning task was associated with less competent 
feelings about themselves m social situations. This r e d  was explored fkther m the next 
mdy. 
Causal Analysis 
Given the exploratory nature of the present research, it stiould prove mformative to 
examine not oniy the hter-relationships among variables, but also the pattern of causation 
among the variables. To this end, path analyses were employed to b d d  a causal model of the 
relationships between analogical reasonbg and competence. This method uses correlational 
data in a regression technique to estimate the causal sequence among variables (Kenny, 1979). 
A series of regressions are conducted to detemine the direct and indirect effects that one 
variable has upon other variables. In this manner, path analyses can d e t e d e  how much of 
the correlation between variables is due to a direct association or due to an indirect 
association through mtervening variables. In the regression equations, the beta weights of the 
predictor variables are the path coefficients in a causal model that hdicate the direct and 
indirect associations. Testing whether the path coefficient is Sgnincantly different f?om zero 
indicates the presence or absence of an effect on that path. Thus, by estiniating the 4te of the 
relations between variables, these estimates cm provide idormation about the underlyhg 
causal processes. To a d  in 'theory aimming', paths with non-signiscant effeas are 
deleted. This trimmed or restricted model was tested m the next shidy. 
In examinmg the f i e n c e  of andogical reasohg on competence , two causal models 
cm be constmcted - one academic and one sociaL 
Academic Causal Mode1 
As Steinberg (1985a) and others have argue4 anaiogous thinking is a fimâamental 
component of cognition, a critical s ld  m leaming and t r d e r ,  considered by some to be the 
main strategy used to sohe novel problems (e.g., Pohla, 195 7; Vosniadou, 1988; Anderson & 
Thompson, 1989; Rumelhart, 1989; Goswd, 1992). From this, it seems reasonable to 
assume that analogical reasoning (ARr) influences achievement (ACHT). These variables 
(ARr and ACW) m tum should mfhience teacher perceptions of a child's academic 
performance (TRC). A child's perception ofhis or her own acadernic skiil (SPC) would be 
expected to be infhienced by teachers' responses (TRC) as weîl as mdicators of Mer 
academic performance (ARr and ACHT). The general path diagram for this mode1 is as 
follows: 
ANALOGICAL TEACHER RATINGS - 
7 
REAsOb/ING (Rrx ACADEhîIC (TRC) 
ACNIEVEMENT SELF PERCEPTION - - 
(Ac=) ACADEMIC (SPC) 
The aandardized structural regession equations are: 
ACHT = a(ARr) + error 
TRC = b(ARr) + c(ACHT) + error 
SPC = d(ARr) + e(ACJ3T) + qTRC) + error 
These equations were sohred controliing for content knowledge, mcludmg d eight themes, 
and using both Grade 6 and Grade 8 groups. The two path models, one for each grade, 
mcludmg path coefficients @eta weights) and Sgnificance Iwels, are presented m Figure 3. 
[The same pattern of resuhs was obtained when using ARr scores fiom the four academic 
themes. See Appendix K for the path diagi.ams.1 
For both grade levels, the path coefficients from ARr to SPC, ARr to TRC, and 
ACHT to SPC, were non-significant and m most instances near zero. Si@cant coefficients 
were found in the f i e n c e  of AR- on ACHT, ACHT on TRC, and TRC on SPC. For the 
Grade 6 subjects, these paths were hi& sipifkant @'s of .O 1 to -00 1). For the Grade 8 
subjects, the ARr to ACHT path did not reach si@cance (as noted earlier m the 
FIGURE 3 






A h  * TRC 
ACHT ' SPC 
AR, = analogical rcasoning, TRC= academic teacher ratings, ACHT= achievcment, SPC= acadcmic self report 
*** p < .oo1. ** p<. O l . * p <  .os 
conelational analyses, it was significant before controlling for knowledge) and the TRC to 
SPC path was ody moderately significant (pC.05)' d e  the ACHT to TRC path was highiy 
significant @<.O0 1). Taken altogether, these fjndings suggest the following model: 
fi ----+ ACHT--> TRC ---4 SPC 
That is, a series of direct effects in which andogical r e a h g  (AR.) influences achievement 
(ACHT), &ch then idluences academic teacher ratgigs (TRC), which m h m  influences 
academic selfperception (SPC). [The same pattern of results was fomd for both the male and 
f e d e  data (see Appendix K).] In this restricted model, analogical reasoning and 
achiwement ody exert mdirect effects on selfperception. This mode1 was tested m the next 
mdy. 
SociaI Causal Mode1 
As discussed m the Introduction, many researchers have hypothesized that 'mental 
actions' (here, analogicd r e a h g )  play an miportant role m information processing (Crick & 
Dodge, 1994). In the hypothesized social causal model, this would suggest that analogical 
reasonhg should f i e n c e  social competence. However, &en the results of correlational 
analyses provided earlier, paths between ARr and aii other social competence variables are 
expected to be non-sipnincant. This is tested ushg the following social causal model, m 
which analogical reasoning (AR.) is thought to infiuence peer perceptions of a child's social 
competence (SOCIO). Teacher's perceptions of a chiid's social competence (TRS) wodd be 
influenced by a child's reasoning sloll and how helshe is perceived by hidher peers (ARr and 
SOCIO). Finally, a child's own perceptions of hidher competence (SPS) would be iduenced 
by teacher and peer reactions (TRS and SOCIO), and a sense of M e r  own reasonhg skill in 
social situations (ARr). The general path diagram for this model is as foIlows: 
SOCIO~~ETRIC SELF PERCEPTION - 
7 
(SOCIO) SOCIAL (SPS) 
The standardized structural regcession equations for this mode1 are as follows: 
SOC10 = a(ARr) + error 
TRS = b(ARr) + c(S0CIO) + error 
SPS = d(ARr) + e(SOCI0) + qTRS) + error 
These equations were solved controIIHig AR for content knowledge (ARr), ussig an eight 
themes, and for Grade 6 and Grade 8 groups. The two path models, one for each grade 
mchidmg path coefficients Oeta weights) and signüicance leveis, are presented in Figure 4. 
[Essentially the same results were obtained when using ARr scores fiom the four social 
themes. 1 
As expected, the resuits very clearly show no direct or indirect mfhience of analogical 
reasoning (ARr) on any indices of social competence (SOCIO, TRS or SPS). The ody 
exception occurred with sigdïcant negative path coefficients between ARr and seifreport of 
social competence (SPS) in the Grade 8 data @<.01). As noted with the correlational data , 
this is due to the female data, d e r e  Grade 8 girls who demonstrated more success on the 
analogical reasoning task tended to rate themsehes as l e s  successful m social interactions. 
ûther than this one aspect of the results, the same pattern of results was found for both the 
male and female data (see Appendix K). 
In generai, examination of the paths among the social competence variables suggests 
that children's self perception of their own social cornpetaice (SPS) was maUenced by peer 
and teacher perceptions, and by analogid reasoning skie However, these paths (ie., 
SOCIO to SPS, and TRS to SPS) demonstrated ody weak relationships for both the Grade 6 

and Grade 8 subjects @<.O5 and non-significant paths). The path between the sociometric 
(SOCIO) and social teacher ratings (TRS) showed the strongest effects @<.O0 1) for both 
grades. These resuhs suggest that there is at bat ,  a weak relationslip between how subjects 
viav themselves social@ and how they are viewed by their peers and teachers. ûther findmgs 
reported in the iiterature have been somewhat mixed, but are genedy in agreement m hding 
a weak but positive relations@ between self and others' perceptions of social competence 
(e.g., m e r ,  1982; Ladd & Rice, 1986; Kurdek & Kriie, 1982). 
Given that there was no indication of any direct or indirect *ence of analogical 
reasoning on any mdices of social competence, this variable was onoitted in the restRcted 
mode1 Thus, these results suggest the folIohg model, where analogid reasoning is 
excluded entireiy and the sociometric and social teacher ratmgs are assumed to influence self 
repoxt: 
SOCIOMETRIC 
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SOCIAL (TRS) 
This restricted model was tested m the next study. 
Summary 
There were several findings of particular interest to the present mvestigation that were 
obtahed fiom the correlationai and causal analyses that require fiirther examination. 
First, anaiogical reasoning sküi was found to be related to academic competenc+ and 
this relationship persisted (aithough it was somewhat weaker) after controhg AR for 
knowledge Merences m the data for the Grade 6 but not Grade 8 subjects. For the Grade 6 
data, these r e d s  demonstrate the inoportant role in problem solWig of b o t -  analogical 
reasoning and content knowiedge in the academic domaia The fÏndings wah the Grade 8 data 
suggest that there may be some shift with dwelopment to more emphasis on content 
knowledge in problem sohing in the academic domah, possiily once a certain levd of 
analogicd reasoning skül has been attained The causai model anaiyses re-iterated these 
hdmgs and suggested that the pattern of causation among the analogical reasoning and 
academic competence variables is a series of direct effects. In this modei, analogical reasoning 
infhiences academic achievement which idinences teacher ratmgs of a child's academic skill, 
f i c h  in tum influences a child's seifperceptions of W e r  academic çkiIL Confirmation of 
the comeiational kdmg and a test of the model was mvestigated m the next study. 
Second, the data are very striking m the absence of any relationship between 
analogical reasoning and social competence. Despite expectations to the contrary, analogical 
reasoning skill (wah or without controiiing for content knowledge) was not related to peer, 
teacher or selfperceptions of social competence. This was again evident in the causal mode4 
where anaiogical reasoning did not appear to influence any social variables whether directiy or 
mdirectly. One exception did occur with the Grade 8 fernales, and requires confirmation in 
the next study. The overwhelm8ig fincüng of no association, however, could be due to some 
inadequacy with the materials, or possiily because competence m social situations is 
dependent on factors other than analogical reasoning. Replication of these hdmgs and a test 
of the model was conducted m the next study. 
CaAPTER THREE: STUDY W O  
Overview 
The major objective of this second m d y  was to test the relationshq, between 
andogical reasoning and competence that was explored m the prwious shidy. Data were 
obtained fiom a new, somewhat larger sample of subjects fiom Grades 6 and 8. This new set 
of data was used to examine the relationship between analogid reasoning slan Hi academic 
and social domains, and academic and social competence. The data were a h  used to assess 
the academic and social causal models proposed in Study One. And finally, in order to ensure 
that the judgments required m the scoring of the subjects responses could be accurately 
replicated with an independent rater, mter-rater reliabiüty was assessed. 
Method 
The resuhs obtained in Study One provided information conceming the adeqyacy of 
the materials and how best to score and anaiyze the data, as well as preliminaq mformation 
about the relationship between coqetaice and analogical reasonmg. One finding was that 
the dBerent methods used to score the analogid reasuning data yielded redundant 
idionnation. This was apparent when comparing the Categoncal and Quantitative scoring 
systems, scoring protocols for omissions, using data fiom the fist and both sorts, and 
comparing the full or reduced set of themes (ie., 8 versus 6 themes). Smce no new 
information was provided by these scoring variations, the decision was made to restrict data 
analyses to the fidl set of themes, anaiyzed using the Quantitative scoring systern for both 
sorts. These choices were felt to make ma>rimum use of the data for analyses. In addition, 
difl6.cdties were noted m Study One m the attempts to compare descriptive and problernatic 
themes. Also, correlational analyses among the individual themes did not reveal any notable 
pattern ofrelationships among the themes. Therefore, these analyses were not pursued m this 
second study, and o d y  the total (8), academic (4), and social (4) themes were grouped for 
analyses- Although performance on the academic and social groupmgs of themes was not 
found to be rehted within each d o m .  in the nrst study, the academic and social themes were 
again grouped for cornparison to determine whether analogical reasoning scores wouid show 
stronger relationships withm the academic and social themes, respectiveiy. Fmally, all of these 
variations in scoring and analyses of the data (i e., categorical and quantitative scoring systeq 
hst and both sorts, fiill and reduced data sets, and mdMduaI and descriptive/problematic 
theme groupmgs) were perfonned on the data fiom the sample used m this second Study, and 
the same pattern of results was obtained as that found in Study One (see Appendix L). 
Subiects 
One hundred ninety children served as subjects m this study, 94 subjects were fiom 
Grade 6, including 56 males and 38 fernales, with an average age of 12.0 years, and 96 
subjects were fiom Grade 8, including 47 males and 49 fernales, wah an average age of 13.9 
years. The subjects were drawn fkom four classrooms at each grade level, fiom three different 
schools fiom the Merin-Peel Separate and W o n  Boards of Education. Two of the Grade 
8 classes were chusen by the Principal of one school to represent a wide range of abüity 
levels The remaining classes were the only classes in the schools at that grade IeveL Subjects 
who participated m the midy were aü children d o s e  parents gave written permission. in 
total, 4% of the students m the four classrooms were not granted permission to participate in 
the study. Of the remahhg students, the data fiom 8% of the students were not used due to 
absenteeism, mcomplete data, or the students' mability to cope with the reading and d e n  
demands of the ta&. These latter students (n=2) were identified by their classoom teachers 
as having a significant leamhg disabiüty or an ESL background. Teachers also mdicated that 
the subjects were fiom middle class h d i e s .  The sample was largely Caucasian, with a 
minority of students (less than 5%) of Black and Asian races. 
Ma terials 
Ail materiais were identical to those used m the previous study. 
Procedure 
Data were gathered m late spring, during regular class sessions. The procedure was 
identical to that used m Snidy One. 
Scorinp the Assessrnent and Experimental Tasks 
Ail assessrnent measures and the Knowledge Test were scored by the author, as 
dembed m the fkst study. As noted above, the Quantitative scoring system and the fiin set 
of themes fiom both soas were employed. 
Inter-Rater Reiîabiiity 
The scoring of underlying prhciples required judgments about the adequacy of the 
responses, and therefore a measure of the inter-rater rehbiiity was necessary. An initial 
training session was used to introduce the materiais and the scoring key to an mdependent 
rater ( a Ph.D student). The rater then practised on data fiom m e n  randomiy chosen 
subjects and any discrepancies with the author's judgments were discussed Followhg the 
trainmg and practice, the rater received data âom twenty subjects (representmg 10% of the 
subjects). The sample was chosen by selecting the protocols fiom every ninth or tenth 
subj ect, with subject s ordered alp habetic*. 
Pearson product-moment cornelations were computed between the ratings of the rater 
and the author for the underlying principles (UP) for each sort in each theme. The mter-rater 
reliabiluy coefficient of the author's ratings with the independent rater was .93 for the 
practice protocols, and .94 for the test sample of 20 protocols. 
Resuits and Discussion 
Correlational Analvses 
The scores fiom the competence and analogieal reasoning tasks were intercorrelated 
ushg Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients. These correlations are presented m 
Tables 11.1 (without controllhg analogical reasoning scores (AR) for knowledge) and 11.2 
(controhg AR for knowledge). 
Academic Corn~etence and Analoeical Reasoning 
For the Grade 6 subjects, the correlations m Table 1 1.1 replicate the hdings fiom the 
previous study of signincantly positive correlations between analogical reasoning scores (Le., 
academic - ARa; social - ARS; total - ARt) and academic competence measures (ie., 
achievement, ACHT; academic teacher ratings, TRC; and academic selfreport, SPC). Self 
perception of academic skül (SPC) demonstrated an apparent stronger relationship with 
analogical reasoning (AR) skül in this second study than m the fkst, that was similar in ske  to 
the correlations between analogical reasonïng (AR) and achievement (ACHT). [The same 
pattern of results was obtained when the male and female data were considered separately (see 
Appendix M.) Table 12 compares the significance levels across the two -dies, for the 
correlational data fiom the Grade 6 and Grade 8 subjects. 
Correlations with AR appeared somewhat larger for ACHT than TRC or SPC. 
Examination of t-tests of the difference between correlations indicated that the correiation 
between ARa and ACHI' was significantiy larger than the correlation between ARa and TRC, 
and the correlation between ARt and ACHT was significantly larger than the conelation 
between ARt and SPC (see Appendix N). Thus, ahhough these correhtions appeared larger 
for ACHT and d e r  for TRC and SPC (sirnilar to Study One), these Werences only 
reached significance in a couple of mstances. 
Similarly for the Grade 8 subjects, AR scores were found to be significantly positive@ 
correlated with scores on aIl of the academic competence tasks (see Table 11.1). While the 
TABLE 11.1 
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ACADEMIC THEMES SOCIAL THEMES 
'l'ABLE 1 1.2 
Pearson Product-Moment Correlations Between Analogicd Reasoning and Cornpetence Tasks - Controiiing for Knowledge 











SOCIAL THEMES TOTAL THEMES 

Grade 8 subjects in the prevïous study demonstrated significant relationships ody between 
AR and ACHT, and AR and TRC (but not AR and SPC), the Grade 8 subjects m this second 
shidy demonstrated significant relationçhips between AR and ail academic competence tasks 
(ie., ACHT, TRC, and SPC). m e  same overall pattern of r e d s  was obtained when the 
male and f d e  data were analyzed separately (see Appendix M] Therefore, in contrast to 
Study One, children's self perceptions of academic skU was found to be related to analogical 
reasoning skin at both grade levels in the second study (see Table 12 for a comparison). 
Correlations between AR (a ARa, ARS) and ACHT appeared larger than 
correlations between AR (A&, ARa, ARS) and TRC, and AR (AR& ARa, ARs) and SPC. 
However, examination of t-tests of the difference between correlations mdicated that the 
correlation between ARa and ACHT was significady iarger than the correlation between 
ARa and TRC, and the correlation between ARa and ACHT was significantly larger than the 
correlation between ARa and SPC (see Appendix N). 
Controlline AR for KnowIed~e 
For the Grade 6 subjects, after controlling AR for subjects' knowledge of the 
underlying principles m the themes, analogical reasoning (Ab) scores (mcludîng ARa, ARS, 
A&) continued to demonstrate significantly positive correlations with the academic 
competence tasks (see Table 1 1.2). However, the magnitude of the correlations decreased 
after controlling AR for knowledge. m e n  the male and female data were considered 
separately, the same overall pattern of results emerged (see AppendÙr M).] Examination of 
t-tests of the Merence between correlations cornpaxkg the original data and 'knowledge 
controiied' or residual data mdicated that conelations using the residual (ARr) scores were 
significantly smaller than the correlations using the original (AR) scores (witb the exception of 
the correlations of AR with SPC: see Appendix N). Thus, while analogical reasoning 
continued to demonstrate relationshqs with academic competence after controlling AR for 
knowledge Merences, these relationstups were sigoificantly reduced in size when compared 
to the original data for the Grade 6 subjects. These results were similar to those found in 
Study One. A visual comparison of signifiicance levels for the correlational data m Tables 11.1 
and 11.2 is presented in Table 12, for both grade lwels, both studies, and with and without 
controlhg for Imowledge. 
Correlations with ARr appeared larger with ACHI' and d e r  with TRC and SPC. 
However, these Merences were s m .  and did not reach sigoincame m t-tests of the 
difference between correlations (see Appendur N). 
Simi'larly for the Grade 8 subjects, AR and academic competence scores were 
significantly positively related d e r  controhg AR for content Imowledge. And, as with the 
Grade 6 subjects, there was a reduction m the size of the correlations when comparing 
correlations ushg the original data to those of the residual data (see Table 1 1.2). m e  same 
pattern of results was found when the male and f e d e  data were analyzed separately (see 
Appendix M.).] Examination of t-tests of the dBerence between correlations of AR and 
academic competence with and without controhg for knowledge Merences mdicated a 
significant decrease m the size of correlations of AR with all academic competence tasks (with 
the exception of the correlations between ARS and ACHT, and ARS and TRC; see Appendix 
N). Thus, m this second study, the relationship between AR and academic competence was 
significantly reduced d e r  controlling AR for Merences in knowledge. However, despte this 
&op, the analogical reasoning - academic coqetaice relationship still reached significance. 
This is m contrast to the hdings of the previous study, where the significant relationship 
between analogical reasoning scores and performance on the academic competence ta& no 
longer reached Sgnificance afker controllkg AR for knowledge differences (see Table 12 for a 
comparison). 
Correlations of ARr with ACHT, TRC and SPC did not appear to be very different 
fiom one another. No sigiu6cant differences were found in t-tests of the merence between 
correlations (see Appendix N). 
Therefore, the data f?om both grade levels m this second study mdicated that subjects 
more successfùl m identifjing principles m the analogies task also tended to be more 
successful on the achievement test, receive higher ratmgs fiom their teachers, and have a more 
positive view of their own academic &lis. Moreover, after statistically equating the data for 
daferences m subjects' knowledge of the content of the themes, the relationship (ahhough 
somewhat reduced) remained Sgnificant. This suggests that both content knowledge and 
analogicd reasoning skill are related to achiwement, and teacher and selfperceptions of 
academic skilL 
Social Com~etence and Analo~ical Reasoning 
For both the Grade 6 and Grade 8 subjects almost aIi correlations between the 
analogical reasoning and social competence scores (ie., the sociometnc, SOCIO; social 
teacher ratings, TRS; and seifreport of social competence, SPS) were not significant, with or 
without controhg for knowledge dioerences (see Tables 11.1 and 11.2). Thus, no 
relationship was found between subjects' ability to reason analogicalIy m their identification of 
underlying principles m themes, and their competence in social situations, as assessed by peer, 
teacher, and selfratings. This is the same result as was found in the previous study. [This 
pattern was also found in analyses of the data for both the male and fernale subjects (see 
A P P ~ ~ &  Ml-1 
The hding fiom the previous study that Grade 8 f d e s  with higher AR scores 
tended to have lower SPS scores was found in this second study. 
Causal Analysis 
In the previous study, IWO models were proposed to d e s d e  the pattern of causation 
amng analogical reasoning and competence - one academic and one socid Results fiom the 
fit study suggested certain restrictions that codd be placed on the modeis to sinipli6 the 
relationships among the analogical reasoning and competence variables. These restricted 
models are tested using the data fiom subjects in this second study. 
A restricted or hypothesked causal model can be confumed or disconfirmed 
dependmg on the 'fit' between the obtained data and the proposed modeL Results obtahed 
for the restncted model are compared to the fùll model, using the Q statistic (Pedhazur, 
1980), m order to determine whether the restricted model is an adequate representation of the 
data. The Q statistic is a measure of goodness of fit7 and ranges fiom O to 1. Vahes of Q 
close to 1 mdicate a better 'fit' of the data, and mdicate that the hyp othesized model is a good 
representation of the obtained data. Structural equations for the fùIi academic and social 
models (descnied in Study One) were sobed usÎng the data fiom this second sîudy 
(controllhg AR for kuowledge, using al1 eight themes and the data fiom both Grade 6 and 
Grade 8 subjects). The fidl path models, mcludmg path coefficients and significance levek are 
presented in Figures 5 and 6 for the academic and social models, respectively. Not 
çurprkingly, &en the consistency in the patterns of the correlational data m both studies, the 
path anaIyses yielded a similar pattern of results. Calculations ushg the resniaed models and 
the Q values follow. 
Test of the Academic Casual Mode1 
From Study One, the restricted academic causai model suggested by the data mvohred 
a series of direct effects with AR bfluencing ACHT, ACHT Muencing TRC, and TRC 
Simiencing SPC. That is: 
A&--->AC~--->~C--->SpC 
The standardized structurai regession equations are a series of direct effects, namely: 
ACHT = a(ARr) + error 
TRC = b(ACHT) + error 
SPC = c(TRC) + mor 
These equations were solved controllhg for content howiedge, hchiding ail eight themes, 
usbg data from both Grade 6 and Grade 8 subjects. The two restricted path models, 




The results fkom the fidl model and the restricted model were compared using the Q 
statistic to determine whetber the restncted model is representative of the data. Q values of 
-96 and -92 were fomd for the Grade 6 and Grade 8 data, respectively. This suggests that the 
resbiaed model is a good fit for the data. That is, the relationship between analogical 
reasoning and academic competence variables cm best be conceived of as a senes of direct 
effects, in which analogical reasoning directly influences achievement, which m tum 
influences teacher ratings of a child's academic skg wfüch then Muences a child's 
perception of hidher own academic competence. Analogical reasoning acts as an indirect 
inauence on teacher and selfratings of skül 
Test of the Social Causal Modei 
The resaicted social causal model proposed in the previous snidy excludes analogical 
reasoning entireiy as an influence on social competence. The model is as foliow: 
SPS 
The aandardized structurai regession equations are as folIows: 
TRS = a(SOCI0) + error 
SPS = b(SOCI0) + c(TRS) + emor 
These equations were sohed, mcludmg all eight themes, using data nom the Grade 6 and 
Grade 8 subjects. The two resüicted path models, mcludmg path coefficients and significance 
levels, are presented in Figure 8. 
Once again, the results f?om the fU and restncted models were compared using the 
Q statistic. Q values of .99 and -97 were found for the Grade 6 and Grade 8 groups, 
respective1y. Thus, the restncted model is a good fit of the data Analogical reasoning does 
not appear to exert an infiuence on any of the social competmce variables. It is this very clear 
absence of any m0uence that is particular1y mteresting as it leads to questions about whether 
analogical reasoning exerts any notable effect on social competence. 
a'. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
O v e ~ e w  
Study One was conducted as an exploration of the materials use4 and was followed 
by a confirmation of these Eitial fïndings, m Shidy Two. In both Snidies One and Two, the 
same general pattern of results was found. That is, success in an analogical reasoning ta& 
was fond to be related to success m academic competence tasks for both Grade 6 and Grade 
8 students. Even after holding differences m content knowledge constant, analogical 
reasoning was found to be related to academic competence, although to a lesser degree. In 
the &st study, these resdts were evident m the pdormance of the younger subjects. While 
the same general pattern of resuits was found with the older subjects m the first study, the 
analogical reasonhg - competence relation&@ was weaker and did not reach signincance 
d e r  controllhg for content howledge. The relationship between analogous thEilong and 
academic competence was more robust in the second study that utilized r somewhat larger 
sample. Subjects at both grade levels demonstrated a positive relationship between andogical 
reasoning skill and academic competence. 
Exploratory path analyses were employed to adyze  the iuter-relationships among the 
analogical reasonhg and academic competence variables (ie., achievement, teacher and self 
ratings). A theoretical mode1 of the causal relationships among variables was constructed in 
Study One and subsequently tested m Study Two. The modd suggested that there is a causai 
relation@ among the variables in the form of a series of direct effects, in which analogical 
reasonhg infiuences academic achievement, achievement influences teacher ratmgs of 
academic competence, and teacher ratings influence an mdividuai's perception ofhidher 
acadernic competence. These resuits d e  several suggestions about fàctors that may or may 
not influence success m academic tasks and perceptions about success by an individual and 
others (here, teachers). First, skül in reasoning by analogy appeared to play an important role 
m academic achiwement. Second, teacher ratings of a chrld's academic competence were 
directly mfluenced by a child's lwel of achievement - slrills that are similariy and regularly 
measured in the school environment. However, teacher perceptions of academic competence 
were not found to be mfhienced (at least not directly) by a child's ability to reason by analogy 
- a ski11 that is not spic* measured m the ciasnoom environment. That is, ahhough 
teachers appeared sensitive to measurable aspects of achievement, they either did not appear 
to be as aware of a chüd's analogous thinkmg, or analogical reasoning did not cany much 
weight m their ratmgs of competence. And finally, a child's self report of Wher  own 
academic competence was reliant on teacher feedback, and not dire@ on achievement 
measutes or a sense of their own ab* to reason by anaiogy. Thus, m terms ofthe present 
variables (analogical reasoning, achievement, teacher rathgs, and selfreport), the r e d s  
suggest the foUowing: 
* a child's perception of hidher competence is iduenced by teacher feedback, 
* a teacher's perception of a child's competence is based on measurable aspects of 
achievement, and 
* achievement is mfluenced by the ability to perceive analogous relationships. 
In marked contrast, success m analogical reasonkg was n a  found to be related to 
social competence, with or without taking into account content knowledge. Exploratory path 
analyses remforced this hdmg and iüustrated the important role ofboth teacher and peer 
perceptions of social competence as influences on a child's own perception of his/her 
mterpersonal skill The absence of any relationship between analogical reasoning and social 
competence was contrary to original expectations based on m e n t  formulations of cognitive 
and social-cognitive problem sohring m the literature. That is, a relationship should exist. 1 
wilI r e m  to a discussion of this issue later. First, I will address the relationship between 
anaiogical reasonmg and academic competence. The present hdings are discussed in terms 
of the issue of knowledge structures versus a process account of performance. Also, 
miplications for theones of analogicd reasoning and dwelopment are addressed. This is 
followed by a discussion of the possible reasons for the absence of a relationship between 
andogical reasoning and social competence. The resuhs question the assumption of similar 
proceshg m cognitive and social-cognitive problem sohring. Messurement issues concerhg 
the assesment of social competence and analogicai reasoning are addressed. The nature of 
the representation of Wormation is also discussed m temu of how the hdmgs lend support to 
cognitive theories that propose separate but inter-dependent conceptual srnimues. The 
implications of the present fïndings for thmking ddls programs are then considered And 
haiiy, Mations  of the present research and possible directions for fùture research are 
presented 
Analogical Reasoning and Academic Cornpetence 
Anaiogical reasoning is viewed by many as a centrd component of mteiligence (e-g., 
Sternberg, l984a; RumeIhart, 1989; Goswami, 1992). It is therefore not surprismg that the 
present investigation found that success in identifjing analogous information was related to 
academic competence. Moreover, this relation was found whether the analogous materials 
contained content typicdiy found m the academic domain (ie., biology, math, social science) 
or content refiecting social issues (ie., social &Us, personality styles, bias and potential 
conflict). 
The analogicai reasoning - academic competence relationship found m the present 
studies is discussed below m temis of its relevance to the issue of knowledge structures versus 
a process account of perfonnance, and to theones of analogical reasonhg and development. 
General Process versus Domain-S~ecific Knowledpe 
The majority of studies of expertise have e d e d  performance on tasks that have 
employed subjects mering considerab& m their howledge and eqerience m a &en domain 
(e.g., Gruppen, et.aL, 1991; Nathan, &.al, 1992). In contrast, the present investigation 
utilized a relative@ homogeneous group of subjects. Even without the wide fluctuation in 
expertise, nibjects' sensitMty to underiying principles was fond to be characteristic of the 
academicaIly more successfùl children. 
Much of the research analyzing experthovice merences has focused on the structure 
of knowledge m memory to account for the differences (e-g., Chi, 1985; Chi et& 1988). 
The present mvestigation also demonstrated that content knowledge innuenced performance. 
However, after statisticdy controllhg for differences in content knowledge, analogical 
reasoning skill continued to demonstrate a significant relationship with competence. Thus, the 
ability to iden@ Smilar relations as opposed to less ~ ~ c a n t  surface detaüs m a passage , 
was found to be related to academic competence. However, as Chi points out (Chi et& 
1988), it is not the specinc knowledge per se, but rather the organhtion of lmowledge that is 
critical in disCnmmating levels of expertise. The use of knowledge is afFected by the 
properties of a structure, m particutar, hierarchy and coherence. Hierarchy refers to the 
pattern of relations among substructures, and coherence refers to the patterns of interlinking 
and attnaute-sharing concepts of the substmctures. Of interen is that as aspects of the 
organiration of knowledge are dehed and elaborated by researchers, what becomes miking 
is the simüarities that emerge with dennitions of analogical reaçoning. In theones emphasimig 
the structure of lmowledge m problem sohring (e.g., Chi etal., 1988), coheraice and hierarchy 
are the pattern of relations mong concepts and substructures, respectiveiy. Theorizing about 
analogical reasoning has also postulated a simüar emphasis on the systems of relations m 
knowledge needed to solve analogies (e.g., Sternberg, 1977; Gentner, 1989; Holyoak & 
Thagard, 1995). That is, successful use of analogies mvohes the mapping of objects and 
relations between the solved problem and a new problem 
Thus, the distinction begins to b h ~  berneen what can be considered properties of 
knowledge structures, and relational mappmgs mvohed in a 'process' account of 
performance. Certainly, based on the present mvestigation and other research (e.g., Chi, 
et& 1988; Schraagen, 1993), it seems reasonable to conclude that both domain specifïc 
howledge and general processes are important aspects of cognition (see Sternberg, I985b; 
Case, 1992). The present investigation supports this notion. Attempts to determine the 
relative merit of aher one or the other aspect of cognition may ultimateiy cloud the issue that 
both are important. Conceivably eqerimental situations could be contrived m which the 
results favour process or knowledge accounts of problem sohing. However, the utility of 
such work seems questionable, as reseaxchers continue to demonmate the role of both 
accoimts in cognitive problem s o h g  (e.g., Case, 1992). 
Theories of Analoeical Reasoning 
Analogical reasoning was found to be related to academic cornpetence when en 
mdividual's scores across several themes (i.e., four academic or social themes, or aiI eight 
themes) were grouped for anaiyses The academically more successful chiidren tended to 
focus on underlying principles more consistently over several themes. 
Theories of analogical reasoning generally agree that analogous thinking involves a 
one-to-one mapping of objects/relations fiom a known, base domain to a novel, target 
domain. It is the selection prmciple which determines what information is chosen for the 
mapping that largely distinguishes the theones. Whüe Gentner (1989) and Holyoak (1989; 
Holyoak & Thagard, 1995) both emphasize the mappmg of abstract priaciples, Ross (1989) 
p oshilates that it is content specifics (both surface and structural features) that are critical m 
mappmg- 
Gentner's Structural Mapping theory (1989) focuses on systems of relations m s o b g  
analogies. She distinguishes analogy fkom other kinds of similarity that iie on a continuum 
accordmg to the degree of attribute overlap. She defmes analogy as occurring only when 
relational predicates are matched. This she contrasts with 'Iiteral Smilanty', where relational 
predicates and object attriiutes are mapped, and 'mere appearance' matches, where only 
object attributes are mapped. In this fiamework, the present resuits may reflect all three types 
of similarity. That is, identification of surface features indicates that the subject is engaghg in 
mere appearance matchhg or literal Smüanty, identification of underlying principles, the use 
of analogy. Certahdy Gentner is attempting to discriminate much more hely, Werent types 
of Smilarity. In domg so, she effective& eliminates the role of surfàce features in theories of 
analogical reasoning. However, &en her acknowledgment of the overlap that exists among 
the Mirent types of similarity, such distinctions may not be valid. 
In aying to arrive at a better understanding of the fàctors that influence the use of 
analogies m problem s o b g ,  Holyoak and Koh (1987) demonstrated how both suxfâce and 
structural features were mvoived m reasoning by analogy. Subjects were presented with one 
of four versions of the 'lightbulb story', an analogue to hincker's (1945) radiation problem 
The lightbulb story was varied according to wIiether or not the aory contained 
siirtilar/dissimilar surfàce or structural features with the radiation probiem Subjects were 
subsequently asked to sohe the radiation problem This was followed by a hHrt that the 
lightbulb story might be usefûi m sohing the radiation problem The results supported the 
notion that both surface and structurai features were hfiuential m subjects spontaneously 
applymg an analogy to sohe a target problem. Holyoak and Koh proposed that these resuits 
indicate that retneval of analogies is based on the summation of activation firom multiple 
shared features that serve as retrïeval mes, that is, both surface and structural features. They 
also found that once the relevance of the source analogue was pomted out (ie., d e r  the hint), 
only structural similanty (not d c e  similanty) afEected subjects ability to make use of the 
source analogue. 
Ross and others have show how surfàce features that are irrelevant m the solution of 
a target problem may affect the solution mdirectly by iduencmg the selection of an 
mappropriate source analogue (e.g., Ross, 1 984; Gilovich, 198 1). 
The present mvestigation pitted surface features against structural features. The 
surfrice features could be considered to be i1re1evant and possibly distractmg to identifjing 
underlying pxinciples That is, in order to successfully categorize al1 nine scenarios accordmg 
to underlying principles, subjects needed to ignore the surfàce features. Likewise, 
categorization of al1 nine scenarios accordmg to surface features required subjects to either 
ignore or not appreciate the underlyhg principles. In case the subjects were aware of the 
uflderlying principles but chose to categorize accordhg to surface features in th& initial 
soaing of the scenarios a second oppominity was provided to sort the scenarios. Although 
subjects typically identined more surface features than undermg principles, there did not 
appear to be a prefemce for subjects to sort imderlyhg principles or surface features in either 
the first or second sort. Also, nibjects did not necessarily focus on either d c e  features or 
undermg principles. At times, of the three piles sorted, one or two represented underiying 
principles and the remainmg pile@) surface features. That is, subjects' categorization of the 
scenarios often involved a consideration of both surface features and abstract principles 
present in the themes. Thus, there did appear to be a noticeable emphasis on abstract 
principles or &ce features done, but rather a sensitkity to both abstract principles and 
surface features. This is supportive of theorizing that takes mto account both surface and 
structural features. 
nius, the data from the present mvestigation supports Reeves and Weisberg's (1994) 
contention that a theory of analogical reasoning needs to encompass aspects of the stmcturd 
(e.g., Gentner, 1989), pragmatic (e.g., Holyoak, 1989), and exemplar (e.g., Ross, 1989) 
views. 
The Develoament of Analogical Reasoning 
Subjects at both grade levels studied m the present investigation demonstrated a 
çimilar relationship between analogical reasonhg and academic competence. However, m the 
frst study, the magnitude of the eEect was reduced with the older chiltiren. That is, ahhough 
the same pattern of results was obtained, the analogical reasoning - academic competence 
relationshrp failed to reach significance with the Grade 8 data. This decrement m 
performance, however, was not evident in the second çtudy that utüized a somewhat iarger 
sample. Thus, for both the Grade 6 and Grade 8 subjects, dornain specinc lmowledge and 
analogous thslkmg sküus were found to be related to academic competence. The on& 
differences were that Grade 8 chïidren possessed better academic skills, more content 
Imowledge, and were more succe& in identttjhg analogies. 
The data fiom the present mvestigation do not contnbute to a better understanding of 
the development of analogical reasoning. In order to accompiish this, the materials would 
need to be revised in a manner that would allow systematic cornparisons of relations varying 
in their degree of complew. This is discussed M e r  in the section 'Limitations and 
Directions for Future Research", 
Analogieal Reasoning and Social Competence 
A striking finding fiorn al l  three studies is that of no association between performance 
on tasks of analogical reasoning and social cornpetence. The only exception to this was some 
suggestion in the first study that Grade 8 females who were more successful on analogical 
reasoning tasks rated themsehes as less successful socially. Howwer, this k d m g  was not 
replicated and could be due to a rather small sample size. Other than this nsgative relationship 
(in the opposite direction to expectations), there was a clear absence of any relationshrp 
between peer, teacher and seifratings of success m social Hiteractions and success m thinking 
analogically. This is certain& contrary to expectations based on assumptions of information 
proceslimg theories that a relationshrp should ex&. For example, Holyoak and T'hagard 
(1995) have demonstrated the utüay of analogical thinking in everyday We. They have shown 
how people use analogies m a variety of Werent tasks m both non-social and social domains, 
mcluding the domains of political science, psychology, science, philosophy, anthropology, 
literature, and business. Why then, does the present study find no relationship between 
andogous thinking and social competence? Sweral reasons may account for the present 
redts,  and these are addressed below through a consideration of 
a) the assumption of Smilar processing in cognitive problem s o h g  and social- 
cognitive problem sohring, 
b) the assessment of social competence, 
c) the assement of analogical reasoning, and 
d) the nature of the representation of information. 
The Assumotion of Simiiar Rocessing 
The general finding that analogical reasoning skill was not associated with social 
competence poses several questions about the assumption of smüar processing of mformation 
in cognitive and social-cognitive probiem s o h g .  The possi'biiity that the resuits reflect 
dEmences between reflective processing of mformation versus more automatic proceshg of 
information is discussed The assumption of sirnilar processhg is also addressed by 
questioning whether reasonhg by analogy is a critical aspect of social problem s o h g  and 
whether other fiîctors may play a more SgnScant role m social problem s o h g  in every day 
Me. 
Reflective versus Automated Processing 
One possible reason for the absence of an association between analogical reasoning 
and social competence may be found by examining whether idormation is processed in a 
reflective or automated fishion (Crick & Dodge, 1994). Holyoak and Thagard (1995) have 
shown how analogy is an mtegral part of problem s o h g ,  decision making, explanation, and 
communication - ail skilis requiring a more thoughtfid, planful approach to problems. In the 
present mvestigation, performance on the academic and social analogical reasonhg tasks was 
found to be related to performance on the achievement test. All of these tasks require 
effortfùl or reflective processsig of mformation to sohe the problems. (SimkIy, it is 
expected that teacher and selfreport ratings of academic competence would be based on a 
variety of experiences with problems m which conscious effort is required to sohe academic 
problems.) In conirast, the mdices of social competence (te., the sociometric, teacher ratings, 
selfreport ratiugs) may be based on an accumulation of experiences m situations that largely 
mvohe habituai, spontaneous responses. The exteot to which processing of social stimuli is 
reflective is not known at the present tirne, but moa iikely respondmg m social situations is 
h i w  automated (Crick & Dodge, 1994). Ifthis is tnie, then the presence or absence of a 
relationship with analogicai reasoning may be infiuenced by the refiective versus automated 
nature of processing mvolved in the academic versus social mdices of competence, 
respeaively. That is, the refledve analogies tasks should demonstrate a relationship with the 
reflective mdexes of academic competence, but not with the automated mdexes of social 
coqetence. 
Conversely, there is evidence to suggest that reflective tasks may under-represent the 
magnitude of the effect that would be had under more automated processing conditions. A 
mdy by Rabmer, Lenhart and Lochman (1990) examined the performance of children m 
reflective and automatic responding situations. They found that the socially maladjusted 
cbrldren processed mfomtion adequately under reflective but not automatic conditions. 
These results aiggea that reflective measures (used in most social problem s o b g  studies as 
weii as the present mvestigation) may under-represent real-life processing that requires more 
automated respondhg. In the present investigation, this would suggest that the analogical 
reasonjng task may under-represent processing invohred m reai-Me social situations. 
However, since near zero correlations were f o n d  between social competence and analogical 
problem sohmig, it seems unükeiy that the reflective task under-represented the relationship to 
such a considerable degree. 
It is possible that the assumption of smilar processhg of information in academic and 
social domains is more applicable in situations where mdividualç must stop and thmk, and 
consciousiy process mformation m order to employ/recognize an analogy. Ifmdeed 
respondmg in everyday social situations is largely automated, this raises questions about the 
adequacy of the information processihg models of social cognition to d e s d e  behaviow in 
everyday (Le., automated) social interactions. Support for idonnation proceshg theories of 
social problem sohring has largeiy been generated from studies requiring reflection in 
hypothetical situation m t e ~ e w s  and questionnaires (e.g., Bream, 1989), i n t e ~ e w s  about 
actual social events (e.g., Steinberg & Dodge, l983), and seiGrepoa inventories (e-g, Harter, 
1982). Other studies m the literature, while largely using reflective eqerhental ta*, have 
aiso employed s h h r  mdices as the present investigation to assess social competence (Le., 
indices reflecting more automated responses). In contrast to the present hdhgs, they have 
consistently demonstrated the robustness of the relationship between various aspects of the 
information processing model (ie., encoding, mterpretation, ckifyhg goals, accesçing 
responses response decison) and social maladjustment (see Crick & Dodge, 1994, for a 
review). However, the merence between the fbdmgs m the literature and the present resutts 
may be due to the focus here on the 'mental action', analogicd rea-g. Crick and Dodge 
(1994) mdicated a need for research specifically addressing 'mental actions'. While the 
present reçuhs may not address the relationship between reasoning and social competence in 
reflective sihiations, the r e d s  do suggest one of two posç'bitities cconcerniog the relationship 
between analogous thmking and social competence m automated situations. One possibility is 
that 'mental actions' - at leaa analogical reasoning - are not a critical aspect of mformation 
processing that influences social competence. A second possiibility is that analogical reasonhg 
is related to social competence as an additive fàctor, where other aspects of information 
processhg must also be considered. A discussion of these two possiiilities follows. 
Output versus Process 
Research in social problem sohring has tended to foms on what children thmk (ie., 
output) as opposed to how children thmk (ie., process). Crick & Dodge (1994) have noted 
the need for research using a process approach to determine the mental actions employed by 
mdividuak as they mterpret and evaluate social mfoxmation. The present mvestigation has 
sought to do this by studying the process of analogous thmkmg. And yet, the resuits indicate 
that analogicd reasonhg skill is not related to social competence. It may be that on-he 
processîng sküls - here analogical reasoning sküls - are not as important or utilized to the 
same degree in the social domain as they are in more effortfid problem s o h g  typical of the 
non-social domain. Thus, whüe more research is needed to investigate 'process' aspects of 
problem s o h g ,  the resuhs f?om the present mvestigation suggest that resçonhg by analogy 
may not be a critical aspect of performance m every day social interactions. 
The Role of Analo~ical Reasonine in Cognition 
One could argue that the process of rea-g by analogy is ody one of many 
important components invoked m information processhg. 'Lneorists have poshilated that 
processing acnially occurs h simuhaneous parailel paths (RumeIhart, McClelland and the PDP 
Rocessing Group, 1986). 'Lhis is represented m the social Miormation processhg fiamework 
by rnuitiple feedback loops to demonstrate that children are always encodhg, interpreting and 
accessing responses (Cnck & Dodge, 1994). For the social domah, the impact of analogical 
reasoning on performance may not dy iiselfbe enough to demonstrate a relation- with 
social competence. It may be that problem s o h g  m everyday social mteractions is 
iomienced by several diffierent aspects of information processing, mcluding other fictors çuch 
as pre-emptive processing (i e., script-based, automatic, 'bithout thmking" thmkmg), 
previous eqenences, peer responses and emotion (Dodge & Somberg, 1987; Cnck & Dodge, 
1994). Indeed, both pre-emptive processing and emotional arousal have s h o w  an association 
with social maladjustment (Dodge & Somberg, 1987). However, the problem that arises with 
this explmation is that analogical reasonoig is considered to be a central component of 
cognition (e.g., Sternberg, 1985; Polya, 1957; Holyoak & Thagard, 1995). Ifthis is me, thai 
analogous thinlmig should be related to social competence. Given that this was not fomd 
here, it may be that various aspects of cognition are more or less d c a l  m problem sohing 
dependmg on the domain mder consideration. Possiibly other factors (e.g., pre-emptive 
processing, emotion, peer responses, expenence) play a much more signincant role m the 
social domain. This would agah suggest that the social information processing mode1 that 
presently acknowledges but does not funy account for these other factors, may not adequately 
represent social problem solving m every day Me. 
The Assessrnent of Social Cornnetence 
nie  previous discussions are based on the assumption that the tasks employed were in 
i c t  valid assessments of social competence and analogous thinking. An optimal assessrnent 
of socid competence would mchide observations of problem s o h g  m real-life social 
interactions. Such data are diflicult and thne consumhg to gather. The best aitemative is to 
gather infiormation nom several difZerent sources and m different ways (see Butler & 
Meichenbaum, 1983), as was done m the present study. However, despite thiç, the indexes of 
social competence that were chosen may not be adequate measures of social competence. 
The foIlowing is a discussion of possible reasons for the madequacy of the measures, includmg 
a consideration of the distinction between the response of versus the reaction to a chilcl, and 
automated versus refleaive responding. 
Behaviour versus Peer Status 
Teacher, peer and self ratings of social competence were employed here. These 
measures are used extensive& in the literature to assess social competence (Butler & 
Meichenbaum, 1983; Rubin & Krasior, 1985; Crick & Dodge, 1994). Underlyhg the use of 
these indexes is the assumption that a child's behaviour towards others is an important factor 
m deteminhg M e r  social status (e.g., Asher & Hymel, 1981). Furthemore, research has 
provided çuppoit for thk assumption (e.g., Coie & Kupersmidt, 1983). However, ahhough 
related, there is a distinction between the actual social response of a chüd (i-e., behaviour) and 
the reaction & a child (Le., status). The peer sociometric assesses the pattern of likes and 
d - e s  within a group (Butler & Meichenbaum, 1983). The two scales used in the present 
investigation provided peer ratings of a child's populanty with others (i e., getting dong with 
others and mclusion m the peer group). Simiiarly, although the teacher and seIf-report scales 
contained spe&c items about social behaviours, these indexes can be direce related to peer 
status (Crick & Dodge, 1994). Thus, the three mdexes employed here may be primarüy 
asseshg peer, teacher and selfratings of aatus - ail reactions & a child, and hence indirect 
measures of social coqetence. 
The distmction between behaviour and datus has important implications for social 
information processing. That is, some aspects of g i f o d o n  processing would be expected 
to lead d i r em to behaviour (e.g., response generation), whiîe other aspects might be a 
reaction to peer status (e.g., a cbild's self perceptions) (Crick & Dodge, 1994). In the present 
hidies, the analogicd reasoning tasks and academic cornpetence tasks are indexes of the 
behaviour of a chüd The social competence tasks, on the other hand, may be more of an 
outcome of peer status. It would then follow that the present investigation cannot determine 
wtiether or not a relationship exists between analogous thinking and social behaviour. Ratha, 
the ody conchsion that can be reached is that no discemile relationship was found betweea 
andogous t . g  and a child's social status. 
Automated venus Reflective Res~onses 
The earlier d i s d o n  of process differences on tasks eqloying reflective versus 
automated responses is also relevant to the issue of the adequacy of the social competence 
tasks. As was discussed, the absence of a relationship between analogical reasoning and social 
competence may be pardany accounted for by differences m the type of response (Le., 
reflective vs. automatic). As mentioned earlier, ratings by peers/teachers/selfare hypothesized 
to be based largely on automated respondmg m evqday social situations, M e  academic 
competence and analogical reasoning measures mvoive more reflective responses. 
The Assessrnent of Analo~ical Reasoning 
The analogical reasoning task mvohed reading a passage, categor-g the scenarios, 
and d g  comments. This ta& may not be the best cornparison for social competence as it 
is a reflective, planful activity. In this respect, it does not approxhnate automated social 
responding in mterpersond interactions. Viewed in this man.net, the analogical reasoning task, 
regardles of academic or social content is basically an academic acthdy, as is the 
achievement test. Consequently, the results rnay reflect the smiilanties m performance on two 
academic tasks. Analyses of results m Study One did in fact fÏnd that performance was not 
differentiated based on analogies that contamed either academic or social content. Thus, the 
analogies materials may not be ermilating responding m social situations. 
The Nature of the Re~resentation of Information 
A fmal explanation for the absence of an analogical reasoning - social competence 
rehtionship may rest in the assumption that idormation is represented m a gniüar fishion m 
both the academic and social domains As noted earlier, mstead of assuming that cognition is 
the same in both domab, it may be that there is something mherentty different m the 
conceptuai structures in memory in social versus non-social problem s o h g .  The results of 
the present investigation are noteworthy in light of Paivio's Duai Coding Theory of cognition 
(PaMo, 1986; Sadoski, Paivio & Goetz, 199 1 ), and Case's theory of cognitive dwelopment 
(Case & Gritsn, 1990; Case, 1992). Both theories propose that two separate but inter- 
dependent conceptual structures are mvoived in cognition. The two theories are discussed 
below. 
Paivio's Dual C o d h  Theory 
Paisrio's Dual Codmg Theory of cognition (F%ivio, 1986; Sado* Paivio & G e t z ,  
199 1) postulates the existence of two separate mental subsyçtems - a language system and an 
"agery system The language system specializes in the representation and processing of 
verbal information. The irnagery syçtem specializes in the representation and p r o c e k g  of 
non-verbal infiormation (includmg idionnation fiom vitad, auditory, haptic and affective 
modalities). The two systems are hterconnected and c m  fiuiction mdependentiy in parallei, or 
m an integrated fashion. Within each system information is represented m a hierarchy and 
associations are fomed betweai units of mfonnation withm a system The ianguage system is 
seen as bemg organjzed in a sequential syntactic manner, whüe the imagery system is 
organizPd m a holistic, nested m e r .  Relations between systems are caIled referentiai 
connections that allow language to evoke imagery and vice versa. Associations and 
interconnections are ali probabilistic, with expenence and situational constraints determining 
the probability that an association or mterconnection is made. Sadoski et.aL (199 1) offer Dual 
Codmg as an alternative to schems theory and present data that they feel either discounts 
schema theory andior demonstrates how Dual Codmg is a more optimal exphnation for 
ikdings m schema and reading research. 
The results of the present investigation could be seen as lending support for a theory 
of cognition that differentiates between mental systems for verbal and non-verbal mformation. 
With visual, auditory, haptic and affective idormation represented in the imagery system, it is 
like1y that social interactions are represented to a considerable degree by this system. Thus, 
fàctors that are mvolved in a child's social competence (e.g., mterpretation of Msual and 
auditory mes, emotion, pre-emptive factors, praious eqenaices) may be represented to a 
greater degree by associations within the imagery system In the academic domain, t would 
be eqected that information is largely represented in the language system In the present 
mvestigation, performance on the academic competence tasks and the academic and social 
themes would re@e hvobement of the language system. Overlap will certainiy eMst. 
However, the differential resuhs found in analogical reasoning performance between the social 
and non-social domains may be due to the different properties of the imagery and language 
systems, witbm whicb the two domains are represented. 
Case's Theorv of Cognitive Develo~ment 
Similar to PaMo's Dual Coding theory, Case also postdates the existence of distinct 
central conceptual structures (Case & Griffen, 1990; Case, 1992) m social and non-social 
domains. 'Central conceptual structures' refer to intemal networks of concepts and relations 
among concepts that are represented semantically (as opposed to syntacticalty). These 
networks guide a person's thinking about particular situations In a series of experiments, 
Case and his coIleagues idenaed structures that were applicable to a broad range of content 
but only within specific domains. Of pdcular  relevance to the present investigation is that 
they identified one central conceptual structure thought to mediate performance on more 
quantitative problems such as scimMc or numericd tasks, and a second structure thought to 
mediate performance m social situations. In his theory, Case outlines various stages of 
Bitenectual development comesp ondmg t O: 
* level0 (4 years) - pre-dimensional stage, characterized by thmking that focus on 
global aspects of a situation, 
* level 1 (6 years) - dimensional stage, characterized by thmkmg that focus on a smgle 
dimension or variable, 
* level2 (8 years) - bi-dimensional stage, characterized by thinking that takes mto 
account two variableddimensions in a meaningfid fishion, and 
* level3 (10 years) - mter-related bi-dimensional stage, characterized by thslking that 
takes mto account two variableidimensions in an mtegrated fishion. 
Within each stage there are hypothesized substages that reflect increased understanding of the 
compIexity ofthe relations among concepts (see Case, 1992 for a more detailed account of his 
theory). Case and Grifnn (1990) examined the developmental progression of ski11 in 4 to 10 
year olds m a series of exp eriments m v o h g  quantitative problems (e.g., the-telkg, 
handling money, understanding concepts of the balance beam, and the projection of shadows) 
and social problems (e.g., identifjing feelings understandmg feelings, predicthg responses in 
social situations). For each set of problems, quantitative or social, perfomiance was very 
consistent across tasks, at each age 1eveL In order to fistrate the developmental stages and 
the social and numerical central conceptuai structures, the general findmgs from the 'time 
t e h g '  and 'understandmg feelings' tasks are descnied here. For quantitative problems, Case 
and GdEn (1990) congstently found the following progression: 
* by age four: understanding about variables m a globaVpolar manner - lmowing that 
hours are long and minutes are short, 
* by age six: representing variables on a continuum - knowing that 2 o'clock precedes 
3 o'clock, 
* by age eight: thmking m t e m  of two mdependent variables - knowhg hours and 
minutes on a clock, 
* by age ten: making cornparisons among any two mdependent variables - knowing 
that 1 hour 30 minutes is longer than 80 minutes. 
For social problems m v o h g  understanding feelings, Case & GrifGm (1990) found the 
followhg general developmental progression: 
* by age four: understandmg that mvohes a focus on an mtemal or extemal state but 
not both - knowing that something made h8n sa4 
* by age six: understanding how an event sequence is related to an mternal event - 
knowing that she did it to make him happy, 
* by age eight to t a :  understanding how an event sequence is related to two distinct 
mtemal states - knowing that she did t to make him happy because she loves him and 
doesi7t want bim hurt. 
As these examples illustrate, as children mature, they exhibit a progression hi th& 
complexity of understanding about the inter-relationships arnong variables. Ver- sinrply put, 
m the domah of numerical reasoning, development proceeds £iom a focus on a lmitary 
dimension to multiple dimensions, with complexÎty fhther mcreased by an expmding 
understandmg of the mter-relationships among these dimensions Simnrtrb m the social 
domain, development progresses fkom attention to one intemal date then several mtemal 
states, with complexity h h e r  mcreased by understanding these mternal states in an mtegrated 
fàshion. Several different research efforts in other domains (e-g., spatial representations, 
Demis, 1992; music Sght-reading, Capodilupo, 1992) have found Smilar results. That k, it 
appears that chüdren develop a central concephial structure m the social domain (or spatial, or 
music) that is unique in its specific elements and relations, but exhibits the same general 
progression m form as children's central conceptual structure in the quantitative domain. The 
data accunnilated by these researchers also suggest that the centrai conceptual structures are 
subject to a common set of constraints, for example, in speed of processing or in working 
memory, as well as experiaice and cultural fsctors (Case, 1992). 
Xnterestingly, this developmentd progression is also smiilar in form but different m 
content to Holyoak's (Holyoak & Thagard, 1995) conceptuakation of the development of 
analogical reasunhg skin. As noted m the introduction, Holyoak proposed that the 
development of children's analogical reasoning ski11 progresses fkom the abiüty: 
* by 18 months: to map Smüar attributes, 
* by age three: to map similar relations, 
* by age frve: to reason about higher order relations, 
* beyond age fbe: to understand increasingly coniplex relations. 
Thus, the dwelopment of analogous thinking is thought to proceed fiom the mappmg of 
atnibutes, then to the mapping of relations, and then later to the mappmg of mukiple relations 
with more complex mter-relationships. In a broad sense, this is a very simüar progression as 
m Case's (1992) formulation. haloalogical reasonhg is thought to be a central component of 
mtelligence, essential m the acquisition of new leaming, m particular (e.g., Sternberg, 1985; 
Goswami, 1992). It is therefore not surprishg that there is considerable overlap m Case's 
theory of cognitive development and Holyoak's theory of the development of andogicd 
reasoning. 
The results of the present investigation could be taken as evidence of two central 
conceptual structures m the academic and social domains, thereby lending support to Case's 
theory. The fhdmgs of a relationship between andogica.1 reasoning and academic competence 
but none between analogical reasoning and social competence could be accounted for by 
differences m the concephial structures of the academic and social domaius. The research by 
Case and others cited above demonstrates that, despite differences m specific elements and 
relations across domains, the fomi of the conceptuai structures was simüar. In contrast, the . 
present results app ear to highlight the difEerences between the two central conceptual 
structures. One might expect, &en the simüantes of fonn descnbed by Case, that the 
mapping of relations mvobed in analogies should have demonstrated Smilar form across the 
academic and social domains, despite the ciiffierences m content and relations. There was m 
fàct evidence of this simüar 'fonn' m the results. Despite the academic themes reflecting four 
di.Eerent content areas, overall performance on the four themes (not the mdividual themes) 
was related to acadeoric competence. In contrast, the absence of a relationship between 
analogical reas-g and social competence cm be taken as evidence that, although m 
fom, the central conceptuai structures are distinct. Factors that contriiiute to these 
différences may relate to the conmaints on the central conceptual structures (Case, 1992). 
Constraints on performance codd invohe p r o c e h g  constraints andor working memory 
constraint S. 
Processk Constraints 
We retum to the Xssue of the merence between automated versus reflective 
processing of information. The research cited as evidence of a social central conceptual 
structure invohes reflective responses to social situations (e.g., Goldberg-Reitman, 1 992: 
Bmchkowsky, 1992; McKeough, 1992; &if&, 1992). However, as noted earlier, the social 
competence tasks utilized m the present mvestigation are like1y derived Iargely fkom automatic 
responses to social mteractions. The sorting task, in contrast, is a reflective problem s o h g  
task. If the central conceptual structures are constrahed by the type of processin& it would 
be reasonable to expect differential results dependent on w h e k  processing bvohred 
automated versus refiective responses. Crick and Dodge (1994) also questioned whether the 
structure of social idormation processbg varies according to conscious and novel situations 
versus non-conscious and highly leamed situations. The present results support the notion 
that the structure of social information processing does indeed Vary m controiled vernis 
automatic processing circumstmces. 
Furthemore, consideration of the type of processing (automated versus refiective) 
could account for the hck of dinerential reçuhs in the academic versus social themes. That is, 
despite content ciifferences, performance on both academic and soîial analogous themes was 
found to be shnkly related to academic competence. This kding could be taken as atidence 
that, despte different content and relations, the form of reasoning was sjmiiar m the two 
domains, thereby d o h g  performance on both academic and social themes to demonstrate a 
relationship with academic competence. 
Workmg memory may also be a constraint on perfomance. The amount of 
knowledge needed to sohe the academic achievement test and soa the analogous themes is 
essentially fixed m tems of the number of concepts and relations among concepts that are 
presented m the problems. In the social domain, howwer, the load on workhg memory is 
dWerent. Ifthe subject responds airtomatically or habitdy, wiîh M e  thought, then 
conceivabiy the load on working memory is dnbxd, particuiarly m compatison to the 
problem solving load m academic tasks. Conversely, in more refiective situations, additional 
factors such as emotion, praious experience, and pre-emptive Eictors, make social problem 
çolvhg a more complex process with heavier demands on working memory d e n  compared 
to academic tasks That is, there would be a lot more to think about. However, I suspect 
&en the time and effort subjects used to complete the categorization task, that the greater 
complexQ would lie with the reasoning ta& Social responses while potentially infhenced by 
a myriad of Bctors, are more habituai (Crick & Dodge, 1994) and may uhimately be restncted 
to the maience of only a few fktors. Thus, constrahts on working memory may be different 
m academic and social problem s o h g ,  and this reflects distinct centrai conceptual structures. 
Thus the differential resuhs m comparing analogical reaçoning skill with academic and 
social competence suggest that something 'difXerent9 is occuning m the two doxnains. These 
results are consistent with two system theorîes of Case and Paivio, as weIl as the recognition 
of others that visual images and affect may be represented Werently m memory than verbaI 
idormation (e.g., Stein, Brock, Ballard & Vye, 1987; Nelson & Castano, 1984; Iran-Nejad, 
1987). 
Thinking Sküls Programs Revisited 
As a prelimhas, investigation, the resuhs are fàr fi0111 conchuive on many issues, 
hcludmg m a h g  recommendations for hstruction. Howwer, the resuhs do support some 
practices that are in place, and raise questions about other assumptions that guide 0th- 
programs. 
The present resdts support the notion of the iniportance of promoting a solid 
knowledge base and developing analogîcal reasonhg slalls. Reasoning by analogy mvohes 
ski11 m workmg out the relations m a p a r t i c h  situation and appwg  these relations to 
another sitution. Fundamental to andogous thhkhg is an understanding of the relations on 
which an analogy is based. Moreover, a .  mdividual will be more successfu m u h g  an 
analogy when the critical relational knowledge is part of a wellhtegrated system of 
conceptual knowledge. Faihire to apply an analogy may arise for a varie9 of reasons. This 
could happen $the relations are not worked out or fully understood The mformation could 
be embedded in the knowledge structure m a Manner that does not dow access to the 
mformation. Ako, performance &ors could mterfere, such as not recogn-g that an 
analogy is appropriate, or being eady distracted by extraneous task factors. Here, 
metacognitive SU wül be important as mdividuals wül benefit fiom an understandmg of their 
own knowledge and leafumg, and the ability to monitor and wahiate th& own thought 
processes. Instruction in analogical reasonhg has been shown to be effective, particularly 
when subjects are told to use an analogy (e-g., Gick & Holyoak, 198 1, 1983), when they are 
provided with the requigte relational knowledge needed to sohe a problem (e.g., Brown, 
et& 1986), when they receive direct instruction and coaching in cross-domain transfer of 
reasonhg skills (e.g., Lowenthal & Pons, l987), and when care is taken to iden* and 
correct the application of misleadhg analogies (e.g., Spiro, Feltovich, Coulson & Anderson, 
1989). Holyoak and Koh's (1 987) hding of summation of activation of multiple features 
would suggea that mstruction and transfer will be promoted by multiple nies, both salient 
mrfàce features and structural principles. Case (1992) would further argue for the utility of 
mstnicting and training smaIi mcremental steps m relational reasoning. Brown and Goswami 
(1992) wodd recommend the promotion of metacognitive slaIls. 
A signincant number of thmkmg sküls programs include mstniction m analogical 
reasoning as part of their program (see Chipman, Segal & Glaser, 1985, for a rewiew). 
TypicaUy this is presented m a separate lesson or skiIl to be acquired (e.g., deBono, 1980; 
Feuerstein, 1981). Perhaps one problem with such programs is that analogical reasoning is 
treated as an isolated skin to be leamed. Certabdy, as a critical aspect of intelligence, and 
&en that we are becoming more sensitive to effective methods to induce andogy, then 
attention to fàctors important m developmg analogical reasoning should penneate thinking 
skills programs to a greater degree. 
While the above seems pertinent to a wide range of content domains, the present 
investigation casts some doubt on the t rader  of these skills to the social domain. Certain& 
this raises questions about the assumption underiying such programs as the SPELT program 
(Andrews, et.aL, 1990) that endeavour to teach reasoning that is expected to transfer to both 
the social and academic domains. In the present investigation, something dramatically 
Merent occurred in the children's performance when analogical reasoning was compared to 
academic performance versus social performance. It may be an artifàct of the materials used, 
the procedure, or the reliance on analogical thmkmg, but no relationship was found between 
analogical reasoning skiil and social coqetence as rated by the subjects, their peers and 
teachers. While school-based social problem s o b g  traming programs have dernonstrated 
effectiveness m mjauencing the social sküls of children (e.g., Gesten & Weissberg, 1986), it 
does not yet follow that effective training m academic problem solving will necessarüy 
influence social problem sohring. Many questions remah to be answered, but certainly 
caution is needed before the asnimption of similar processing in the academic and social 
domains can be accepted. 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
As a preliminary mvestigation that bas attempted to dire@ compare cognitive and 
social-cognitive problem sohcmg, it is not surprishg that many questions are raised and fàr 
fewer answered. 
Analo~ical Reasonin~ and Academic Com~etence 
The present investigation was successful in demonstrating that success m identifjing 
analogies is related to academic competence. This relationship was evident even after 
statiseically controlling for Werences in domain-spedc knowledge. Sweral unresolved 
issues were raised by the kdings. Consequently, friture research would mvohe examining the 
following areas: 
* modifications to the experimental materials (ie., the analogical reasoning ta& and 
lmowledge test) and procedures, 
* M e r  examination of the role of generd process versus domain specific knowledge, 
* exploration of developmental dineremes across a wider spectnim of ages, and 
* M e r  exploration of transfer of learning across academic and sonal learning 
situations. 
Modifications to the Ex~erimenta 1 Materials 
The Analogjcal Reasonbg Task. 
The themes employed in the present investigation represented content fiom severai 
different domains of knowledge within the more general academic domain. Correlations 
among individual themes were small, wi3e correlati~ns among the group of academic themes 
were more noteworthy. It would be hteresting to expand the themes to include several 
themes wahm each academic content area (e.g., several themes fiom the domains of 
arithmetic, science, biology, environmental issues) m order to examine more closely the 
relationship between competence and analogies, and the role of content howledge. 
The themes were consûucted such that each scenario contained three sentences; one 
containhg the underlying principle, one containhg a surfàce feature, and one 'filler' or neutral 
sentence. The scenarios were written at a grade 4/5 leveL A variation on these materials 
wouid be to conshuct the themes with greater attention paid to the relations mvolved m order 
to successfiühl map the analogy. This codd mvohre creatmg themes varyïng the complexity 
among the relations. Similarly, the themes could be fashioned after Case's (1992) 
conceptualhion of central structures, with a focus on controhg the number of variables 
and the mter-rehtionships among the variables across the themes. 
F i n a  to give the social themes a more appropriate social 'fIavourY (Le., to corne 
closer to an approximation of the social situation), the scenarios could be presented m 
pictorial as opposed to sentence format. 
Future research should also deviate f?om the use of these materials to other 
methodologies. ûf choice would be the examination of actual problem sohing situations, 
within which the sensitivity to underlying principles cm be determined. As some researchers 
have suggested, this technique is the moa valid in generating appropriate conclusions about 
real-life problem s o h g  (e.g., Schraagen, et.& 1993). 
The Knowledge Test 
The content of the scenarios was origindy chosen to be well within the knowledge 
base of the Grade 6 and 8 subjects. As a result, scores near ceiling level were anticipated. 
However, there was enough variation to warrant the need to statistically control for 
knowledge differences. Unfominately, the restncted variance of the knowledge data was not 
an optimal situation within which to interpret the statistical analyses. Future research should 
mclude a more demanclhg knowledge test such that the distn'bution of subjects' scores would 
more closely approxkte a normal distniution. 
General Process versus DomainS~ecific Knowledee 
In entering the debate over the relative conmbution of general process factors and 
content knowledge, the present mvestigation mdicated that both are important. Instead of 
attempting to argue in fàvour of one or the other, it would be more SuafiU to examine the 
elements in both that lead to succeçsful problem sohring. h order to accomplish this, the use 
of the thmk-aloud procedure may be helpful This technique wodd aUow more detailed 
analyses of the tbinkbg that is mvohred m completing the categorization task. ConceÏvabiy 
information could be had about content and the relations among the content that result in 
more succe& performance. Idormation about the knowledge structures could be acquired, 
hcludmg how aspects of cohesion and hierarchy relate to competence (Chi, et& 1988). 
Similariy, thmk aloud protocols could mdicate how analogous information is successfuly 
mapped between scenarios, and the relative influence of underiymg principles and s d c e  
feahues This could conceivably have implications for theones of analogy, m determining the 
importance of the relations among elements (e.g., Gentna's (1989) Structure Mappmg 
theory), goals in problem s o h g  (e.g., Holyoak's (1989) pragmatic theory), and specSc 
detailç (e-g., Ross' (1989) Exemplar theory) m the successfbl solution of analogies. In 
addition, thmk aloud protocols m conjmction with the categorization task could dso 
contribute mformation about the relationçhip between competence and the use of 
metacognaive howledgelslalls in identifLing andogous information. 
Developmental Issues 
Grade 6 and Grade 8 children were utilized m the present investigation. While the 
Grade 8 children were more successful m identifjing analogies and had a better howledge 
base than the Grade 6 children, the same relationsbip between analogical reasoning and 
academic comp etence was found. The nature of the materials did not d o w  for closer 
consideration of developmental Merences due to competence, howledge, or metacognitive 
differences. However, systematic modifications to the problem sohing materials could begin 
to address a variety of developmental issues. 
Developmental theones of analogical development are dMded by the view of 
development occurring m stages (the competaice deficit view, e.g., Sternberg, 1977; 
Holyoak, 1989), vernis viewing developmental differences as behg due to increasingly 
sophisticated and effective metacognitive skills or relationai lmowledge (e.g., Gowuami & 
Brown, 1992; Goswami, 1992; Vosniadou, 1977). This discrepancy could be addressed by 
presenting these materials to subjects at di£ferent ages (ensuring that Wcuity level is 
controlled), and deteminhg whether knowledge/analogical reasoning exert differential 
influence at Merent ages. Inchrding th8ik aloud protocols (as demied  above) may provide 
more infiormation about stage versus metacogoitive ninuences. Altemativeiy, the themes 
could be created in a mamer that increases the complexity of the conceptual relations 
presented m the themes across the various age levels (according to Case's (1992) or 
Holyoak's (1989) theories of the development of cognition~analogical reasoning). Ideally , it 
would be interestmg to r n o e  materials according to Holyoak's (Holyoak & T'hagard, 1994) 
&or Case's (1992) developrnental stages (discussed earlier as overlspping), and to then 
examine performance on these tasks utilking thmk doud protocois to also explore 
metacognitive iduences. 
Transfer of Learnine and train in^ Studies 
One &al area to consider in looking to friture endeavours is that of training -dies 
that address academic and social problem somg Smuhaneously (e.g., Andrews, et. a l ,  1990). 
The hdmgs of the present investigation suggest that problem sohing in the two domains is 
quite dif5erent. Much more research is needed before any conchisons can be drawn. 
However, the present r e d s  suggea that even iftrainhg general processes may as& in 
transfer of leamhg across the disparate domains, this tramfer is not gomg to occur m a 
simplistic, straightforward marner. This issue is M e r  discussed below. 
AnaloeicaI Reasoning and Social Corn~etence 
An inipoxtant issue raised by the present mvestigation is why andogical reasoning skill 
did exhiba a relationship with perceived social coqetence. Certaidy the 
implications/ramXcations of this nndmg (as was discussed) is to question the role of 
analogical reasoning m social cognition, and the underlying açsumptions about process m the 
mfomiation processing models that have been proposed. There are several questions that 
need to be addressed m funire research. 
1) Can the absence of an analogical reasoning - social success relationship be 
accounted for by inherentiy different processing of mforrnation under automated versus 
reflective conditions? 
Snidies have compared chüdren's automatic and reflective processhg of information (e.g-, 
Rabmer, et.aL, 1990). Children mering in social aatus have been found to respond 
Werently dependmg on the type of processing. For example, Rabmer (1990) found that 
rejected non-aggressive boys processed infoxmation adequately under reflective cirnimstances 
but inadequately under automatic conditions. As a fouow-up to the present research, it would 
be interestmg to replicate the studies presented here in two ways, according to the following 
modifications: 
* RefIective processhg: Retain the original andogous materials and academic 
competence tasks (as weli as the social competence tasks, for cornparison), and introduce 
hypothetical-reflective measures of social competence. In this design, ail tasks would invoive 
responding under reflective circxmstances. 
* Automated processhg: R e t h  the original measures of social competence and 
m o d e  the measures of analogical reasoning and academic competence such that they are 
assessing more automatic processing. The actual mechanics of designhg this latter alternative 
would be far more difficult than the former. ûne means to accompli& this would be to 
change the materials fiom a categorization task to soMg areryday social and non-social 
problems. The problems could be presented such that problems initiany presented could 
potentdly as& in sohring subsequent analogous problem (Sniüar to Gick & Holyoak, 1983, 
or Holyoak & Ko4 1987, but with real-life problems). A second method would be to retain 
the categorization task, but present the themes as a speeded task requiring quick responses. 
Tbis would 1Mit (although probably not elhinate) reflective processing of mformation. 
Subjects would need to quiclcly determine which scenarios are similar, thereby demonstrating 
subjects' sensdivm/ to underlying principles and surface features, but with minimal time to 
reflect on their problem sohtmg 
2) As indicators of peer status, have the indexes of social cornpetaice employed here 
provided an adequate assesment of the generai constnict of social competence? 
In order to address the differences between indexes of peedother reaction to a chüd versus a 
child's actions m social situations, more tasks assessing competent behaviour m social 
situations need to be mcluded m the design. Ide-, this would mchide direct observation. A 
related technique would be to create contrived Stuations using child codederates to çhidy 
how targeted children respond m what they believe to be acnial situations. 
3) 1s andopical reasoning a component of problem s o h g ,  but not adequate on its 
own to demonstrate a refationship with social competence (ie., an additive factor)? 
If analogous thinking is only one aspect of many that determines success m problem sohring, 
then a more adequate research design would be to address severai aspects of information 
processing. For example, this could potentially mvolve a smiilar but expanded design that 
may mclude (some, al1 or more than) the foliowing: 
* fiee recall of the scenarios - to examine how the problem situation is mitially 
represented (i e., '?dent@ the problem"), 
* categorization of the scenarios - to examine how andogous idiorr~tion is r 
presented and similarities mapped, (i e., c?nental representation and int erpretation"), 
* grnerathg lists of various possible solutions (ie., "search for alternative soIutions"), 
* choosing the bea response (Le., 'ïmplement the chosen response"), and fhally, 
* ratmg how weU the sceoarios were sorted (Le., 'cevahate the response"). 
Ifthe innuence of analogical reasonhg is mdeed additive, then several measures of different 
aspects of processhg may reveal a relationship with social competence. 
4) Do other factors such as ernotion, pre-emptive fimors, and previous experience, 
play a more significant role in social information processing than has yet been determined? 
The mvohrement of fàctors such as exnotion, preemptive fàctors (ie., script-based, automatic, 
' W o u t  thmking" thmkmg), and previous experience are recent additions to the social 
information processEg fiamework (Cnck & Dodge, 1994). Little empirical research has been 
conducted examhing the role these factors play in mformation processhg. It would be 
interestmg to contraa the present investigation - wiùch focuses on process aspects of 
idonnation processing - with comparative research examinhg these 'other' i c to r s  This 
could possily mvohe mrinipulating the emotional arousal or previous experiences of a child 
pnor to receiving the scenarios (e.g.,, see Dodge & Somberg, 1987). Again, ifthese other 
factors do show a significt relationship with social cornpetaice, then conceivably their role 
m mformation processing needs to be elaborated more fi@. 
5) Are 'mental actions', as yet little studied, an important aspect of social-cognitive 
mformation processhg, and what are cntical process variables m social cognition? 
Crick & Dodge (1994) recommended more research be conducted on process aspects of 
social Hiformation processhg. Much of the social literature has focused on 'what children 
think' as opposed to 'how children W'. Results nom the present mvestigation would 
suggea that analogous thinking is not a significant factor in social competence. However, 
before m y  conclusions can be reached, studies employing a variety of different analogous 
materials, as weil as many of the manipulations suggested above need to be conducted. Also, 
other process variables (e.g., how outcome expectations are used to select responses; 
evaluations of responses) would be worthy of exploration. 
6) Ahhough there is considerable evidence that analogical reasonÏng is a central 
component of cognition (e.g., Poiya, 1957; Sternberg, 1985; Holyoak & Thagard, 1995)' is it 
a central component of social cognition? 
Future investigations should mchde several Mirent measures of analogical reasoning, as 
those found m the literature, with attention to both automated and refiective respondhg, and 
the need to expand the assesment of social competence. For example, analogous social 
situations (smilar to Gick & Holyoak's (1983) work) could mvohe presenting a problematic 
social situation with a solution, then following this with an analogous social situation and 
asking subjects to sohe the problem An even more real-Hie situation wouid be for subjects to 
be a bystander in a 'staged' problem situation that is sohred successfiiny by another, and 
observhg whether the subjects are subsequentiy able to sohre an analogous problem. The 
materials used m the present mvestigation may not be representative of or sensitive enough to 
measure analogous thinking that takes place m social situations and relate to social 
competence. However? if fiinire research continues to tuni up an absence of a relationship 
between social competence and analogous thinking then the critical role of analogical 
reasoning m cogoition needs to be re-considered as it relates to social cognition. 
7) 1s the idormation-processing fiamework &&nt or wen adequate to account for 
social problem s o k g  behaviour? Or more genera.llyy is it a reasonable assumption that 
similar processes underlie cognitive and social-cognitive problem sohing? 
The cognitive and social-cognitive models of problem s o h g  postdate similar mderlyhg 
processes (e.g., NeweU & Simon, 1972; Hayes, 198 1; Crick & Dodge, 1994). Also, 
analogical reasonhg is considered to be a central component of cognition. Ifthe analogical 
reasonbg - social competence relationship remains non-existent despite M e r  research, then 
the social-cognitive mformation processing fiamework would need to be revked or an 
alternate framework formulated to reflect the difkences found. 
Concluding Comments 
The present research identified an analogical problem sohing task that was equated 
across the social and non-social d o h s .  Of particula. interest to the general processhg 
versus do&specinc knowledge debate, the reailts demonstrated the importance of both 
content lmowledge and anaiogical reasoning skül as influences on academic competence. 
However, as the 'knowledge' and 'process' accounts of problem sohring become more 
elaborated and kely  tuned, the degree to which they reflect different positions seems bhmed. 
Both accounts demonstrate considerable overlap m the critical aspects of reasming, nameiy, 
the Enportance of an understanding of the mter-relationships among relations m analogical 
reasoning. 
The analogical reasoning - competence relationship was evident wirh academic 
social competence, thereby raishg questions about the assumption of similar processing m 
theoretical f o ~ t i o n s  of cognitive and social-cognitive problem s o h g .  Furthemore, the 
results do not provide support for trainhg programs that endeavour to promote transfer of 
leamhg across social and academic domains. However, the resuhs are supportive of theones 
of cognition that postulate two (or more) central conceptual structures. 
As a prelimmary mvestigation that directiy equates problem çohring in the social and 
academic domains, few answers but many questions were generated. Cert- the questions 
raised have implications for currentiy accepted problem sohring theories and warrant attention 
in hture research, 
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APPENDIX A= THE PILOT STUDY 
Introduction 
Reasonhg and problem sohring are highly vaiued skiIls. Traditionally, these skiIls 
have been associated with intenecnial and academic achievement. More recentiy, research 
interest in reasoning and problem s o h g  sküls has been extended to mchide behavioural and 
social aspects of human hctioning. It is assumed m much of this work that Smilar general 
cognitive processes underlie these Werent domains of human capabilities (e.g., Hayes, 198 1; 
Dodge, 1986; Mancini, Short, Mulcahy & Andrews, 199 1). The present study was a 
preliminary mvestigation of the issue of wlietha simüar processes underlie social and 
academic (non-social) problem sohring. It's major purpose was to e v h t e  a vaiety of tasks 
for possible mclusion in subsequent studies Five tasks were developed to assess putative 
analogous processes m the academic and social domains that have been postulated to occur in 
the eady stages of problem sohring. The study also began to address the issue of whether skiü 
m sohring problems m a particular domain is related to overd competence m that do&. An 
additional mterest, then, was to evahiate for subsequent use a variety of indices of academic 
and social competence. 
Information Processing Modeh of Problem Solving 
Many of the more recent, prominent theories of cognitive and social - cognitive 
problem sohring are based on Neweii and Simon's (1972) mfomtion processing mode1 (e.g., 
Hayes, 1981; Dodge, 1986; Rubin & Krasnor, 1986). Neweli and Simon's mode1 views the 
problem soker Hi terms of a serial idormation processing system that mteract s with a task 
mironment (the presenting problem). Problem s o h g  is thought to mvohre the following 
stages: 
1) attendmg to sençory input m the ta& environment, 
2) constmcting an intemal representation of the problem, 
3) searchg for a solution, 
4) selecting a solution, and 
5) implementing a soiution. 
This fiamework has been successfiil in modeling general search strategies in s o m g  well- 
stnictured problems that have cleariy defined initial and goal States. However, such problems 
provide limited msights mto red-world leamhg which requires the acquisition of domain 
specific knowledge. Consequenth,, other formuiations of problem s o h g  have eqhasized 
knowledge-based representations in the fom of schemas (e.g., Anderson, Greeno, Kline & 
Neves 198 1). While the same stages of problem s o k g  are assumed in these models, it is 
additionally assumed that, m 'knowledge-filled' as opposed to 'knowledge-fiee' domains, 
features of a problem may activate lmowledge in memory durkg the construction of the 
problem representation. If a schema for a particular type of problem is activated, then the 
strategies and procedures found in the schema will be implernented. Otherwise, a search 
strategy is employed to search for an altemate soiution to the problem 
In the social problem sohing literature, Dodge (1986) has developed an 
mformation processing mode1 of social problem s o b g  that is based on Neweii and Simon's 
modeL Dodge's mode1 describes how chüdren process social idonnation, and how this 
processing of information directiy mfhiences their responses to social Stuations. He proposed 
that social problem sohring hvohes: 
1) encoding social mes in the environment, 
2) creating a mental representation and interpretmg the social stimdi, 
3) engaging m a response search invohrsig generating a number of possible 
alternatives, 
4) decidmg on a response, and 
5) enacting the response. 
The stages are essentially the same as N e d  and Simon's problem sohing stages, and are 
based on similar assumptions. 
The information processing models assume that problem sohring occurs m a 
sequential fàshion, with later stages infiuenced by earlier stages. Thus, problem sohing 
proceeds within the fiamework provided by the mtemal or mental representation. This 
suggests that the mental representation of information is a crucial, early stage m the problem 
s o k g  process. The present study focuses on this aspect of problem sohing. 
Social versus NonSocial Problem Solving 
While the rnodels of cognitive problem solving and social-cognitive problem 
s o h g  are based on essentialiy the same theoretical fiamework, there is no hown  research 
that has directly compared problem sohhg in social and non-social (academic) domains 
There have been discussions m the literature that have dram paraflels between existing 
research in cognitive and social-cognitive problem sohhg (e-g., Wyer & Gordon, 1984), but 
no known empirical testmg ushg equated materials in the social and non-social domains. 
Relationships between academic and social competence have also bem studied (e.g., Wentzel, 
199 1). Furthemore, at least one thmking sküls program (ie. SPELT; Mulcahy, Andrews & 
Peat, 1988; Andrews, 1987) is based on the assumption that generalizable skills are mvohred 
m academic and social problem sohring. In this program, trainhg academic and social 
problem s o h g  skills is thought to promote transfer and generaluability of the skiiis across 
the academic (non-social) and social domains (e.g., Mulcshy, et ai., 1988; Andrews, 1987). It 
is also assumed that competence is associated with problem s o h g  ability m both domÏns. 
Extensive training sessions with large groups of students have been conducted. However, 
there is no lmown research that has directly examined the assumption that there are general 
skills underlymg academic and social problem sohing. Moreover, there is no known research 
that has studied the relationçhrp between competence and problem s o h g  in both the social 
and non-social domains. 
In order to investigate whether simiiar processes underlie social and academic 
problem sohring, the present study employed tasks fiom the e>risting problern sohring research 
m one domain (academic or social) and developed 'equivalent' measures m the other domain. 
In addition, measures of competence were obtained to examine the reIationship between 
competence and problem s o h g  in the two domaim. 
Clarifieri tion of Terminology 
Before proceedmgy clarification of terminology used m this study is needed The 
distmction between social and non-social domains lies largely m the differepce between the 
processing of information in social mteraction~~ versus the non-social mformation cMdren 
deal with every &y m academic tasks m the school setting. Clearly, the two domains are not 
mutudy exciusive. In an attempt to mhimize confiision and to allow a cornparison of the 
differences between the two domainsY the 'acadedc' m academic problem s o h g ,  academic 
competence, or the various academic tasks presented to subjects m this study, refers to 
cognaive processing of mformation that is non-sociaL 
Problem Solving 
Five tasks were used to assess skill in problem s o h g :  
1) Towers of Hanoi (TOH) 
2) Picture Vignettes (PV) 
3) Unnnished Stones (US) 
4) Analogous Situations (Anal) 
5) S o r - g  Ta& (SRT) 
The tasks were modeled on tasks wliich have been employed in the experimental literature on 
cognitive and social-cognitive problem s o h g .  Each task was considered to contriiute 
idiormation about how subjects construct mental representations of problems as part of the 
eady stages of sohring a problem, as postulated by Neweil and Simon (1972) and Dodge 
(1986). Each ta& and the rationale for its mchsion is descriied below. 
Tower of Hanoi (TOH) 
In this task subjects were &en three poles, with three discs increasing in ske on 
the fit pole. The goal was to move the discs, one at a time without placing a larger disc on 
top of a d e r  one, to the last pole (see Appaidix A 1). Subjects' 'think aloud' protocols 
were recorded and later analyzed. The TOH has beem employed in modehg general search 
stratedes m problem s o m g  behavior when the initial and goal States of a problem are we& 
specified (e-g., Newen & Simon, 1972; Kotovsky, Hayes & Simon, 1985). The TOH 
represents the 'ciassic', 'knowledge-fiee' problem s o h g  paradigm (e.g., Newell and Simon, 
1972), which is stin beirig used and continues to provide new msights mto problem solving 
skiil (e-g., Kotovsky, Hayes & Simon, 1985). Ahhough no 'equivalent ' social materials were 
created, the TOH was included to explore the relationship between 'knowledg e- fiee' problem 
s o h g  and 'knowledge-rich' problem sohring. 
The strategy chosm to solve the TOH win depend on how the problem space is 
represented interna& by the problem solver. It was feh that the variables of number of errors 
commitîed and time to complete the task would refiect the efficiency and accwacy with which 
subjects understood the problem (ie., their mtemal representation). Thus, measures of t h e  
to solution and number of errors wodd provide msight into the adequacy of the subjects' 
mental representation. Longer time and more errors made before the problem was sohred 
would be mdicative of a less accurate mental representation of the problem space. 
Pichire Vipnettes 0 and Unfmished Stories CUS) 
In these tasks bnef stories were presented about problem situations that ended jua 
short of a problem solution. AU stories were created by the author. Subjects followed dong 
as a aory was read to them, then answered questions about the story. Four stories were 
presented to subjects for both the Picture Vignettes and Unfimished Stories. Two stories 
contained social content (i e., problem situations of possible provocation (PV) and joining 
games (US), and two stories contained non-social content (Le., themes of using tools (US) 
and displacement of water (PV) to solve problems). The difference between the two tasks 
was that the PicWe Vignettes (PV) stories were line-drawhg pictures with captions, while 
the Udnkhed Stones (US) presented the text ody. The US passages were longer than the 
PV pictures-phs-captions Blanks were distnited throughout the US çtories that omitted 
mformation that expiicitly stated the goal of the story. That is, subjects needed to &e the 
correct inferences m order to understand the problem. The 'picture-plus-caption' vernis 'text 
ody' difference between the PV and US stories contrasts visual v m s  verbal only 
information. PV more closely approximated the visual mformation provided m social 
situations through the use of pictures. Thus, it was thought that with its emphasis on pictorial 
Siformation, performance on PV might show a stronger relationship with social competence. 
Similarly, with its emphasis on reading text, performance on US might show a stronger 
relationsbip with academic competence. 
The use of 'picture stories' has been used m the social problem sohring literature to 
approximate the social cues present in real-life social situations (e.g., Rubin, 1983). h o ,  the 
PV and US are hypothetical-refleaRre passages, similv to those used Hi the social problem 
s o h g  literature (see Bream, 1989). 'Hypothetical-refleCti.vey refers to presenting subjects 
with a hypothetical problem situation, and a h g  subjects to pretend they are in that situation 
and solve the problem. Although hypothetical-reflective measures are not thought to be 
equivalent to real-We problem s o b g ,  they are thought to assess the ability to reason and 
thmk about social dilemmas. Accordhg to devdopmental theorists (Damon, 1977; Cooney & 
Selmaq 1978), real Mie problem sohring is thought to hg behind hypothetical problem s o h g .  
Of particular interest to the present investigation in using hypothetical-reflective materials, is 
subjects' perception or mterpretation of the problm situation. 
In the cognitive problem sohrgig literature, researchers studying reading and 
schema theory, for example, have used subjects' recd of passages to mvestigate aspects of 
reasoning and problem solving (e.g., Vosniadou, Pearson & Rogers, 1988). The common 
element is the use of story recall to mfer how information essential m sones is represented (or 
not represented) in memory. The current mvestigation was mterested m how problem 
situations in stories are mtenially represented This was addressed through analyses of 
subjects' recall of essential problem s o w g  elements m the stories. PV and US contras visual 
idormation (felt to approximate social mes) with text only idormation (more common m 
academic situations). 
Analoeous Situations 
Thiç ta& was adapted fiom one used by Holyoak, J m  and Billman (1984) in 
çtudies of analogical reasonimg Hi young children. They presented children, wÏth a story about 
a genie who had the problem of how to move his jewels fiom his m e n t  homehotde to a new 
home/bottle. The genie sohred his problem by rollhg up his magic carpet and rolling his 
jewels through the tube mto his new home. M e r  havhg each child recall the story (and 
ensuring that the problem situation was recalled), subjects were presented with a transfer ta&. 
This involved generating as mauy dinient ways as possible to move balls fiom one bowl to 
another, using a variety of materials. Ofinterest, was whether a solution analogous to that 
used by the genie was applied (ie., whether the chüdren roiled up the construction paper that 
was provided and rolled the bail through this 'tube'). In the present research, the genie story 
and bail problem were used as the non-social or academic mate*. Social materials (story- 
plus-problem and transfer task) were created by the author. The story was about a monster 
who wanted to eat a rabbit, but the rabbit talked him out of it by reaching a reasonable 
compromise. In the tramfier task, subjects were asked to a a  out (using various characters and 
a school setting that were provided) different ways to resohe the social dilemma of a school 
bully wanting to beat up the subject after school The analogous sohxtion was to talk out the 
problem and arrive at a mutually beneficial solution. 
Holyoak et. al (1984) found that young children were able to use the analogous 
solution presented m the precedmg story to sohte the tramfier problem. However, 
performance varied according to wiiether the children needed a hmt. In the present shidy, no 
need for a hmt was considered a benchmark of better problem soîving skiil and cornpetence. 
It was expected that generation of the analogous solution wodd depend on whether subjects' 
intemal representation of the story solution made the relationshq, to the transfer task obvious 
(ie., no need for a hint) or whether prompting was needed. 
Sortine Task 
Subjects received two sets (one academic and one social) of nine, briec three- 
sentence scenarios. Oae set or theme descn'bed different animals' use of defense mechanisms 
(academic materials), and the other set or theme d e s d e d  social mteractions m situations of 
possible peer provocation (social materials). Subjects were asked to S O ~  the scenarios m each 
theme mto three related piles, and to descnbe their rationale m sorting the cards. 
The academic problem s o k g  materials were drawn fiom Brown's (Brown & 
Kane, 1988) research on pre-schoolers use of analogical reasoning skiusskius She used brief 
animal stories to teach young children about biological concepts of visual mimicry, naturd 
pest control and camouflage. She fomd that the chiidren were subsequently able to use these 
general concepts in analogous animal stories. That k, children were able to idem* the 
anaiogy or underlyhg priuciple (UP) when presented with novel animal stones. For the social 
materials, modified versions of the hypothetical-reflective scenarios created by Bream (1989) 
to study social problem soMg m situations of potential peer codlict, were used. Underlying 
principles of possible peer embarrasment, rejection and provocation were depicted in the 
scenarïos. The academic and social passages were modified m the present mvestigation to 
create a senes of bnef stories or scenarios of similar length which contained the undermg 
principles or generai concepts used by Brown and Bream In addition, common surface 
features or detaüs explicitly stated m bnef stories/scenarios were mcluded. 
Examination of subjects use of underlying principles is h o  a primary focus of 
investigation in the expert-novice iiterature (e.g., Chi, FehoMch & Glaser, 1981). How 
nibjects categorized the scenarios m the present study mdicated sen* to analogous 
mformation (underlyhg phciples), or conversely, the tendency to focus on more obvious, 
details (mrfkce features). Thus subjects' mental representation of mformation, m terms of 
sensitivity to analogous mformation versus les  relevant details, was studied. 
Relationships of performance on the sorting ta& to other problem sohring and 
competence tasks were also explored. It was expected that identification of UP wodd be 
related to more success on other tasks of problem s o h g  and competence. 
Competence Tasks 
Several tasks were selected to provide converging data about the broad constnicts 
of academic and social competence. This included measures of non-verbal IQ, academic 
achievement, a sociometric rating scale, and teacher ratings (both academic and social). 
m 
General intelligence was assessed using a non-verbal standardized test (TOM; 
Brown, Sherbenou & Johsen, 1982)' to allow cornparisons between performance on the 
problem s o b g  tasks and on an index of general reasonhg. Roblem s o i h g  skills are 
considered to be an miportant aspect of intelligence (Sternberg, 1980). Investigation of the 
relationship between IQ and the problem s o h g  tasks would provide information about the 
validity of the materials to demonstrate subjects' use of generalized reasoning sküls (ie., 
problem s o h g ) .  
Academic Achievement 
An assessrnent of academic achievement was obtained using a standardized test of 
reading (Woodcock, 1987). 
Sociometric 
Sotiometxic rating scales have been used to obtain peer perceptions of an 
individual's social competence (e-g., Singleton & Asher, 1977). A sociometric ratmg scde 
was used, where each subject was rated accordmg to how much they are Wred by m e r  
peers. 
Teacher Ratines 
Teacher ratings have been found to demonstrate siiificant relationships with both 
academic and social competence (e.g., Green, Forehand, Beck & Vosk, 1980). Three 
différent rating scales were used m the present study, mchiding two general statements that 
rated academic and social competence and problem sohring ski& and one rathg scale ushg 
academic and s o d  content items fkom the Teacher-Child Rating Scale (TC'eRS; Hightower, 
Work, Cowen, Lotyczewski, Spmell, Guare & Rohrbeck, 1986). These item on the TC'eRS 
are thought to desmie the constmcts of academic and social competence. 
Subjects in Grade i he  were seen indMdualiy and completed the academic and 
social competence and problem s o b g  ta&. Due to time constraints, subjects completed 
four of the fÏve probiem s o h g  activities, ahemately omittsig either the PV or US tasks. 
Correlational analyses were largeiy used to examine the relationships among problem sohring 
activities, and between competence and problem sohbg tasks. ûfparticular mterest was the 
degree of similarity in the processing EvoIved during the eady stage of problem sohing, 
namely the mental representation of idormation. Interrelationships among problem s o h g  
tasks in a single domain would mdicate the degree of sinüanty m the processes that underlie 
these tasks. Intercorrelations between the academic and social ta& wodd address the issue 
of whether generalized skills versus ski& specific to a parti& domain predominate m 
problem sohring. Fmally, co~~elations between competence and problem s o b g  tasks would 
mdicate how early problem sohring processes are related to overd competence m a domain. 
Method 
Subiects 
Forty-three children served as subjects m this study. There were 19 females and 
26 males, fkom NO, Grade 5 classrooms in a school m the City of York Board of Education. 
The average age was 10.9 years. Subjects who participated m the study were all those whose 
parents gave writt en p enmission. 
Ma teriais 
Assessrnent of Co~nitive and Social Cornrietence 
Subjects' overaIl, academic and social competence were assessed by uing 
standardized tests and rathg sales. 
General mteliieence was assessed ushg the Test of Nonverbal Intelligence (TOM; 
Brown, Sherbenou & Johnsen, 1982). For each item on this test, subjects chose one out of 
four or six abstract figures to complete the relationship depicted by a given set of abstract 
figures. Subjects needed to h o w  the d e  depicted by the set (e-g., shape, direction, sKe, 
pattern) in order to select the correct response alternative. With the majority of experimental 
tasks h e a w  dependent on verbal M.ls, this was a language-fiee test of cognitive ability. 
Percentile ranks were used as scores. 
Academic cormetence was assessed ushg the 'Word Identification" subtest of 
The Woodcock Reading Mastev Tests - Revised (Woodcock, 1987). This is an oral reading 
test of isolated words, and is a meame of academic achievement. Given time constraints, this 
test allowed a quick assessment of achievement. Pdormance on the 'Word Identification" 
test has been found to be highh/ coneiated with overd achievement in school (Woodcock, 
1987). Subjects received percentile scores based on their performance. 
SociaI cornetence was assessed ushg a 5-pomt Likert-type sociometric rathg 
scale. Subjects were provided wah a List of students in their class participaihg m the study, 
and a series of f i e  faces beside each name s h o w ~ g  a gradient of expressions fiom sad to 
happy. Subjects were told that the experimenter was mterested m childrens' fiiendships, and 
were asked to select the face that best demies  how much he/she iikes each child on the list. 
An overall average rating across peers was obtained fiom each subject. These peer ratings, 
obtained for each subject, provide infonriation about an important aspect of a child's social 
competence, that 4 how weli a child is liked or accepted by hidher peers. 
Teacher ratings of subjects' academic and social competence were &O obtained by 
using the "Teacher-Child Rathg Scale" (TC'eRS; Hightower et. ai., 1986). The items on this 
5-pomt rating scale produced three subscales reflecting social, academic, and behavioural 
coqetence. Additionally, global teacher ratings were obtahed fiom four, 5-point rathg 
scales of each subject's overd academic, academic problem s o h g ,  overall social, and social 
problem sohring ski&. 
Pro blem Solvine Tasks 
The following five experimental tasks were used m this study and are descnbed m 
the subsequent sections: 
a) Towers of Hanoi (TOH), 
b) Picture Vignettes (PV), 
c) Unfinished Stories (US), 
d) Analogous Situations, and 
e) Sorting Task 
a) Towers of Hanoi (Tom: 
The three-pole version of the TOH (Newelldk Simon, 1972) was presented. Subjects were 
asked to move three rings (hcreasmg in 4ze) fiom the first pole to the 1st pole, one at a time, 
such that at no time could a larger ring cover a d e r  ring (see Appendix A 1). Subjects 
obtained scores for the time it took to arrive at the soiution, and the number of errors made 
before the solution was reached. AU subjects were able to soive the problem, and therefore, a 
measure of success/~ure on this ta& was not obtained. 
b) Pictue Vignettes eV): 
Four stones containhg unresohred problem situations were presented as pictures 
with captions. The stories were created by the author and mcluded two 'social' stones, 
"Cardsyy and "Snowbaiî", and two 'academic' stories, 'Camp" and 'Gardener" (see Appendix 
A. 2). Subject s received social stories cont aining same-sex characters. They were told that 
each pichire st0r-y contained a problem that couid happen to anybody. Stories were wntten in 
the &a person, and subjects were told to pretend that they were the person m the story and it 
was their problem Following each story, subjects were asked the following questions: 
1) Tell me what is happening m the story. 
2) What is your problem in this story? (What's wrong?) 
3) What do you waot to happen? 
4) Explain exa* what you would do next. 
The protocols were anaiyzed according to structural aspects of stories, ushg Stein and 
Glenn's (1979) story granmiar. That is, subjects' responses were categorized into 
propositions that descriied eIements of the story (e.g., d g ,  W t h g  ment, problem, 
solution). Only those propositions that descrïbed aspects of the story that were essential in 
solving the problem were scored As each story contained a total of four propositions 
desmbing important aspects of the problem situation, each subject received a score out of 
four. 
c) Unfinished Stones: 
This task was simüar to the Picture Vignettes. However, the stones were 
presented in text foxmat only (ie., no pictures). There were blanks scattered throughout the 
aones that deleted information that expiicdy stated the goal of the story. lnus, subjects were 
required to mfer the goal fiom the information presented in the story m order to understand 
the problem situation. They were not asked to 'fiIl m the blanks' as the story was read. Four 
amies, two "social"y 'New Kid" and "Skateboard", and two "academic", 'Crow" and 'Fox'', 
were read aloud by the author, whüe the subject followed the text (see Appendix A3). The 
'Crow" story was adapted by the author fiom a children's story, and the remahhg stories 
were created by the author. Each a o q  ends just short of a problem solution. In the social 
aories, subjects received stories containhg samesex characters. 
M e r  each story, subjects were asked the followhg questions: 
1) Pretend that 1 don't know anything about this story. Tell me the whole nos, m 
your own words. 
2) Ifyou ody had a very short time to tel  me this story, so that you on& had time 
to tell me the moa important parts of the story, what would you tell me? (ie., 
What would be the most important idormation to remember about this story?) 
3) The person who wrote thiç story has left out parts of the aory. There isn7t an 
ending to the story and there are some blanks in the n o v .  What mformation is left 
out or miçsnig that we should lmow about in the story? 
4) What is the [crow's/foxes'hoy's/girl' s] problem in this story? (What ' s 
wrong?) 
5) What did the [crow/fox/boy/girl] want to happen? 
6) I'd like you to nnish the story. 
Smiüar to the PV, the protocols were analyzed accordkg to structural aspects of 
stones ushg Stem and Glenn's (1979) aory grammat. Responses were M e d  mto 
propositions that descnbed elements of the story (e.g., se#@, initiahg ment, problem, 
solution). Recail of the propositions descnimg essential aspects of the problem situation were 
scored. There were a total of t a  propositions desmibing important aspects of the problem 
situation, and each subject received a score out of ten. 
c) Analogous Situations: 
Subjects were presented with two stories one academic and one social, descnbing 
how a problem situation was sohed. Each story had an accompanyhg transfer problem 
Each transfer problem hvolved manipulafing materials to solve a problem that, on the surface, 
did not appear related to the previously read story. However, the problem solution used m 
the story could be used as an analogy m solving the transfer problem 
For the academic 'aory plus transfer problem', Holyoak et. aL 's (1 984) "Magic 
Carpet" story was used, followed by an adaptation @y the author) of his transfer task, the 
"Bd Problem" (see Appendix k 4 ) .  The "Magie Carpet" story descnbes a genie s o m g  the 
problem of how to transfer his jewels fiom one bottle to another by rolling up his magic carpet 
and roiling his jewels through this 'tube' to the new bottle. In the transfer 'BaU Problem", 
subjects were asked to generate ideas for a new toy a toy Company is creathg of how to 
move pmg pong balls to a bowl just out of reach. The materials provided for the subjects to 
use included a dowel, a ping pong paddle, scotch tape, nibber bands, sthgy papa clips, 
scisson, and a l e e t  of construction paper. The vanous methods used by the subjects to sohre 
the problem were recorded. For example, many subjects hit the b d  with a phg pong paddle, 
used the elastic bands Iüre a sling shot, or taped the ball on to the end of the dowel, in order to 
get the ball into the bowL The solution analogous to the solution used by the gaie m the 
story invohred roIling up the construction paper h to  a tube and using it to roll the ping pong 
balls mto the bowL 
For the social 'story plus transfer problemy, a story the "Rabbit's New Friend" and 
a transfer task, the 'Fight Problem", were created by the author to be smiüar to the "Magic 
Carpet" nory and 'Ball Roblem" in structure, length and format, but to contai- social content 
(see Appendix A 4). The 'Rabbit's New Friend" story descnbes a rabbt threatened by a 
monaer, who talks out the problem and arrives at a sofution that allows them to be Eends. In 
the transfer ''Fight Roblem", each subject was told that he/she had accidentaily d e d  the 
math homework of the class 'bully'. The bu& thought it was done on purpose and was gomg 
to seek revenge after schooL Subjects were presented with a board ilhistrating a school and 
the surroundmg area, and several figures representing the bu&, the subject, and other relevant 
adults and peers. Subjects mwipuiated the figures to act out possible solutions, and the 
various stratedes were recorded. For example, some subjects used the figures to demonstrate 
running away, t e h g  the teacher, or fightmg the bully. The sohition analogous to the solution 
used by the rabbit m the aoiy mvohed talking out the problem and working out a plan to be 
fiends, not enemies. 
during the transfer problem, the subject ran out of ideas without generating the 
solution analogous to the story, a hint was provided by asking, 'Does anythmg m the story 
help?". Ifthis did not elicit the analogous solution, a more specific h t  was provided: ' m a t  
did the genie/rabbit do, and could you do anytheng like that?". Ifthe analogous sohition to 
the story was chosen, the subject was asked, 'What made you think of that?' 
Ofinterest was whether subjects were able to spontaneoudy generate the 
analogous solution, or whether a hmt was needed to as& m drawing the analogy. Subjects 
received scores of O or 1, depending upon whether or not a h t  was required before the 
subjects generated the analogous soiution. 
d) Sortina Task: 
Subjects were @en two sets of cards, descriiiing an academic theme ('Biological 
Rinciples") and a social theme (Totential Peer Conflict"), balanced for order of presentation 
(see Appendix A5). The academic theme was adapted fiom Brown's (1989) 'biological 
themes", which she used to demonstrate the use of analogical reasoning by young children. 
The social theme was adapted fiom Bream's (1989) use of 'potentid peer conflict" situations 
to andyze children's social problem s o h g  sküls. 
Each theme or set of cards contained nine scenarios, or nine bnec threesentence 
descriptions about an animal ('Biological Principles") or a peer interaction ('Totential Peer 
Confiict"). The content of the scenarios withm a theme was adapted to ailow categorization 
into three equal piles discrimmated by Underlying Principles (UP), and three dinerent (again 
equal) piles discriminated by Surface Features (SF). The UP and SF for the 'BiologicaI 
Principles" and '%tenthi Peer CodEct" themes are show m Appendk AS. UP refer to 
abmact principles that are infmed by the content of the scenarios. SF refm to concrete 
details explicitly stated m the scenarîos. 
Subjects' responses were scored accordmg to thei. categorization of UP's and 
SF's. In order to be considered a 'correct sort', the majority of cards m a pile needed to be 
representative of that category. Each pile was scored as 1 or O for UP and SF. No response, 
an unknown rationale, or clear errors, produced a score of O for that piie. Ifthe pile described 
an UP, it was scored as ' 1' for WP and 'O' for SF. Similatly, ifthe piie d e s d e d  a SF, it was 
scored as 'O' for UP and ' 1' for SF. Thus, given that the subjects categorized each theme mto 
three piles, UP and SF scores ranged nom O to 3, for each theme. Inchded m Appendix AS 
is an example of one subject's categorization of the 'Biological Pxjnciples" thexne, and the 
resuhant scores for UP and SF. Higher scores for UP mdicate greater sensdMty to the 
underlying principles suggested m the scaiarios, while higher scores for SF mdicate attention 
focused on the more obvious details stated m the scenarios. 
Procedure 
Subjects were seen individually during regular school hours for approxhately one 
hour, to complete the competence ta& and three of four problem s o b g  tasks. They were 
seen again several days later in small groups of six to eight for approximately 20 minutes, to 
complete the &al problem sohring task (the Sortmg Task). hving the study, the classroom 
teachers filied out the Teacher-Child Ratmg Scale (Hightower et. aL, 1986), and the four, fïve 
point rating scales for each subject, -ch rated overd academic, academic problem sohhg, 
overall social, and social problem sohring skills. 
Each chüd was told that the purpose of the study was to see 'Mat kids m Grade 5 
think about or do with diffierent kmds of puzzles or problems".. They were also told that 
''there are no right or wrong answers, just whatever kids th8ik about when &en these tasks". 
The following competence activities were then presented in the order below: 
a) the Word Identification subtest of the Woodcock Reading Mastery Test ( 
Woodcock, 1987), 
b) the Test of Nonverbal Intelligence (TONI; Brown, Sherbenou & Johnseq 
1982), and 
c) the sociometric rating scale. 
Subjects were then presented with the foilowing experiment al tasks: 
a) Towers of Hanoi: The d e s  were explained and subjects' 'think aloud' 
verbaihtions were tape recorded, and sequence of steps and t h e  to reach the solution, were 
recorded on paper by the eqerimenter- 
b) Picture Vignettes (PV): and 
c) Unfinished Stones (US): Due to thne constraints, each subject was given either 
the PV or US measure. By the end of testing? 18 subjects had completed the PV and 25 
subjects had completed the US. Subjects fonowed along as the experimenter read aloud four 
aones - two academic and two social. This ensured that readmg dBcuhies did not influence 
the proceshg of information. The order of presentation of the stories was balanced across 
subjects, with academic and social stones altemated. After each story, subjects were asked 
specific questions conceming the problem aspects of the stories. All responses were tape 
recorded and later transcn'bed. 
d) Analogous Situations: An academic story and an accompanyhg trander 
problem, and a social story and a .  accompanying trander problem were presented to each 
subject. The order of presentation was counter-baIanced across subjects. Subjects followed 
along as the story was read aloud by the eqerimenter. This was followed by a f?ee recall of 
the aory. Ifthe problem solution descnbed m the story was not recalled, specific questions 
about the probiem solution were asked If the subject cleady had not comprehended or could 
not recall the problem solution, the story was re-read. (This ody occurred m one instance). 
The appropriate transfer problem was then presented. ûfparticular interest was whether the 
solution presented in the story was used as an analogy to d v e  the trander problem 
Materials were laid out, the problem was descnbed, and subjects were asked to manipulate the 
materials to demonstrate posaile solutions to the problem If the solution analogous to the 
aory solution was not attempted, hints were provided to use the sohition suggested by the 
story. AU responses were tape recorded, and the need for a hint was noted. Subjects were 
then given the second story, followed by the accompanyhg transfer problem, and the same 
procedure was followed. 
e) Sortmg Ta*: Subjects were presented with the academic and social themes, 
with the order of presentation counter-balanced across subjects. Each theme was comprised 
of 9 cards, with each card containhg a brief descriptive passage, or scenario. Subjects sorted 
the cards into three piles accordmg to which scenarïos were smiilar. They iabeled the piles, 
and briefly recorded (with pend and paper) their rationale. Each subject was then asked to 
complete the second theme m the same manner. 
DesiPn and Analyses 
As an exploratoiy study of f i e  problem sohring tasks, data analyses mvestigated 
first, the adequacy of the tasks as measures of competence and problem s o h g .  Secondly, 
the relation&@ between performance on the competence and problem s o h g  tasks was 
analyzed. 
Information conceming the adeauacy of the competence tasks was obtained 
p r i .  through the use of correlational analyses. Signincant correlations among the scores 
would suggest that the various tasks assess smiilar constructs of academic and social 
competence, and would indicate whether competence in these two domains is dimiminated by 
the d.erent activities. That is, are the ta* thought to assess academic competence related, 
and are these relationships distinct fkom the relationships found with the social competence 
actkities. Of additional interest, &en the various teacher rathg scales employed in the study 
(Le., academic and social competence items of the TC'eRS, ratmgs of academic and social 
problem sohtmg, and global ratings of academic and social skiJls), an exploratory fàctor 
anaiysis was conducted. This provided mformation concemhg how well the Mirent  scaies 
described similar constructs and Hiiich ratÏngs appeared most appropriate to use m future 
studies. 
The adeauacy of the problem solvine ta& to provide giformation conceming 
problem solving skiIl was shdarh, explored through correlational analyses. Significant 
associations among the scores would suggest that the tasks are similariy asseshg a problem 
solving consûuct. In addition, performance on the academic and social versions of each 
problem s o h g  task was compared through correlational analyses. The relationships found 
were expected to provide information conceming the degree to which general problem s o h g  
sküls are transferable across the academic and social domains, or conversely the lack of 
simüarity across domains. Also, the associations found, combined with observational data, 
would provide mformation as to whether the content of the academic and social materials was 
adequate to use to assess Smilar problem sohring processes. This wouid assist m M e r  
refinement of the materiais, if needed. 
F i n a  correlational analyses were also used to analyze the relationships between 
the cornpetaice and problem s o h g  tasks. This provided information about which problem 
s o h g  activities were related to aspects of academic and social competence, and whether the 
relationships found were consistent for the academic and social versions of the problem 
s o b g  tasks. 
Due to time constraints, subjects completed four of the f i e  problem s o h g  tasks. 
Jua over halfof the subjects (n=25) completed the Unnnished Stones (US), while the 
rernainder (n= 18) completed the Picture Vignettes (PV). Analyses of the problem sohhg 
activities were therefore conducted on two subgroups fiom the sample, an US group and a 
PV group. 
Results 
The results of the data analyses are presented as foiiows: 
a) descriptive statistics (means, standard deviations), 
b) sex differmces among tasks, 
c) fàctor analysis of the teacher ratings, 
d) correlations among competence tasks, 
e) correlations among problem s o h g  tasks, and 
f) correlations between competence and problem sohing tasks. 
Descri~the Statistics 
The means and standard deviations for aU scores on the assessnent and problem 
sohring ta* are presented m Table k 1. In general, the means and standard deviations were 
similar across tasks, particulariy the five problem s o h g  ta& 
Sex Differences 
Pearson product-moment correlations were caiculated for boys and girls 
separateiy, correlating all of the competence scores with the problem somg scores. t-tests 
were also performed to determine whether there were differences between the scores obtained 
by boys and girls. The resdts did not reveal any sipifkant relationships betweea sex and 
coqetaice or problem s o h g .  Therefore, no M e r  anaiyses were conducted 
differentiating by sex 
Factor Analvsis of Teacher Ratinm 
A total of seven teacher rating scaies were subjected to factor anaiyçis. Included 
were ratings of academic and social skiils as reiated to general problem sohring7 overd 
competence, and relevant items on the 'Teacher-Child Rating Scale7' (TC'eRS; Hightower 
et.aL, 1986), as weU as the 'behavior' sale of the TC7eRS. A Rmcipal Components factor 
anaIySs (with eigen values = 1) using a varimax rotation was conducted to determine the 
degree to which the various rating scales were measuring Smilar constnicts. The summed 
scores of the relevant items on the academic, social and behaviour scales of the TC7eRS7 and 
item scores on the remaining rating sales were used. Two factors were identifie& an 
Academic and a Social, that accounted for 86% of the variance. The Academic fhctor 
accounted for 35% of the explained variance, and the Social factor accounted for 5 1% of the 
explained variance. The data are presented m Table k 2 .  In general, ratings of overall 
academic fùnctioning and ability to sohre academic problems, as wen as more specific ratings 
of achiwement and work habits loaded on the Academic Factor. Ratings of gettmg dong 
with peers and ab* to resohe interpersonal problems, as well as more specific ratings of 
TABLE A.1-Means & Standard Deviatioas of Competence & Problem Solving Tasks 
Variable Name Mean - Standard Deviation 
IQ (TONI) 36.6 28.6 
Reading 48.2 33.1 
Sociometric 69.2 10.1 
TR - overaii academic 55.6 2 1.4 
TR - cognitive problem s o h g  57.6 20.1 
TR- TC'eRS, academic 5 1-0 25.2 
TR - overd social 66.9 15.5 
TR - social problem s o h g  65.3 17.1 
TR - TC'eRS, s o d  54.7 21.7 
TR - behaviour 5 1.0 27.7 
TOH - time 
TOH - error 
PV - academic 
PV - social 
US - academic 
US - social 
Analogy - academic 
Analogy - social 
Sort - UP, academic 
Sort - SF, academic 
Sort - UP, social 
Sort - SF, social 
TR=teacher ratings; TOH=Towers of Hanoi; PV=Picture Vignettes; US=Unfkkhed Stones, 
up-7inderlymg principles; SF=surface features 
interpersonal skills, loaded on the Social fictor. W e  the two factors appeared to 
discriminate social and academic competence, a moderate Ioading was also evident for the 
academic TC'eRS on the Social factor. 'Inese results suggest that teachers rated th& 
students simi?iirly on academic and social scales, but the separate âctors ako show that the 
teachers did discriminate the two constnicts. GNen the very high Smüanty and consequently 
the redundancy of idormation among the academic and social teacher rating scdes, it was not 
considered necessary to mclude all ratmg scales m subsequent analyses. The academic and 
social TC7eRS rating scales were chosen for inclusion m fùture studies since the scale 
contained multiple items. The remahhg ratmg scales were ody  one item sales. 
TABLE A.2 - Factor Analysis of the Teacher Ratings 
Factor 1 - Social Factor II - Social 
Overail Academic -13 -95 
Academic Problem S o b g  .40 .87 
TC7eRS, Academic Items .69 .64 
Overall Social .92 -17 
Social Problem S o h g  -9 1 -19 
TC'eRS, Social Items .79 .42 
TC'eRS, Behavior .81 .3 1 
Percent of Total Variance Exprplained: 51% 35% 
Relationshi~s Amonp Com~etence Tasks 
Correlational analyses using Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients were 
conducted to mvestigate the relationçhips among the measures of intelligence, and academic 
and social competence. Of interest m the present mvestigation is whether the various mdices 
of cornpetence wÏthin a domain are reiated, and whether the resuhs discriminate academic 
nom sociai competence. The conelational data are presented in Table A3. 
TABLE A3 - Pearson Roduce-Moment Correlations Among Cornpetence Tasks 
IQ Reading TR-academic Sociometric 
Significant co~~elations among the ta& were consistentiy found in the total 
sample and US group. None of the correlations m the PV group reached signjfïcance (with 
the exception ofthe correlation between the academic and social teacher ratmgs). This lack of 
signincance may be due to the smaller çize m the PV group. The foliovukg summary of the 
resuhs wùl therefore focus on the total sample and US group. 
For both the total and US samples, mtelligence was found to be significantiy 
correlated with academic competence (ie., with readmg, r = .49, p < .001, with academic 
r = .39, p < .05) and with social TR (r = .63, p c .001). No relationship was f o n d  b ~ e e n  
mtelligence and the sociometric. Scores on the academic competence mdices (reading and 
academic TR) were found to be significantly related (r = .52, p < .01). Significant correlations 
were obtained between academic competence and the social TR (Le., with reading, r = .58, p 
< -00 1, with academic TR, r = .8 1, p < .O0 1). The sociai competence tasks (sociometric and 
social TR) also showed a significant relationship with each other (r = -36, p < .05). The 
sociometric ody demonstrated signincant correlations with the social TR and the academic 
TR (r = .43, p < -01). 
In summary7 Sgnificant relationships were found among mteIligence and academic 
competence tasks, and among the social competence tasks. This suggests that similar 
constmcts are bemg assessed by the academic and social competence tasks. On the other 
hand, the TR data were related to both academic and social competence, and mtenigence. 
Thus, while the TR scales showed considerable overkp with competence tasks m both the 
academic and social domains, the intelligence, reading, and sociometnc activites appeared to 
discrimsiate academic and social competence. 
Relationshi~s Amone Problem Solvine Tasks 
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients were calculatecl on the problem 
sohring scores7 and are presented m Tables k 4 . 1  and k 4 . 2 .  These analyses were conducted 
m order to determine wiiether the problem sohing tasks are related to each other, and 
whether consistent relationships are seen between the academic and social problem solving 
niaterials. 
Subjects either completed the US or the PV, and therefore, the results are 
presented for each group separateiy. Detection of underlying principles (UP) in the Sortmg 
Task was the only problem sohlng activity found to be related to al1 of the other problem 
s o h g  tasks. That is, senStivity to UP m academic themes showed ~ ~ c a n t  correlations 
with less time needed to complete the Towers of Hanoi (TOH) (US group; r = .44, p < .05) 
identification of more essential problem solving elements in the academic Unfinished Stones (r 
= .49, p < -05) and no need for a hmt m the social Analogous Situations (PV group; r = .58, p 
< -0 1). Identaymg UP in social themes demonstrated si@cant correlations with fewer 
errors on the TOH (PV group; r = .46, p < .OS), and more essential problem sohring elements 
detected m academic Unfinished Stones (US group; r = .46, p < .OS). 


For the remaining problem sohring tasks, few correlations reached sigrScance. 
No significant correlations were found between the academic Picture Vignettes and any other 
problem solshg activity. Fewer mors on the TOH were related to quicker completion on the 
TOH, but this is an expected hdmg and of M e  interest to the present mvestigation. 
Significant correlations were found between the social PV and UP of the Sorting Task and 
between the social PV and the social Analogous Situations. However, these correlations were 
in a direction opposite to that expected @en good problem sohring sküL Specifically, more 
essential elements identified in picture stories was associated with faver UP detected in 
academic and social themes (r = .49, p < .O5 and r = .49, p < -05, respective&). Similarly, 
more essential elements identified in picture stones was related to the need for a hint to use 
the analogy m sohring the social transfer problem of the Analogous Situations (r = .41, p < 
-05). For the Analogous Situations, theneed for a hint in one domain was related to no hint 
bemg needed m the other domain for the PV, but not the US group. This is again an 
unexpected kding. Thus, the few sigificant relationships foimd were either of Iittle mterest 
to the present investigation, or the r e d s  were somewhat questionable. These questionable 
red t s  found with the Picture Vignettes and Analogous Situations caa some doubt on the 
adequacy of these tasks. 
Withm each problem solving ta&, performance on the academic and social 
materiais was also compared using correlational analyses. A Sgdicant cornehion was 
evident between the academic and social US (r = .45, p < .05), mdicatmg that identification of 
essential problem s o b g  elements m one domain was related to identification in the other 
domain. Sirnilarly, for the detection of UP in the Sorthg Ta* significant correlations were 
found between the academic and social themes (US group; r = .5 1, p < -05, PV group; r = .49, 
p < .05). Thus, significant relationships between the academic and social materials were only 
evident with the Unfinished Stones and UP of the Sorthg Ta& 
C o m ~ a r i a ~  the Cornnetence and Problem So1vi.n~ Tasks 
Pearson product-moment correlational analyses were conducted to explore the 
relationship between intelligence, academic and social competence, and the f i e  problem 
s o h g  activities. The results are presented m Table A S .  
The competence ta&, with the exception of the sociometric, demonstrated fàirly 
consistent relationships with senntivity to undermg principles (UP) m the Sorthg Ta& m 
particular, as weiI as identifyeig essential problem sohring elements in Unhished Stones That 
is, for the UP detected m the academic theme of the Sorting Task, significant correlations 
were obsewed (for both the US and PV groups, respedvely) with higher readmg scores (r = 
-59 andr=.55, p e .01), acadernicTR(r=.51 andr= .44, p < .05)andsocialTR(r=.40 
and r = .47, p < .O5). For the UP identified m the social theme of the Sorthg Task, significant 
relationships were observed for aII competence ta& with the exception of the sociometric. 
That is, UP fond in the social theme were associated with intelligence (US group; r = 36, p 
< .01, PV group; r = .47, p < .OS), reading (US group; r = -78, p < -001; PV group; r = -58, p 
< .O 1), academic TR (US group; r = .46, p < .05; PV group; ILS.), and social TR (US group; r 
= .54, p < .O 1; PV group; as.), but not with the sociometric. For the Unfinished Stories, 
significant correlations were found between the academic US and IQ (r = 36, p < .O l), and 
between the social US and IQ, readmg, and social TR (r = .44, p < .05; r = -54, p < -01, and r 
= -41, p < .01, respectively). 
In contrast, very few significmt correlations were found between the competence 
tasks and the Towers of Hanoi, Picture Vignettes, or Analogous Situations. 
Discussion 
This study investigated the relationships among f i e  problem s o h g  tasks, and 
how performance on these tasks was related to academic and social competence. The 
problem sohing activities were derived fiom existing problem s o h g  research and modifed 
in order to d o w  cornparisons between academic and social problem solvhg. 
TABLE A S  - Pearson Product-Moment Correlations between the Cornpetence Tasks 
and Roblem Solving Tasks (US and PV simples) 
IO Reading TR-academic Sociometric TR-social 
us PV US PV us PV us PV us PV 
TOH -tirne -.O6 -14 
TOH-errors -.21 -.21 
US-academic . S6** 
us-social .44* 
PV-academic -.O9 
PV-so cial -.O4 
Anal'y-acad'c -25 .43 * 
Anal'y-social--16 -.32 
Sort-UP-ac -31 .37 
Sort-SF-ac -.O8 -04 
Sort-UP-SOC .56** .47* 
Sort-SF-~c -.27 -25 
TR = teacher ratings; TOH = Towers of Hanoi; US = Unfinished Stones; PV= Picture 
Vignettes; UP = underlying principles; SF = suf3ce features 
The goals of the present mvestigation were &st, to assess the adequacy of the 
tasks used to assess competence and problem sohg.  This mvohed detemiining whether the 
cornpetence tasks chosen were vaiid measures of acadeooic and social competence, and 
wliether the tasks discriminated academic and social competence. The adequacy of the 
materials as tools to assess problem sohring was also mvestigated, as well as whether the 
academic and social materiais provided valid mdices that discriminated problem solvmg widh 
the academic and social domains. Second, performance on academic and social competence 
tasks was compared to performance on the problem sohring materials to mvestigate the 
relationship between competence and problem s o h g ,  and to discover similanties and 
Merences m problem sohring processes withm the same domains or across the academic and 
social dornains. Fmaily, the theoretical implications of the resdts in demonstrating the use of 
generalized problem s o k g  processes and how it relates to competence was explored. 
Adeauacv of the Com~etence Tasks 
Several teacher rating scales were employed in the present study3 inchiding global 
ratings of academic and social competence and academic and social problem s o h g ,  and 
ratings on academic and social items of the Teacher-Chüd Raihg Scale (TC'eRS). A factor 
analysis showed that alI rathg scales were highly related within the academic and social 
domains, and that the scales discriminated two separable constnicts - academic a d  social. 
The academic items on the TC'eRS did show a moderate relationship with the Social factor, 
mdicating some similarity in teachers perceptions of academic and social competence in 
children. Use of the academic and social items of the TC'eRS alone was recornmended for 
fiiture mvestigations given that this scale contained nmhïple items (as opposed to a global item 
to rate). 
A varîety of activities were used to provide convergent data on academic and 
social competence. In assessing academic coqetence, co~~elational analyses mdicated 
significant relationships b ~ e e n  nonverbal IQ, reading skiU and teacher ratings of academic 
competence. Among the social competence tasks, the peer sociometric ratmg scale and 
teacher ratmgs of social competence were found to be correhted laus, the expected 
associations were found among the competence ta& wahm each domain. The teacher ratmg 
data suggest that tbere may be generalized problem sohring skills that subjects are using m 
a c a d d c  and social situations, or at least slrills that the teachers perceived to be sindar. At 
the same thne, the fâaor analysis showed that teachers did discriminate academic and social 
competence. Whether the associations found among academic and social teacher ratmgs 
refiect generalized competence sküls versus siinilar teacher perceptions of children, wiIl be 
M e r  explored m subsequent studies by inmeashg the size of the sample and the number of 
competence tasks. 
A non-verbal measure of mtelligence was used to provide information about 
intelligence with verbal demands minhhd .  The TON1 is considered a test of problem 
s o h g  where subjects must identay relationships among designs in order to sohre the problem 
(Brown, et.& 1982). Performance on this non-verbal measure of cognitive ab- did show 
significant relationships with academic and social competence mdices (but not the 
sociometric), and with the UnfÏnished Stones and Sorting problem sohing tasks. However, 
the original intent m using this task was to contrast competence with the problem s o h g  
tasks. While these resdts were mfonnative m showhg that this IQ measure was related to the 
experimental problem s o h g  tasks, it was merely an additional problem solvhg ta& as 
opposed to a specific measure of academic or social competence. Therefore, for the purposes 
of cornparmg academic and social problem soiving with academic and social competence, this 
IQ task was not hchrded m subsequent investigations. 
m e n  time constraints, the reading task was chosen as a quick assesment of 
academic achievement. Siificant relationships were found with moa problem s o k g  tasks. 
However, the task may be limiting m its focus on readmg single words If time permits m 
tubsequent studies, a task that Hivolves more active thinking and problem s o h g  sküls (e.g., a 
school ability test), shodd be used to provide a broader measure and 'richer' source of 
information about children' s academic comp et ence. 
Ahnoa no signincant relationshqis, apart nom that between the sociometric and 
teacher ratings, were found between the sociometric and other competence or problem s o h g  
activities. Sociometric rating scales are sensitive to the wording of the statement rated by the 
subjects ( M e r  & Hymel 1977). Aslong subjects to rate how much they 'like' other children 
may not have been specifïc enough to be an adequate measure of social competence. A 
criterion more specificaily fonised on peers' social competence or preferred peer group, and 
possiibly the use of more than one scale, wiil be used in future investigations. 
Finaiiy, m e  attempts were made to 'equate' the academic and social materials m 
each problem solving task, this on& occurred with the teacher ratmg scales of the competence 
tasks. It may not be possible'to equate all competence tasks, due to the nature of the 
academic and social domains. For exanrple, a sociometric and abiüty test wouid be dificuit if 
not impossible to equate. However, increasing the number of tasks that can be equated, 
shodd be mcluded m subsequent research. 
Adeauacv of the Probiem Solvine_Tasks 
The fie problem sohring actMties used in the present study represent a variety of 
methods that have been employed in the Iiterature to asses both academic and social problem 
sohing. Analyses of the relationships between the problem sohiing tasks and between the 
problem s o k g  and competence activities, resulted m some problem sohring tasks showhg 
meanin@ relationships whüe others did not. 
Subjects' abiüty to detect underlymg principles m the Sorting Task was the most 
broadly related to competence and other problem s o h g  exercises. The UdÏnished Stones 
also showed relationships with the compet ence tasks and underlying principles of the Sorting 
Task AU other problem sohing tasks (ie., Towers of Hanoi, Picture Vignettes, Analogous 
Situations, and surnice features of the Sortmg Ta&) demonstrated few (and at times 
contradictory) relationships among problem s o h g  ta& and with competence. 
Therefore, the Sorthg Task, more spedcally sen- to underh/E.g principles, 
appears to warrant fùrther mvestigation. While the Unfinished Stones also demonstrated 
significant relationships, these relationships were not as widespread as those found with the 
Sorting Ta& Inchision of the Unfinished Stones does not appear to provide any additional 
mformation to that of the Sortmg Task. 
Modifications in Assessing Problem Solvine in Future Research 
The Towers of Hanoi (TOH) was originaUy mcluded as an example of a 'ciassic' 
problem sohring activity. Howevq &en that few si@ca.t relationships were found with 
other competence or problem sohhg tasks, the TOH did not contniute much mfonnation 
concerning the relationçhip of problem solvmg to competence. Indeed, whatever skiils are 
tapped by the TOH appear unrelated to the academic or social abilieies or problem sohring 
skills assessed here. Also, since the author was unable to create TOH materials for both the 
academic and social domains, no cornparisons codd be made between dom-. Furthemore, 
subjects appeared to have di£liculty 'thmking aloud' without practice, and thus, omittmg a 
practice session may have affected the results. A practice session was omitted due to thne 
constraints, but should be mcluded ifthis ta& is used m fùture studies. 
Picture Vignettes (PV) were not found to be conçistentiy signrficantiy related to 
competence or problem sohiing, whether academic or social. This may be due to the d e r  
çample size use& andlor the materials themsebes- Analysis of the means and standard 
deviations (Table k 4 )  mdicated that there was variabil@ among the scores and the ta& was 
dciently chdengïng (i e., scores were not at ce&g). However, observations of subjects as 
they recded the aories suggested that the simple, line-drawn pictures with brief captions did 
not elicit much elaboration of stoiy content. The task appeared to tap memory of content as 
opposed to promotmg thinkmg ski& needed for problem sohing. The task therefore 
appeared too srniplistic to elicit problem sohring, and would require modifications to the 
materials (e.g., a more complex story plot, andior pictures that required more mferences to be 
& a m  m order to understand the story) ifused m other studies. 
Ana1oe;ous Situations was related to very few other variables. It was hypothesized 
that no need for a hmt would be related to better competence and problem sohg.  However, 
it was found that the need for a hmt was, at times, reiated to competence and other problem 
s o h g  ta&. These results were observed largeiy with the Picture Vignettes group. Scores 
fiom this group were oftm inconsistent and demonstrated some questionable relationships 
with other rneasures. In addition, the Analogous Situations represented an attempt to more 
close& approximate 'm vivo' problem sohring by presenting materials to manipulate. 
Howeveq observations suggested thai subjects went through the motions of completing the 
tasks but did not invohe themselves as much as was hoped m the transfer task, partidariy 
with the social mater*. This task, therefore, did not appear to nmulate 'm vivo' problem 
sohing. 
In cornparison to the Towers of Hanoi, Picture Vignettes and Analogous 
Situations, performance on the Unfinished Stories demonstrated more significant associations 
with academic and social competence and with the various problem s o b g  tasks. There was 
some question, however, as to what exactly was being measured with this ta& m e n  the 
nature of the task (Le., recalling information by answering questions), the results may be more 
a reflection of verbal expressive skiUs than general problem sohring ski'lls. In cornparison, the 
Sortmg Ta& may provide a better oppominity to study problem sohing skül with less 
emphasis on verbai skills. 
Ability to detect underlying principles m the Sortmg Task was widely related to 
both competence and problem sohring, in both the academic and social domains. In contrast, 
no S@cant associations were found berneen identification of surface features m the Sorting 
Task and either competence or problem s o b g .  Therefore, the Sortmg Task was selected for 
fiiture investigations. The task appears to tap sküls of analogicd reasoning in the 
identification of imderlying principles in brief scenaxios. These slalls are considered important 
m problem s o b g  and demonstrated a relationship with academic competence and some 
aspects of social competence (ie., teacher ratings but not sociometric ratings). 
Several modüications were deemed necessary before employhg this task m a 
subsequent study. First, the reading Ievel of the materjais, although appearing to be wen 
withm the ability of Grade 5 students was never f o d y  assessed Smce the Sorthg Task 
required subjects to mdependently read the scaiarios, the readmg Ievel would have had an 
impact on performance ifthe passages were too ~WEcult for tbis age group. Et& were the 
case, the relationship between problem s o b g  and competence would reflect differences m 
reading ab-. Indeed, UP scores were found to be highly correlated with reading scores (r's 
of .55 to -78). Therefore, the materials need to be assessed for their readability level (e.g., 
using the Fry Readability Scale; m Cheek & Cheek, 1980), and appropriate modifications 
made to the materiais, ifnecessary. 
A more senous problem with the Sorting Ta& is that it was essentiaiiy a one-item 
test (Le., with only one academic theme and oniy one social theme). Therefore, the observed 
effects may be due to the specific content of the materials used. In subsequent midies several 
themes m both domains were dweloped to aiiow for more general conclusions to be drawn 
about the findmgs. 
Fin- since the themes were created to contain imderlymg prhciples and surface 
features, subjects may initia& attend to one type of informaton in the themes (UP or SF), but 
be aware of the other type of mfotmation. Roviding a second opportunity to sort the 
scenarios may reveal the use of underlying principles by subjects who previously had focused 
more on sut£lce features. Thus, M e r  mvestigations wiii allow two oppommities to 
categorize the materials m order to determine whether more competent mdividuals are better 
problem solvers, or are siniply attending to this Sonnation as an initial response to the 
materials 
Theoretical Implications 
The fÎnding that more academicaJly comptent individuaIs are better able to 
i d e n e  derh/ing principles in the Sorthg Task is simiiar to the findings in the expert-novice 
literature that experts m a particular domain demonstrate greater use of underlying pxkciples 
when sorting problems m that domain, tban novices. This has been observed with both addts 
(e.g-, Chi & Glaser, 1985) and children (e.g., C'hi, Hutchinson Br Robin, 1988). The present 
study did not use a sample of experts and novices that represent the extremes of ability in the 
academic and social domains. Ratlier, the same effects were observed with children of .cimilar 
age and presumably educational experiences. Differences in academic competence covered a 
much d e r  range, as compared to that typically found m expert-novice shidies Even so, 
the greater sensitMty to underlyhg principles seen in the literature with experts was observed 
with subjects with higher scores on academic tasks. ûther recent studies have also shown 
smüar cognitive differences between stronger and weaker novices (Chi & Bassuck, 1988; 
DeJong & Ferguson-Hesder, 1986; Zajchowski & Martin, 1993). 
The resuits also relate to hdings hi the analagical reasoning literature. The 
' Biological Theme7 used m the sorting task was adapted fiom Brown et. al. 's (1 988) 
'8iological themes". Iney were interested m demonstratmg analogical reasoning m young 
children. They found that young chddren did possess generakd problem sohring d d k  of 
analogical reasoning, as long as they had the requisite knowledge about the materials. The 
present study fonised on an older age group and looked at  the^ ability to reason analogically. 
Analogical reasoning has been studied at various age lwels. Here, the spontaneous use of 
underlyng principles or analogies by Grade five subjects showed a reIationship with 
competence. 
Researchers studymg expert-novice differences argue that the relationship between 
competence and senstivity to underlying principles is due to Merences in the knowledge 
structures that the subjects possess (e.g., Chi & Glaser, 1985). Conversehl, researchers 
studying analogical reasoning ski& would argue that this relationship largely reflects 
dif]Ferences in generalized problem sohriing slalls (e.g., Sternberg, 1985; Holyoak, 1989; 
Schraagen, 1993). These researchers do acknowledge the importance of the knowledge 
available to a person, but as long as adequate lmowledge e d s ,  coqetaice would be rehted 
to generalized reasoning skills. The present mvestigation does not dimimmate between these 
perspectives. This is because differences m subjects' knowledge were not assessed or 
controfled. The obsewed relationship between competence and problem sohhg may be due 
to sensitivdy to undalymg principle~~analogies~ or may be due to more or less sophisticated 
knowledge structures among the subjects. Thus in subsequent shidies a test of subjects 
imowledge of the mderlyhg principles fotmd m the themes is mciuded. Scores on this 
'Knowledge Test' can then be used m statistical analyses to control for Merences m subjects 
knowledge of the undermg principles. Ln this manner, the relative mfhiences of lmowledge 
versus generalized problem s o h g  sküls can be determineci. 
Fmally, the theoretical models of problem s o h g  m both the academic and social 
domains assume that info~~~littion s processed m a gmilar manner, whether it be more 
academic or social in orientation. This would suggest that the relationship between 
competence and problem s o h g  could be simrlarb seen in both academic and social tasks. 
However, this was not the case m the present study, where a relationship between competence 
and reasoning was observed with academic but not social competence tasks. This may 
suggest that aspects of social situations differ m some mtegral way beyond that proposed by 
Hiformation processing models. AlternativeIyy the tasks assessing social competence were not 
sensdive enough to social variables. These issues will be explored m fiirther studies, by 
includmg two sociometnc scales that focus more closeiy on social interactions among peers, 
and additional selfreport measures of academic and social competence. 
APPENDM A.1: Towers of Hanoi (TOR) 
Initial State: 
Goal State: 
1) Discs c m  only be moved one at a t h e .  
2) A larger disc cannot be placed over a smaller disc. 
APPENDIX A.2: ficture Vignettes (PV) 
The following are the four picture-pbcaption stories for the Picture Vignettes 
problem sohring ta& The materials for the f d e  subjects are depicted here, where the 
characters m the social stories depict girls. Identical stones were constructed utiüzmg boys in 
the social aories for the male subjects. Each of the original pictures med an 8 1/2" x 11" 
piece of paper, but are presented here reduced in size. 
The Academic Stories are "Camp" and "Gardenei'. 





APPENDIX A.3: Unlinished Stories (üS) 
The following are the four stories for the Unfkkhed Stones problem sohhg ta& 
The bracketed and underlined words were presented as blanks to the subjects. The materials 
for the boys are depicted here, d e r e  the characters m the social aories are boys. Identical 
stories were constnicted utilizmg girk m the social stories for the fernale subjects. 
The academic stories are 'The Crow and the Pitcher" and 'The Fox and the Bear". 
The social stories are 'The New Boy m Town" and 'me Boy and the 
Skateboard". 
Academic Stones: 
The Crow and the Pitcher 
It was a warm summer day. The sun was shmmg and the sky was blue. There was 
a crow flying in the forest, who needed fa drink). He was quite a large crow, ail black m 
color, a .  a very fast flyer. He looked all around for (water?, but he could not find @y). At 
las, he found a big pitcher under a tree. The tree was a big willow tree, with long branches 
hanging down to the ground. He looked h o  it and found that there was a M e  water left. 
The pitcher was so deep that try as he could the crow could not (reach the water). It was 
very quiet m the forest, and you could hem the birds shging clearly. The crow, however, 
wouid not give up. Mer thmkmg about t for a few minutes, he lmew what to do. Near the 
pitcher there were some stones piled up. 
The Fox and the Boat 
It was springtime m the forest. Trees were budcüng and the grass was a lu& green 
color. A fox was standing beside a river and needed (to cross). The fox had a thick reddish 
fur coat, and a very long, bushy taiL He tried to find a narrow place to (cross), but the river 
was (too wide). He hdly found an old boat beside the river. The area by the river was quite 
pretty, with lots of colorful flowers and large rocks. He jumped mto it and started to row. 
The heavy boat got stuck, and wen though he trie4 the fox could not (d. The sun was 
high overhead, and the leaves on the trees were swaying Hi the whd. But the fox wouldn't 
stop trying. Mer thmkmg about what to do, he came up with an idea. Inside the boat there 
was a lot of dirt and rocks. 
Social Stones: 
The New Boy in Town 
It bas been a great SUII11ner this year, with lots of warm, ~ n n y  days. Last week a 
boy moved mto town, and he wanted to ( - d e  new fiiends). There were a lot of people 
outside who were enjoyiug the good weather. He would d e  and say 'hi' to try and [ d e  
fiends), but nobody would faop and plav). He haUy decided to go to the playgrmd near 
his house. A big playground, it has swings, a baseball diamond, and a large soccer field. He 
heard many voices and found ten boys his age playhg four square. There were so many 
people that even though he asked, the boys wouldn't let him ( D ~ Y ] .  It was stin a long time 
before he had to be home for supper. The boy however, would not give up. He walked 
home, thinking about what to do then remembered something. In his toy box, there is lots of 
sports equipment. 
The Boy and the Skateboard 
Today was the fist day m the past four days that it hasi't been cloudy and COOL 
There was a boy playing outside, and he wanted to try (skateboardmq,). It was a pefiect &y, 
with clear blue skies, and a warm breeze. He would watch other boys @cateboarding), but 
nobody wouid give him {a W. After a while he went closer to talk to the boys. The boys 
were about his age and seemed to be having a great tirne. He would nm beside them admirmg 
their skateboards He tried to be nienâly and a& nicely, but the boys didn't want to stop 
(ridion). Time was pashg  by slowly and he didn't feel like gohg home yet. He thought and 
thought about what to do then had an idea. He had a new electronic game that was a lot of 
filn. 
APPENDIX A.4: Analogous Situations 
The academic story, 'Wagic Carpet", and the accornpanyhg trander problem, 
"Baii Problem", and the social story, '%abbit's New Fiiend", and the accompanyhg transfér 
problem, 'Fight Roblem", are presented below. 
Academic Story Magic Carpet 
Once upon a time there lived a magical genie. He was a v q  014 wise, and rich 
genie indeed. One day whüe he was poüshing his home, which was actuany a bottle, he 
decided he would like to find an even bigger and better home to live m. So he began 
searching far and wide for another bottle. Fhally, he found the perfect home. It was larger, 
prettier, and not too far away fiom his old bottle. The genie was very excited and began 
movhg his belongnigs right away. But now the gaie had a problem. He had a great many 
beautiful and very precious jeweis m his old home. He had to somehow get al l  the jewels 
f?om his old bottle to the new bottle without droppmg or loskg a single jeweL M e r  thinking 
a bit, the genie came up with a wondef i  idea. 
He searched for his magic carpet. Then he commanded it to roii itselfup mto a 
long hoJIow tube. Next the ga i e  commanded his flying carpet to place one end at bis old 
home and the other end at his new home so that it fomed a sort of hoilow bridge between the 
two bottles. Then, the genie very carefuny took one jewel fiom inside his old home and 
placed it into the op ening of his carpet. At once, the jewel began nimbling and rolling through 
the carpet tube untü t reached his new home and plopped &eh/ inside. The genie grinned 
happily and began r o h g  al l  his jewels through the carpet mto his new home. In nid, I'm sure 
you can still find him sittmg m his new, bigger and better bottle with d his jewek and smiling 
contentedly even today. 
Trander Task: Baii Problem 
A toy company has decided to hire kids to help them design new games. They 
know that kids are very creative and imaginative, and have a lot of ideas that adults might not 
tbmk of You are hired to heip them corne up with different ideas of how to play a new game. 
One part of the game mvohres gettiug these pmg pong balls fiom this bowl to the empty bowL 
You can't reach the bowl &ce it isjust beyond your reach. The toy Company wants you to 
corne up with as many different ways of doing that as you can. You can use anythmg you can 
think oc and ifthese materials on the table are helpfiü, you can use them, too, m any way you 
wish. Show me and say exactly what to do. Remember, thmk up as many different ways to 
do tbis as you can. 
Social Story: Rabbit's New Friend 
Once upon a time there was a fiendly rabbit who h e d  in the forest. He was 
fiends with werybody and he loved to throw parties for all the animals he knew. One day he 
was out m the forest cdecting flowers to decorate his home, and lots of tasty vegetables to 
feed to his W d s .  He was plannmg a big p a q  that night and had mvited every fiiend he had. 
It was gomg to be great fùn. Suddenly, he was stopped in his path by a large menacmg 
monster. The monster looked down at him and siarled in a deep voice, saying that he was 
gomg to eat the rabbt for a snack. The rabbit was trembling with fear. Every animal in the 
forest knew about the monster, but no Rnimal who had ever seen him had lived to teIl about it. 
The rabbi's £irst thought was that this was the en4 but then he had an idea that he hoped 
would Save him. 
The rabbit held up his paw and ple Jed with the monster to let him say something 
before the monster ate him The monster was only a bit hungry, so he agreed. In a very calm, 
pleasant voice the rabbit started tnlkmg to the rnonster about not wanting to be eaten and that 
he had lots of tasty vegetables here that the monster could eat mstead. The rabbt talked 
about becoming friends and how much nicer it is to be fiends than d e s .  He noticed that 
the monster was listening. The rabbit felt encouraged md told him that he codd get enough 
to eat and not be hungry by eating vegetables, and be happier by having the rabbit as his 
Eend. The rabbit even offered to help him make new Eends. The monster thought about 
what the rabbit said, then thought about how lonely he was without any fiends to  play with. 
He bit off a chunk of the rabbit's vegetables, decided that they really were tasty, and gave the 
rabbit a big d e .  In reliec and happy to have a new fiend, the rabbit shook hands with the 
monster and seded a new Eriendship. It wasn't long before the monster had as many fiends 
as the rabbit, and was pst as happy. 
Transfer Task: Fiht  Problem 
This boy/girl is not very smiut, and is having a lot of trouble m math, and is fir 
behmd the class. You are snart and find math r e m  easy You accidentaily ruin this 
boy7ç/girI's math homework. He/she thmks it was done on purpose, is reaily mad and 
fiustrated, and tells you that hekhe is gohg to 'get yod  &er school The teacher t e k  the 
class to get in their seats, and there h ' t  time for you to eqlah You are r e m  scared 
because the other boy/girl is stronger and bigger than you. It's now the end of school and the 
boy/girl is waiting for you here [point on board]. 1 wrmt you to figure out as many ways as 
possiiIe to get out ofthis Show me and say exact€y what to do. Remember, thmk up as 
many different ways to do this as you can. 
APPENDIX A.5 
Sorting Task and Scoring Example 
The following are the scenarios for the "Biological Principles" and " Potential Peer 
Conflict" themes. Also included are the Underlying Principles and Surface Features for each 
Biolopicai Principles: 
The Capricorn Beetie is a type of insect. It has 2 stiff outer wings and 2 wings hidden 
undemeath. If a dangerous animal is near, the Capricorn Beetie opens it's wing to look like 
a wasp. 
UP: visual mimicry SF: description 
The Seahorse's head look like a horse. It has a long snout on it. It can hide from danger 
because it can match al1 background wlors. 
UP: camouflage SF: description 
The Arctic Fox is h m  the dog farnily. It is most often seen up north in the Arctic. Gray 
in summer and white in the winter, the Arctic Fox blends into it's surroundings. 
UP: camouflage SF: where it Iives 
The Purple Martin Is a kind of bird. It feeds on mosquitos. In the places where they live, 
mosquitos are much less of a bother to people. 
UP: naturai pest control SF: what it feeds on 
The Hawkmoth Caterpillar is a long worm-like larva. It is seen most often in South America. 
It tums over to show marks on its underside that look Iike a poisonous snake. 
UP: visual mimicry SF: where it Iives 
The Charneleon is a type of lizard. It feeds on insects. It is able to chûnge color, so that it 
is very hard to see in the shadows of the forest. 
UP: camouflage SF: what it feeds on 
The Manatee is a large water mammal. It is seen most often in Florida's water ways. The 
Manatee eats the weeds that clog the river and hinder pleasure boating. 
UP: natural pest control SF: where it lives 
The Ladybug is part of the beetle family. It's shell has bright colors on it. It kills little white 
bugs cailed aphids that grow on and on min hops and orange crops. 
UP: natural pest control SF: description 
The Crested Rat is in the rodent family. It feeds on airnost anything that can be eaten. It 
parts ifs hair to show skunk-like markings to protect itself. 
UP: visual mimicry SF: what it feeds on 
Possible Peer Confiid: 
It is recess, and you see your friends at the far end of the playground. You start to walk 
toward them to join thek game. You pass by some other boys kicking a soccer ball. As you 
waik by, you get hit in the back with the bail. 
UP: physical provocation SF: on the playground 
You are on the playground waiting for the bel1 to ring. You just got your hair cut last night. 
As you walk by two boys in your class playing catch, they both start to Iaugh. 
UP: embarassment SF: on the playground 
You are in gym class. Captains are chosen to play baseball and they start to pick tearn 
members. The teacher asks the captains to take Nnis chwsing. You are the last one to get 
picked for a tearn. 
UP: rejection SF: gym class 
In language arts class, the teacher is discussing a story with the class. She calls on you to 
answer an easy question. You did not know the answer. As the teacher is asking someone 
else to answer, you hear wo boys behind you whispering and giggling. 
UP: embarassment 
I 
SF: in class 
During science class the teacher tells everyone to split up into smail groups to work on a 
project. You see a lot of boys two rows from you. You go over and ask if you *in be in 
their group. They Say " now. 
UP: rejection SF: in class 
You were out on the playground and a boy suggested that everyone play a game of mg. You 
were standing nearby, and want to play the game. The boy asks everyone who is standing 
around to play except you. 
UP: rejection SF: on the playground 
You were really hot and thirsty from exercising in the gym. You were waiting in line to get 
a drink of water. A boy cornes running up behind you and smashes right into you, knocking 
you down on the ground. 
UP: physicai provocation SF: gym class 
Everyone in your class is making a poster in art. Your teacher says it is almost time to dean 
up. One of the boys in your class cornes over, reaches for a jar of paint, bumps into you, and 
spills paint al1 over your poster. 
UP: physical provocation SF: in class 
The teacher asked everybody to line up to jump the high jump. With the high jump bar still 
low, everybody in your gym class clears the bar without trouble. You are the 1st one to try 
and you knock the bar off the stands. Lying on the mat, you see a couple of boys making 
faces. 
UP: embarassment SF: gym class 
Sco ring example of Underly ing Priaci ples and Surface Features for the "Biological 
Princi ples" t heme. 
FIRST PZLE: Subjects comment: "How it look dangerous" 
The Capricorn Beetle is a type of insect. It has 2 stiff outer wings and 2 wings hidden 
underneath. If a dangerous animal is near, the Capriwrn Beetie opens it's wing to look like 
a wasp. 
The Hawkmoth Caterpillar is a long worm-like larva. It is seen most often in South America. 
It tums over to show marks on its underside that look like a poisonous snake. 
Score: UP - 1 (visual mimicry), SF - O 
SECOND PILE: Subjects comment: "Talking about what it eats" 
The Purple Martin Is a kind of bird. It feeds on mosquitos. In the places where they live, 
mosquitos are much less of a bother to people. 
The Charnelwn is a type of lizard. It feeds on insects. It is able to change color, so that it 
is very hard to see in the shadows of the forest. 
The Manatee is a large water mammai. It is seen most often in Florida's water ways. The 
Manatee eats the weeds that clog the river and hinder pleasure boating . 
The Ladybug is part of the beetle family. It's shell has bright colors on it. It kills little white 
bugs called aphids that grow on and can min hops and orange crops. 
Score: UP - O, SF - 1 (what it feeds on) 
THIRD PILE: Subjects comment: "carnoufiages " 
The Seahorse's head looks like a horse. It has a long snout on it. It can hide fkom danger 
because it can match al1 background colors. 
The Arctic Fox is fiom the dog family. It is most often seen up north in the Arctic. Gray 
in summer and white in the winter, the Arctic Fox blends into it's surroundings. 
The Crested Rat is in the rodent family. It feeds on almost anything that can be eaten. It 
parts it's hair to show skunk-like markings to protect itself. 
Scok: UP - 1 (camouflage), SF - O 
TOTAL SCORE: UP - 2, SF - 1 
APPENDIX B 
Harterys (1982) Teacher and Chüd Self Report Rating S d e s  
''Teacher Rating Scale of Child's Actud Behavior" (Harter, 1982) 
TEACHER'S RATING SCALE OF CHILDyS ACTUAL BEEMVIOR 









This child is really 
good at hisher school 
work. 
This child hds it 
hard to make fnends. 
This chiid o h  
forgets wbat s/he 
I e a n i s .  
This child bas a lot of 
fnends . 
This child has trouble 
6guring out the 
answers in school. 
This chiid is popular 
with others hisher 
%f=- 
This child can't do the 
school work assignesi. 
For t&is child it's 
Pr* easy- 
This chld cm 
remember things 
easily. 
This child doesn't 
have many f5end.s. 
This child almost 
always can figure out 
the answers. 










llSelf Perception Profde for Chlldren" (Harter, 1982) 
SAMPLE SENTENCE -. . 
Redly Sort of 
True Truo 
for me for me 
. . 
Son of ~uil; 
Tme trur 
for me for mi, 
Some klds would rather Other klds would rather 
p i s  ouidmm in their ~ i t ~ n  rv. 
S P ~  thne n u 
Som% klds feel that they Other klds wony about 
are very good at thsir BüT whether they can do the 
school work asslgned to 
them. 
Some klds flnd it hard to CI make fdend3 Other kids find il's pretly B ü l  eesy to make friends. 
. --  D 
13 17 Same klds feal liU they Other kids arenWt so sure 
are fust as smarl as BUT and wonder if lhey are 
as other klds their age as smart. 
Some kids have 8/01 ol 
friends 
Other kids donel have 
BUT very many trlends. n ii 
Some kids are pretty Other klds can do their 
slow In finiahino lhelr BLlT school w o k  gulckIy. 
school work 
Some kids would like to Other kids have as many 1- have dot mon triends BUT friendt as lhay rani. 
.- . * . . 
Some klds often forgel Other kids can 
O cl 
O O what lhey leam BUT remember thlngs eesily. u O 
Some klds are always Other klds usuaUy do 
doing thlngs wilh dot BUT things by themsehs. a o of k i d ~  -. - . -  
Some klds do very well Ot her kids donv[ do -0 O at thelr classwork BUT very well at their classwork. [? 0 
- Some klds wish that Other kfds feef thet most 
more people thefr age B U t  people thelr age do llke 
llked them thern. . -- - .  n u .  -- 
Same kids have trouble Other klds almost 
flguring out the answers BUT always can figure out 
In school the answers. 
I 
J 
Some klds are popular Other kids are nol very 
wilh olhers lhefr aga BUT popular. n O 
APPENDIX C 
Academic and Social Themes 
The following are the 'academic' and 'social' themes used in the sorting task, and the 
under1 y ing principles (UP) and surface features (SF) created for each theme. 
Academic Themes: 
1) B iolog ical Princip les (descriptive) 
2) Environmental Waste Control (descriptive) 
3) Arithmetic Word Problems (problem) 
4) Water Principles (problem) 
Social Themes: 
5) Social Skills (descriptive) 
6) Rejection Situations (descriptive) 
7) Potential Peer Conflict (problem) 
8) Unsuccessfd Persodity Types (problern) 
1) Biologicai Principles: 
CARD A: [UP - visual mimicry, SF - physical characteristics] 
If a dangerous animal is near, the Capricorn Beetie opens it's wing to look like a wasp. 
It is a type of insect. It has 2 stiff outer wings and 2 wings hidden underneath. 
CARD B: WP - camouflage, SF - physical characteristics] 
The Seahorse's head looks like a horse. It cm hide from danger because it can match al1 
background colors. It has a long snout on it. 
CARD C: [UP - camouflage, SF - where it lives] 
I 
Gray in summer and white in the winter, the Arctic Fox blends into it's surroundings. 
It is fiom the dog family. It is most often seen up north in the Arctic. 
CARD D: [UP - natural pest control, SF - what it feeds on] 
The Purple Martin feeds on mosquitos. In the places where they live, mosquitos are much 
less of a bother to people. It is a kind of bird. 
CARD E: [UP - visual rnimicry, SF - where it lives] 
The Hawkrnoth Caterpillar is a long worm-like larva. It is seen most often in South 
America. It tums over to show marks on its underside that look like a poisonous snake. 
CARD F: [UP - camouflage, SF - what it feeds on] 
The Cbameleon is a type of lizard. It f d s  on insects. It is able to change color, so that 
it is very hard to see in the shadows of the forest. 
CARD G: WP - natural pest control, SF - where it lives] 
The Manatee eats the weds that clog the river and hinder pleasure boating . It is a large 
water mammal. It is seen most often in Florida's water ways. 
CARD H: [UP - natural pest control, SF - physicai characteristics] 
The Ladybug is part of the beetle family. It's shell has bright colors on it. It kills little 
white bugs called aphids that grow on and can min hops and orange crops. 
CARD 1: [UP - visual mimicry, SF - what it feeds on] 
The Crested Rat feeds on almost anything that can be 
eaten. It parts it's hair to show skunk-like markings to protect itself. It is in the rodent 
family. 
CARD A: [UP - recycling, SF - containers] 
Tin cans keep foods that go bad quickly , tasting good. Tin cans are made of metai, and 
after they have served their purpose, they can be melted down for more c a s .  They are 
a great way to hold and store food for a long time. 
CARD B: [UP - landfil1 waste, SF - common use] 
Disposable diapers are very common to use because rhey can be thrown out. Peopie are 
starting to use cloth diapers more so we do not fil1 garbage dumps with disposable 
diapers. Babies go through many diapers each day. 
CARD C: [UP - recycling, SF - containers] 
Glas bottles are gcxxl to hold and store liquids. People have been using glas bonles for 
a long rime. When a glas bottle is empty it can often be sent back to the Company and 
re-filled. 
CARD D: [UP - composting, SF - common use] 
People do not Iike the srne11 of manure, but still use it on their lawns. Using rnanure is 
a common way to help plants grow. Manure cornes from animal droppings and is helpful 
in al1 kinds of gardens, from a small patch of grass to a large field. 
CARD E: WP - recycling, SF - jobs] 
Once a newspaper is not of any use, it can be rnixed with water, dried, and made into 
newsprint. Lots of kids have a job delivering papers. The news helps to keep people in 
touch with the world around them. 
CARD F: NP - landfill waste, SF - jobs] 
Some scientists have the job of studying strong chernicals. Many are part of Our daily 
needs, like the chernicd that keeps a fridge cold. Some are so harmful, that once we are 
done with them, we can not get rid of them. 
CARD G: [UP - composting, SF - jobs] 
In gocd weather, a lawn m u t  be cut once a week. Leaving the cut grass where it falls 
on the lawn is good for the grass, and it rnakes grass cutting an easier job, too. Lots of 
kids have a job cutting gras and get paid for each lawn cut. 
CARD H: [UP - composting, SF - common use] 
Fruit that is left on the ground will rot, and is healthy for the soil. Fruits are a very 
cornmon part of a good diet. You should not make a mess, but it's okay to throw pieces 
of fhit (like apple cores) on the ground. 
CARD 1: [UP - landfill waste, SF - containers] 
When plastic containers are thrown out they will stay in one piece and will not rot for 
years and years. They can hold and you can store most things in them. The containers 
are cheap to make, and have many uses. 
I 
3) Arithmetic Word Problems 
CARD A: [UP - addition, SF - nurnber] 
John and Kate were both wllecting stamps to put in one album. John had 26 and Kate 
had 35. They wanted to figure out the number of stamps that would be in the album. 
CARD B: [UP - addition, SF - hours] 
He was trying to decide exactly how long before he could leave. Ken wanted to go and 
bowl. First, he had to clean the house for 2 hours, jog for 1 hour, and walk the dog for 
half an hour. 
CARD C: [UP - division, SF - number] 
He had a box of smarties with 30 smarties in it to give to the kids. He was trying to 
decide what number of smarties would be fair to give to each kid. Joe was babysitting 
3 kids. 
CARD D: [UP - division, SF - money] 
They wanted to figure out how much money they could get for each bushel of apples 
picked. Tom picked 2 bushels and Bob picked 3 bushels of apples. They were paid 
$20. O al together . 
CARD E: [UP - subtraction, SF - hours] 
Ted worked 3 ,4 ,  and 2 hours, while Dave worked 4, 1, and 3 hours, during the week. 
They were trying to figure out who did the most homework. Ted and Bill did homework 
on three nights. 
CARD F: [UP - subtraction, SF - number] 
They were trying to decide who had the bigger grocery bill for cat food. Kim has 8 black 
cats and 5 white cats, and Jack has 7 gray cats and 4 brown cats. Al1 cats eat about the 
same arnount of food- 
CARD G: [UP - subtraction, SF - money] 
Mary worked for a day on one job and made $9.00. She worked for a day on another job 
and made $5.00. She wanted to know how much more money she got on the fust job. 
I 
CARD H: [UP - addition, SF - money] 
They put together dl of the money. They want to know the total amount that they will 
give to the charity . Kim raised $ I 10.00 for the charity and Jim raised $95.00 for the 
charity . 
CARD 1: [UP - division, SF - hour] 
Pat and Sue could wash 3 cars in an hour. There were 24 cars to wash. They wanted to 
know how long they would have to work until they could go home. 
4) Water Principles 
CARD A: WP - displacernent of water, SF - man] 
A man put a big load of rocks into his wheelbanow and rolled it to the side of the pond. 
He wanted to make the pond wider and more shallow. A man had a small but deep pond. 
CARD B: @JP - sinking, SF - glass] 
A young boy wanted a snack, so he poured some milk into a glas and dropped a cookie 
on top of the milk. He put away the cookie jar and milk bottle, and cleaned up his mess. 
When he went to get his glass of milk, the cookie had disappeared. 
CARD C: WP - sinking, SF - ma4 
A man in a new lake saw some rocks just below the water's surface. He was ahid that 
other people might not see the rocks and crash their boats into them. He grabbed an 
empty plastic container and an old rope that were in his boat. 
CARD D: [UP - displacement of water, SF - animal] 
A thirsty crow found a pitcher with a linle water in it. The pitcher was so deep, the crow 
could not reach the water with his beak. He saw some Stones by the pitcher and started 
picking them up with his beak. 
CARD E: [UP - sinking, SF - man] 
A man robbed a bank and was chased by police to a river. He found a boat, jumped in, 
and started to row away. The police wanted to catch him but not hurt him, so they aimed 
their guns at the bottom of the boat. 
t 
CARD F: [UP - displacement of water, SF - glass] 
The large glas made it look like there wasn't very much pop in the glass. A boy had 
poured a drink into a large glass. He waiked over to the fridge, opened the ice box and 
grabbed the ice cubes. 
CARD G: [UP - floatation, SF =animal] 
The river was wide and the monkey could not swing across between the trees. He saw 
a big, flat piece of wood caught in some weeds and went to get it. A monkey wanted the 
big bananas on the other side, but could not swim. 
CARD H: [UP - sinking, SF - animal] 
The penguin's mother tricked the baby into going on a raft that had holes in it. She 
knows that penguins must Iearn how to swim so they can fish and eat. The baby penguin 
did not like to get wet and could not swim. 
CARD 1: NP - floatation, SF - animal] 
Somebody was pouring a strong drink in the glass, and the bug could not swim. A small 
bug had fallen in a glass with a couple of sweet cherries in it. He saw that the cherries 
were at the top of the water and tri& to reach them. 
CARD A: [UP - sharing/cooperation, SF - wmputer] 
A bunch of your fiiends are over at your house and everybody wants to play. You just 
got a new computer game for your birthday. Since oniy two people cm play at a tirne, 
you decide to let each person have ten minutes on the wmputer at a time. 
CARD B: [UP - nonverbal communication, SF - lunch hour] 
At lunch hour, your fiiends outside see you in the classroom and are jumping up and 
down and waving their a m  at you. You can't hear what they are saying, only see them. 
While eating your lunch, you see a bunch of your fiiends on the playground. 
CARD C: [UP - joining, SF - wmputer] 
You have room for one more mernber, so you invite hirn to join your group. You see 
kat one boy in your class is not in a group. You have just formed groups to da a project 
on the computer. 
CARD D: [UP - joining, SF - lunch hour] 
Neither soccer game has many players. During the lunch hour, you and a few kids are 
playing soccer, and some other kids are also playing soccer. You talk it over with your 
friends, then suggest to the other group to play together. 
CARD E: [UP - nonverbal communication, SF - four hiends] 
It is a tough game and you and your 4 friends are playing well. You and four of your 
friends have been practicing for weeks for this big game. You look over at your coach 
and he gives you the thumbs up sign. 
CARD F: [UP - joining, SF - four friends] 
You see 4 of your fkiends having a lot of fun playing tennis. You would really like to 
play, but there is no one else around. You ask the four boys if you could be a substitute 
for their game when somebody needs a rut. 
CARD G: [UP - sharingfcooperation, SF - lunch hour] 
You did not bring a lunch and are starving by lunch hour. You are working on your 
homework to forget about eating. A boy near you notices that you don? have a lunch 
and offers you some of his. 
CARD H: [UP - nonverbal communidon, SF - computer] 
Your best friend is presenting his project about uses of the computer to the clw. You 
are listening carefully and srniling while he talks. Most of the other kids in your class 
are yawning. 
CARD 1: [UP - sha.ing/cooperation, SF - four friends] 
The 4 boys see that you do not have a glove and decide to take tums and let you use their 
gloves. Four of your friends are on the playground practicing. You forgot to bring your 
basebail glove to school to practice catching. 
6) Rejeetion Situations 
CARD A: WP - accidentai, SF - party] 
The boy did not ask you because you were behind one kid and he did not see you. You 
bant to go to the games Party, but the boy asked everyone to corne but you. The boy 
wants to have a games party and it sounds like fun. 
CARD B: [UP - intentional, SF - party] 
You want to go to the Party, but the boy asks everyone to be there but you. The boy is 
planning a party. He did not ask you because he knows how much you want to ba a part 
of the group and is just being mean. 
CARD C: [UP - justified, SF - forming a group] 
You like to play the drums, but the boy asks everyone to join the band but you. In music 
class, a boy was talking about forming a group. He did not ask you because you are 
always making fun of kids when they play their instruments. 
CARD D: WP - intentional, SF - weekend] 
At recess, some of the boys are talking about going skating this weekend. You love to 
go skating, but they ask everyone to go but you. They did not ask you because they 
thought it would be fun to see how mad you would get. 
CARD E: [UP - intentional, SF - forming a group] 
The boys did not ask you because they are being nasty and want to make you feel bad. 
You would Iike to be in the club, but the boys ask everyone to attend but you. Some 
boys are talking about forming an "after school" group. 
CARD F: [UP - justified, SF - party] 
A boy wants everyone to corne to his place for a v i d a  party. You like to see videos, but 
the boy asks everyone to go but you. He did not ask you because you did not ask him 
to your place last weekend. 
CARD G: [UP - justified, SF - weekend] 
The boy did not ask you because he had a fight with you and you called him some bad 
names. You would Iike to go bowling, but he asks everyone to attend but you. The boy 
was taiking to everyone about going bowling this weekend. 
CARD H: [UP - accidentai, SF - forming a group] 
A boy is mlking about forming a study group for math. You want to be in the group, but 
he asks everyone to go but you. He did not ask you because he thought you knew that 
you were invited, and he did not mean to l a v e  you out. 
I 
CARD 1: [UP - accidental, SF - weekend ] 
You like swimrning. but the boys ask everyone to join in but you. During gym, some 
boys are planning to go swimming on the weekend, and it sounds Iike fun. They did not 
ask you because you were shaking your head and looked Iike you wuld not go. 
7) PossibIe Peer Conflid 
CARD A: [UP - physicai provocation, SF - playground] 
You start to walk to your friends, to join their game. It is recess, and you see them at the 
far end of the playground. You pass by some other boys kicking a soccer ball and as you 
walk by, you get hit in the back with the ball. 
CARD B: [UP - embarassment, SF - playground] 
As you walk by two boys in your class playing catch, they both start to laugh. You just 
got your hak cut 1st  night. You are on the playground waiting for the bel1 to ring. 
CARD C: [UP - rejection, SF - gym class] 
Captains are chosen to play basebail and they start to pick team members. You are in 
gym class and the teacher asks the captains to take ~ n i s  choosing. You are the last one 
to get picked for a team. 
CARD D: [UP - ernbarassment, SF - in class] 
In language arts class, the teacher is discussing a story with the class. She calls on you 
to answer an easy question but you did not know the answer. As the teacher is asking 
someone else to answer, you hear two boys behind you whispering and giggling. 
CARD E: [UP - rejection, SF - in class] 
During science class the teacher tells everyone ta split up into small groups to work on 
a project. You see a lot of boys two rows from you. You go over and ask if you cm be 
in their group and they say "no " . 
CARD F: [UP - rejection, SF - playground] 
A boy asks everyone who is standing around to play except you. You were out on the 
playground and the boy suggested that everyone play a game of tag. You were standing 
nearby, and want to play the game. 
CARD G: [UP - physical provocation, SF - gym class] 
A boy cornes ruming up behind you and smashes right into you, knocking you down on 
the ground. You were waiting in line to get a drink of water. You were really hot and 
thirsty from exercising in the gym. 
CARD H: [UP - physical provocation, SF - in class] 
Everyone in your class is making a poster in art. Your tacher says it is almost time to 
clean up. One of the boys in your class cornes over, reaches for a jar of paint, bumps 
into you, and spills paint al1 over your poster. 
CARD 1: WP - embarassrnent, SF - gym class] 
With the high jump bar still low, everybody in your gym class clears the high jump bar 
without trouble. You are the last one to try and you bock the bar off the stands. Lying 
on the mat, you see a couple of boys making faces. 
8) Unsu-ul Personality Types 
CARD A: [UP - buIly/aggressive, SF - skating] 
You are playing hockey at the skating rink, but you are one man short. Les plays hockey 
and is at the ri* looking for a game to join. You do not know if you should ask him 
because he always gets into fights. 
CARD B: [UP - bully/aggressive, SF - neighborhood] 
You wish Chris would not show up to play because he always ends up yelling and 
swearing. Everybody else is a good sport when you play baseball. You are forming a 
baseball game with the kids in your neighborhood. 
CARD C: WP - selfuh, SF - in class] 
You mom asks you to be friends with the son of her fkiend. He is in your class and does 
not have a fkiend. You feel sony for him, but he does things like keeping the best for 
himself when handing out stuff in class. 
CARD D: [UP - bully/aggressive, SF - in class] 
Jess asked if he could be part of your group. You just started a group project in class. 
'You would like Jess to go to another group because he argues a lot and makes people do 
stuff they do not want to do. 
CARD E: [UP - shyfwithdrawn, SF - in class] 
You do not want to ask Brad to be in your group because he never srniles, and does not 
hang around with anybody. He is sitting near your group in class. Brad is the only 
person in your class that has not joined a group to put on a play. 
CARD F: [UP - shy/withdrawn, SF - neighborhood] 
Pat lives in your neighborhood, but you do not like to play with him. Your teacher asks 
you to try to involve Pat in games outside of school. You do not want to because he 
sticks to hirnself and does not try to talk to other kids. 
CARD G: [UP - selfish, SF - skating] 
As captain of the team, you have to tell Jim to stop eating most of the pizza. It is fun 
to talk about skating while eating pizza but Jim never shares. After skating, the coach 
always orders a pizza. 
CARD H: [UP - shy/withdrawn, SF - skating] 
lamie is the one kid that takes lessons who does not have fun. He is in the same skating 
lessons as you. You feel bad for Jane, but it is bard to be friends because he never joins 
in the fun and always skates done. 
CARD 1: [UP - selfish, SF - neighborhood] 
Everybody in your neighborhood hopes that Steve will not be at the playground. 
Everybody likes to swing on the rope. You wish there was something you could do about 
him because he always hogs the rope and does not let others try it. 
APPENDIX D 
Scoring Key for the Underlying Principles and Surface Features for Each Theme, 
foflowed by an example of the Categorical and Quantitative Scoring Systems for Two 
Subjects 
Themes were swred according to underlying principles (UP) or surface features (SF). 
For the categoricai scoring method, each pile sorted appropriately according to the scoring 
key below received a point, with a maximum of 3 points for each theme. For the quantitative 
scoring method, each  cen na rio categorized in a meaningful fashion according to the s&ng 
key below, received one point, for a maximum score of nine for each theme. Each scenario 
or card is represented by a letter (from A to 1; see Appendix C for each scenario and the 
corresponding letters) . 
Scores were based on the letters provided by the subjects and the accompanying 
comments describing theù rationale for grouping the scenarios together. Comments only 
needed to reflect the 'gist' of the descriptors listed in the scoring key. Every attempt was 
made npt to make scoring dependent on written expressive skills. Thus, relevant written 
comments resulted in greater ease with scoring, while poorly described or non-existent 
comments required closer analysis of the letter groupings in order to discern the rationale 
employed by the subject. The following guidelines were used when responses were not 
prwented in a manner that easily fit into the scoring criterion: 
1) If comments were inadequate or nonexistent, but the groupings fell into categories 
reflected in the scoring key, credit was given. 
2) When tm many scenarios were grouped together, with several falling into a given 
cadgory and one or two additional scenarios that did not 'fit', and if half or more of the 
scenarios were appropriately grouped, those scenarios received credit. 
3) When only a few scenarios were grouped together and several more wuld have been 
included, and if the grouping fit the scoring criterion, then the scenarios were credited. 
4) If only one scenario was presented for one category, this generally did not receive any 
credit (since no relationship c m  be discemeci), unless the other two categories demonstrateci 
group ings that clearl y excluded the individual scenario (thereb y, demonstrating a distinctive 
relarionship by exclusion). 
5) If a rationale was stated but the cards did not re£iect the rationale, nor any sirnilar 
rationde according to the scoring criterion, then no credit was given. 
6) If a rationale was given that was so general that it did not discriminate categories (e.g., 
stating that a subset of scenarios in the rejection situations reflects rejection, and the grouped 
scenarios could not be discrirni~ted from the rest), then no credit was given. 
7) No credit was given when the comments were incorrect and the grouped scenarios did not 
'fit' in any coherent fashion. 
In order to be considered an underlying principle, the grouping of scenarios needed 
to represent information that is not directly stated, but is a concept or underlying theme that 
ties the scenarios together. A sufface feature is a salient detail that is clearly stated in the 
scenarios. It would include specific objects or actions, or specific words common to the 
scenarios grouped together. Some information may not be explicitly stated, but refers to a 
common detail presented in the scenario that does not reflect an understanding of the 
underlying intent of the scenario. Features that did not relate to the content of the scenarios, 
but rather to basic syntactic or graphic similarities (e.g, grouping al1 scenarios that end with 
I 
an 's'), were not scored. It was felt that, while this type of information could be considered 
a surface feature, it was qualitatively inferior to surface feaaires referring to story content. 
These types of categories tended to occur infkequently, and appeared to represent 'groping in 
the dark' attempts by subjects to corne up with some kind of similarisr during the second sort. 
Furthemore, comparing scoring systems with and without the inclusion of this type of 
information did not yield any significant differences in results. 
The following is the scoring key of UP and SF for the various themes. The capital 
letters identify the specific scenarios. Brackered groupings of letters refer to more general 
groupings or an extension of a principle or feature that was wnsidered valid. 
ACADEMIC THEMES: 
Underlying Principles: 
visual mimicry (becorne more dangerous) - AEI 
camouflage - BCF 
natural p s t  control - DGH 
animals that lay eggs - BDEFH 
animals that kill something - DH 
Surface Features: 
" ieeds onUleats (insects) - DFI (GH) 
"most often seenu/iives - CFG 
description - ABH (GECI), "looks like" - ABF 
colors of animais - BFH (CD) 
" family " (" kind o f ,  "type o f )  - CHI @F) 
in water (swim) - BG; 'beetle" farnily - AH 
fly mas wings) - ADH; have fur - CC1 
on land - ACEFI; four legged - CFGi 
Envirotunental Waste Control: 
Underlying Principles: 
recycle - ACE / re-use things - ACEIW) 
compost (nature/use for lawns/discard) - DGH 
landfill waste (harmful to us/problems) - BFI 
containers prolong life of food - AC1 
something going bad - AGH; rot/droppings/waste - BD 
people don? like them, smelI/odor - BDF (GH) 
Surface Features: 
"containers "/" holdand store" (food) - AC1 (F) 
"cornmon" use - BDH; "kidsW/babies - BEG 
job - EFG; lawns and garden / ground - DGH 
liquids - CE; food and drink - ACHI 
people - BCDE O 
Arithmetic Word Problems: 
Underlying Principles: 
sumrnatiodadd - ABH; must use +(total) - ABEFH 
difference/subtract - EFG (B) 
division/fractions (multiplication, rate) - CD1 
comparing - EFG; working together - ADHI 
give something awaylsharingheing kind,generous - CH 
1 math step - DEF; > lmath step - ABCHI 
Surface Features: 
number - ACF (1); collecting - ADH 
hours / "how long" - BEI; animais - BF 
rnoney - DGH O; "work" (jobs) - EGI (BCD) 
objects - AC 0); more/bigger/most - EFG 
" h-ying to decide" /decision making - BCF 
"to figure out" - ADE; "want to know" - GHI 
"altogether" - DH; how much - DG (H) 
to do with food - CDF; boy and girl - AFHI 
about 1 person - BCG; about 2 people - ADEFHI 
I about girls - GI; about boy(s) - BC@E) 
Water Principles 
Underlying Principles: 
fioating - CGI; something floats - EFGI 
(will) sink - (D)BEH; they'll get wet - EH1 
displacernent of water (changing size) - ADF 
something heavy in water - ABDF 
trying to get food - BGH; disintegrating - BF 
concerning safety (accidents) - CEHI 
don't want people harmed/ wamings - CE 
hurting another personhimal (for own good) - CH 
help ingl help ing yourself - ADEGI 
used rock to getlfinish something - AD 
try to fi something/do thernselves - ACG 
teaching a lesson - EGH 
intent given but not specified - ADG 
Surface Features: 
man - ACE; boy - BF; human - ABCEFI 
glass, thirsty/drink - BFI 0); container - BCDFI 
animal - DGHI; bird - DH; wood - GH 
soft drink - BF; "could not swimn - GHI 
reach / trying to get something - DI (EG) 
man, water and boat - CE; rocldstones - ACD 
pond/river/lake0 ACEG (H); eating - BGH 
water transportation - CEGH; Iiquid (not H20) - BFI 
uses fkidge - BF; "want something" - ABEG 
disappeared - BI;; trying to cross river - EG (F) 
dropping into something - ABDF 
couldn't do something - DG1 
Social Themes 
5) Social Skiils 
Underlying Principles: 
sharinglcooperation - AGI OF); take turns - AFI 
joining - CDF; include another person - CG1 
l communication - BEH; make a new fkiend - CG 
suggestions - DF; you solve a problem/help others - ACDF 
give/offer you something - GI; organize groups - ACD 
look for/give approval - EH; miss out on something - BGI 
you don't leave a person out (isolated person) - CFGI (B) 
playing together as one - DE; helpskindness - EGI 
Surface Features: 
computer 1 indoor activities - ACH; project - CH 
4 kidslfriends - EFI; forget something - GI 
lunch hour (time) - BDG (A); tired - FH 
sports/ play outside - DEFI (B); game - ADEFI 
at school - BCDGH; out of school - AEFI; inside - ACGH 
"practicing" - EI; give you something - EG 
6) Rejections Situations 
Underlying Principles: 
accident - AHI; being misunderstood - HI 
intentional. mean on purpose - BDE; revenge - CFG 
justified, deserve it - CFG; not physicaily active - BCFH 
you influenced their decision in some way - CGHI 
Surface Featur es : 
party - ABF; "wants to go" - ABH 
form a group - CEH; "(would) Iike ton - CF1 (EG) 
weekend (sports) - DFGI; talking - CDGH 
schooI - CDH (EI); classes - CH 
out of school activities - ABDEFI 
7) Possible Peer Confiid 
U nderl ying Principles: 
embarassment - BDI; make rnistakes - DI 
rejection (lonely) - CEF; can't do something - DEFI 
provocation - AGH; accident - AGHI; get hurt - AGI 
feelings h u n  by what someone says - BDE 
teacher initiated - CDEHI; self initiated - AB 
other (peer) initiated - FG; embar't is own fault - DEI 
I 
embar't is caused by others - AGH; embar't has no clear cause - BCF 
Surface Features: 
gym - CG1 (B); choosing - CF; laughing - BD 
playground - ABF (I); last one - CFI; tacher - CDEHI 
class (school) - DEH (CGI); extra curricular - DEGI 
playing games - ABCF (G); sports - ABCFI; bal1 - ABC 
"walking" by people - AB; "waiting" - BG (C) 
groups - AE (C); you are talking - DE 
8) Unsuccessful Personality Types 
Underlying Principles: 
bully - ABD; not compelled to take action - ABFHI 
selfish - CGI; feel compelled to do something - CDFG 
shylwithdrawn - EFH; difficulty joining groups - CDEFH 
lonely/needs friends/donVt hang around with others - CEFH 
people who are pitied - CH; ambivalent feelings - ACH 
deals with your free time - CF1 
Surface Features : 
skating - AGH; hope person won? show up - BI 
neighborhoodl out of schooll playground - BFI 
"groups" at school - CDE; about school - CDEFH 
sports - ABGH; garnes - ABFGHI; "art" - DH; 
someone asbs you to do something - CDF; fun - GH 
you feel badlsorry for person - CH; pair - CFH 
groups - DE (ABFG); "you wish" - BI 
An Example of the Categorical and Quantitative Scoring Systems for the FIrst and 
Both Sorts for two Subjects 
The following is an example of how the "Unsuccessful Personality Types" theme was 
sorted by two subjects on their frst and second som, and includes thek written responses. 
The categorical and quantitative scoring systems follow the subjects responses. 
The frst subject identified surface features (SF) correctly for al1 scenarios during the 
fmt sort and no underlying principles (UP). This resulted in categorical scores of 3 for SF 
and O for UP and omission, and quantitative scoresof 9 for SF and O for UP. On the second 
sort, the subject identifed UP only. resulting in categorical scores of 3 for UP and O for SF 
and omission, and quantitative scores of 9 for UP and O for SF. Taken together (Le., both 
sorts), this subject received categorical scores of 3 for UP and 3 for SF and O for omission, 
and quantitative scores of 9 for UP and 9 for SF. Thus, subject one was able to identifi both 
UP and SF, and identifieci the UP after further considerations of the materials, during the 
second sort. 
The second subject focussed on UP in the fust sort. Al1 three piles correctly identifid 
UP, resulting in categoricai scores of 3 for UP and O for SF and omission. Card 'C' in the 
second pile was incorrectly p l a d  and consequently could not be credited in the quantitative 
scoring, resulting in quantitative scores of 8 for UP and O for SF. During the second sort, the 
second subject's frst and second piles were overlapping and too generai, while the third pile 
correctly contained SF. This resulted in categorical scores of 2 for omission, 1 for SF and O 
for UP. Card 'B' was inwnectly placed in the third pile, resulting in quantitative scores of 
3 for SF and O for UP. Taken together, both sorts yielded categorical scores of 3 for UP and 
1 for SF and 2 for omission, and quantitative scores of 8 for UP and 3 for SF. Thus, the 
second subject focussed on UP initiaily, then considered the materials tw generally and oniy 
grouped scenarios according to one SF in the second sort. 
Sorting of the "Unsuccessful Personality Types" îheme, and Categorical and Quantitative Scores, for two Subjects. 
SUBJECT # 1 - FIRST SORT 
Your mom asks you to be friends with the 
daughter of her friend. She is in your class and 
does not have a fiend. You feel sony for her, but 
she does things like kecping the best for herseIf 
when handing out stdT in class 
C 
Jess asked if she could be part of your group 
project in class. You would like lcss to go to 
another group because she argues a lot and makes 
people do stuff they do not wvant to do. 
D 
You do not wvant to ask Barb to be in your group 
because she never srniles, and does not hang 
around 114th anybody. She is sitting near your 
group in class. Barb is the only person in your 
class that has not joined groups IO be in a play. 
"11 al1 involves a situation at school." "They al1 have skating in theni." "You hopc hc won't show up to play." 
You are playing hockey at the skating rink, but 
you are one man short. Les plays hockey and is 
at the rink looking for a game to join. You do 
not know if you should ask her because she 
always gds into fights. 
A 
As captain of the team, you have to tell Kim to 
stop eating niost of ihe pizza, It is fun to talk 
about skating while eating pizza but Kim never 
shares. AAer skating, the coach always orders a 
pizza. 
G 
Jane is the one kid that takes lessons who does 
not have fun. She is in the same skating lessons 
as you. You feel bad for Jane, but it is hard to 
be friends because she ncver joins in the fun and 
alwriys skates alone. 
You wish Chris would not show up to play 
because she always ends up yelling and 
swearing. Everybody else is a goad sport when 
you play a baseball with the kids in your 
neighborhood. 
B 
Pat lives in your neighborhood, but you do not 
like to play wvith her. Your tacher asks you to 
try to involve Pat in games outsidc of school. 
You do not w n t  to because she sticks to herseIf 
and does no1 try to talk to other kids. 
F 
Everybody in your neighborhood hopes that Sue 
will not be at the playground. Everybody likes 
to swing on the rope. You wish there was 
something you could do about her because she 
always hogs the rope and does not lei othcrs try 
it. 
SUBJECT # 1 - SECOND SORT 
You are playing hockey at the skating rink, but 
you are one man short. Les plays hockey and is 
at the rink looking for a game to join, You do not 
know if you should ask her because slie always 
gets into fights, 
A 
Your wvish Chris would not show up to play 
because she always ends up yelling an sweanng. 
Every body else is a good sport when you play 
baseball wlth the kids in your neigliborhood, 
B 
Jess asked if she could be part of your group 
project in class. You would like Jess to go to 
another group because she argues a lot and makes 
people do sluff they do not wvant ta do. 
"Somebody is doing soniething bad." 
Your mom asks you to be friends with the daughter 
of her fnend. She is in your class and does not have 
a friend. You feel sorry for her, but she does things 
like keeping the best for hersetf when handing out 
stuff in class. 
C 
As captain of the team, you have to tell Kim to stop 
eating most of the pizza. It is h n  to talk about 
skating while eating pizza but Kim never shares. 
Mer skating, the coach always orders a pizza. 
G 
Everybody in your neighborhood hopes that Sue will 
not be a t the playground. Every body likes to swing 
on the rope. You wish there \vas something you 
could do about her because she always hogs the rope 
and does not let others try it. 
You do not want to ask Barb to be in your 
group because she never smiles, and does 
not hang around with anybody. She is sitting 
near your group in class. Barb is the only 
person in your class that has not joined 
groups to be in a play. 
E 
Pat lives in your neighborhood, but you do 
not like to play with her. Your ieacher asks 
you to try to involve Pat in games outside of 
school. You do not want to because she 
sticks to herself and does not try to talk io 
other kids, 
F 
Jane is the one kid that takes lessons who 
does not have fun, She is in the same 
skating lessons as you. You feel bad for 
Jane, but it is hard to be friends because slie 
never joins in the fun and always skates 
alone. 
"Thc person always hogs things." "Evcry persoii feels alone," 
SUBJECT # 2 - FlRST SORT 
4s captain of the team, you have to tell Kim to 
;top eating most of the pizza. lt is fun to talk 
ibout skating while eating pizza but Kim never 
;hares. After skating, the coach always orders a 
k a .  
G 
Everybody in your neighborhood hopes that Sue 
tvill not be at the playground. Every body likes 
:O swing on the rope. You wish there wvas 
;ornethhg you could do about her because she 
ihvays hogs the rope and does not let others try 
it . 
I 
"Kids who don3 share and hog things." 
P 
Your mom asks you to be friends with the 
daughter of her friend. She is in your class and 
does noi have a friend. You feel sony for her , 
but she does things like keeping the best for 
herself when handling out stuff in class. 
C 
You do not want to ask Barb to be in your group 
because she never smiles, and does not bang 
around with anybody. She is Sitting near your 
group in class. Barb is the only person in your 
class that has not joined groups to be in a play. 
Pal lives in your neighborhood, but you do not 
like to play with her. Your teacher asks you to 
try to involve Pat in games outside of school. 
You do not want to because she sticks to herself 
and does not try to talk to other kids. 
F 
Jane is the one kid ihat takes lessons wvho does 
not have fiin. She is in the same skating lessons 
as you. You feel bad for Jane, but it is hard to 
be friends because shc never joins in the fun and 
always skates alone. 
Yeu are playing hockey at the skating rink, but 
you are one man short. Les plays hockey and is 
at the rink looking for a game to join. You do 
not know if you should ask her because she 
always gets into fights. 
A 
You wvisli Chris wvould not show up to play 
because she alwvays ends up yelling and 
swearing. Everybody else is a good sport when 
you play baseball with the kids in your 
neighborhood. 
Jess asked if she could be a part of your group 
project in class. You wvould like Jcss to go (O 
another group because she argues a lot and 
makes people do stuff they do no1 want to do. 
"They are lefi oui." "Everyone is angry and fighting," 
SUBJECT # 2 - SECOND SORT 
You do not want to ask B a h  to be in your group 
because she never smiles, and does no1 hang 
around with anybody, She is Sitting near your 
group in class, Barb is the only pcrson in your 
class ihat has not joined groups to be in a play. 
E 
Pat lives in your neighborhood, but you do not 
like to play wvith her. Your teacher asks you to try 
to involve Pat in games outside of school. You do 
not want to because she sticks to herself and does 
not try to talk to other kids. 
"They don't want to bother participating." 
Your mom asks you to be friends with the daughter 
of her friend. She is in your class and does not have 
a friend. You feel sorry for her, but she does things 
tike keeping the best for herself when handing out 
stuff in class. 
C 
Jess asked if she could be part of your group project 
in class. You would like Jess to go to another group 
because she argues a lot and makes people do stuff 
they do not want to do. 
D 
Every body in your neighborhood hopes that Sue 
wili not be at the playground, Every body likes to 
swing on the rope. You wish there was something 
you could do about her because she always hogs the 
rope and does not let others try it. 
Your are playing hockey at the skating rink, 
but you are one man short. Les plays hockey 
and is at the rink looking for a game to join. 
You do not know if you should ask her 
because she always gets into fights. 
A 
You wish Chris would not show up to play 
because she always ends up yelling and 
swvearing . Everybody else is a good sport, 
When you play baseball with the kids in your 
neighborhood. 
B 
As capiain of the team, you have to tell Kim 
to stop eating most of the pizza. It is fiin to 
talk about skating while eating pizza but Kim 
never shares. M e r  skating, the coach atwvays 
orders a pizza. 
G 
lane is the one kid that takes lessons who 
does not have fun. She is in the sarne skating 
lessans as you. You fee1 bad for Jane, but it is 
hard to be friends because she never joins in 
the h n  and always skates alone. 
"They don'i let others participate." "Some thirig to do with skating or lessons." 
Summary of the Categorical arid Quantitative Scoring System 
SUBJECT #1 
























The Knowledge Test 
The following is the knowledge test, given to each subject in order to assess their 
understanding of the underlying principles presented in each theme. Male and female 
versions of the test were created that were identical in terms of item content, with the 
exception that questions focussing on social themes contained same-sex characters. That is, 
for social themes describing a boy or a girl, males read about a boy, and femalu read about 
a girl. 
KNOWLEDGE TEST 
Please read each question or statement very carefully and circle the letter that best answers 
the question or completes the statement. 
1. Cats chase and o k n  catch and kill mice and rats. We can Say: 
a) cats are hungry anirnals 
b) cats are killers and we should avoid them 
c) mice and rats like to play with cats 
d) people like cats because they help control pests, such as mice and rats 
2. We send messages to other people without using any words by: 
a) smiling b) shmgging our shoulders 
c) yawning d) dl of the above 
3. Which of the following cannot be recycled? 
a) soup tins b) newspapers 
c) broken glas d) plastic bags 
4. A boy invites everyone standing around except you to a part- after school. He mistakenly 
thought you said that you had to go to the doctor's after school. He did not invite you 
because he: 
r 
a) wanted to be mean 
b) accidentally thought you would be busy and couldn't go 
C) did not want you to come 
d) did not think that you liked parties 
5. A farm has 3 horses, 4 cows, 12 chickens, 1 dog, 5 cats, and 6 kittens. How would you 
figure out how many anirnals there are on the farm altogether? 
a) add (+) b) subtract (-) 
c) multiply (x) d) divide (-) 
6. A boy bumps into you again and again from behind while standing in line, and laughs 
with his friend every time he does it. This boy: 
a) is a very fumy person 
b) bumped into you accidentally 
c) is sorry for bumping into you 
d) is bumping into you on purpose 
7. If you throw a bunch of rocks into a bucket of water, the level of the water in the bucket 
will: 
a) go down b) stay the same 
c) go UP d) none of the above 
8. A boy you know always gives himself the most or b a t  of everything and leaves less or 
the not-as-nice stuff for others. The best way to describe him is to Say that he is: 
a) a bully b) hungry 
c) selfish d) lonely 
9. Some anirnals can make themselves look like a more dangerous animal when they are 
about to be anacked. They do this to: 
a) hide from the attacker 
b) try and scare away an attacker 
c) be seen easier so other animals will corne and Save them 
d) warn other animals to go and hide 
10. Working together as a group to finish a project, means: 
a) cooperating with others 
1 
b) working alone 
c) not getting dong with others 
d) joining a game 
11. Which of the following should not be thrown on the earth in your garden? 
a) carrot greens b) appie cores 
c) gras clippings d) candy wrappers 
12. Some kids knew you really wanted to join their club and thought it was really fumy to 
invite everyone in class except you to join. Which of the following is me? 
- 
a) it was accident that you weren't invited 
b) they were going to invite you but forgot 
c) they didn't ask you on purpose, just to be mean 
d) you didn't want to join the club 
13. Jessie has a bigger paper route than Pat, and they want to figure out how many more 
papers Jessie has than Pat. To do this, they need to use: 
a) division b) subtraction 
c) fractions d) decimals 
14. How would most people feel if they made something in art and their classrnates said it 
looked stup id? 
15. What happens to a beach bal1 filled with air if it is at the bottom of an empty pool, and 
somebody starts filling the pool with water? The bal1 will: 
a) fioat on the water b) be covered with water 
c) burst d) lose it's air 
16. How would you best describe a boy that aiways si& by himself and doesn't try to talk 
with other kids? 
a) happy * b) smart 
c) lonely d) friendly 
17. With some animals, the color of their skinkoat changes to blend in with their 
surrounding. This is helpful because: 
a) they don't like to be only one color 
r b) they are easier to see 
c) it is a part of aging 
d) it protects the-animals 
18. A boy who does not join 
is someone who is not: 
a) smart 
c) understanding d) 
in a game even when asked, and sis with his back to the game, 
b) participating 
sad 
19. Which of the following should not be put in garbage durnps? 
dangerous chernicals b) old leaves 
kitchen scraps d) newspapers 
boy having a Party doesn't ask you to corne because you are aiways mean to him. 
one of the following is me? 
it was an accident that you were left out 
the boy is being mean for no reason 
you aren't invited because of the unfkiendly way you treat that boy 
the boy is being friendly 
21. A man has $150.00 and wants to give it to his five children. He wants them dl to have 
the same amount of money. How would the man do this? 
a) add (+) b) s u b a t  (-) 
C) multiply (x) d) divide (-) 
22. You ask to join a game, but the kids who are playing say "no". From this, you could Say 
that they: 
a) are not being very nice 
b) need another player 
c) like you a lot 
d) don? know how to play the game 
23. What happens to a heavy rock, when you throw it in a lake? 
a) it ftoats to the surface 
b) it goes undenvater but won? touch bottom 
c) it si& to the bottom 
d) it breaks into small pieces when it hits the water 
24. Which kind of person would most people Iike to hang around? Somebody who: 
1 
a) has a broken leg b) works hard 
c) gets into a lot of fights d) talks a lot 
The following summarizes the themes and underlying principles tapped by each 
question of the knowledge test: 
Academic Themes: 
B iological Principles : 
1 d) - natural pest wntrol 
9 b) - visual mimicry 
17d) - animal camouflage 
Environmental Waste Control : 
3 d) - recycling 
1 Id) - cornposting 
14a) - landfill waste 
Arithmetic Word Problems: 
5 a) - summation 
13b) - ciifference 
2 1d) - fkactions/division 
Water Principles: 
7 c) - displacement of water 
1Sa) - floatation 
23c) - sinking 
Social Themes: 
Social SkiIls: 
2 d) - non-verbal communication 
10a) - sharing/mperation 
18b) - joining 
Rejection Situations: 
1 
4 b) - accidental 
12c) - intentional 
2ûc) - justified 
Possible Peer Conflict: 
6 d) - physical provocation 
14a) - embarassment 
22a) - rejection 
Unsuccessful Personaiity Types: 
8 c) - selfish 
f 6 4  - withdrawn 
24c) - aggressive 
APPENDIX F 
Descriptive Sta tigties, Study One. 




Academic Teacher Rathg 
Academic Self Perception 
Saciometnc Ratings 
Social Teacher Rati ngs 
Social SelfPerception 
Knowiedge Test: 
Total Test Items 
Academic Test Items 
Social Test Items 
Problem Solvinn Ta& 
First Sort : 
Theme 1 (Academic) 
Theme 2 (Academic) 
~ h e r n e  3 (.4cademic) 
Theme 4 I.4cademic) 
APPENDLX F (continued) 
Descriptive Statistics, Study One. 
Variable Name Grade Mean Standard Skew Kurtoss 
Devirition 
Theme 5 (Social) 6 0.56 1.37 2.23 4.0 1 
8 0.94 1.88 2.17 4-65 
Theme 6 (Social) 6 3.04 3.71 O. 66 -1.30 
8 3 -75 4.09 0.3 1 -1.75 
Theme 7 (Social) 6 1-74 2.60 1.35 0.60 
8 3.88 3.59 O. 15 - 1 .58 
Social Themes 
Torai Themes 


















APPENDM F (continued) 
Descriptive Statistics, Study One. 





t - tests of the DüTerences Behveen Means, Study One 
APPENDIX G. I : Sex Differences 
APPENDJX G.2: Grade Differences 
APPENDIX G.3 : Individual Themes 

APPENDIX G.1 
t-tests of the Dinuence Between Means. Study One 
Sex Differences 
t Vdue 
Grade 6 Grade 8 
df= 53 df= 63 
Conmetence Tasks : 
Achievement 
Academic Teacher Ratings 
ACadex.uk Self Perception 
Sociometric 
Social Teacher Ratings 
Sociai Self Perception 
Total Test Items 
Academic Test Items 
Sociai Test Items 
First Sort: 
Theme 1 (Academic) 
Theme 2 (Academicj 
Theme 3 (Academic) 
Theme 3 (Acadernic) 
Theme 5 (Sucial) 
Theme 6 (Social) 
Theme 7 (Social) 





Theme 1 (Academic) 
Theme 2 (Academic) 
Tbeme 3 (Academic) 
Theme 4 (Academic) 
Theme 5 (Social) 
Theme 6 (Socid) 
Thcme 7 (Social) 
Theme S (Sociai) 
Academic Themes 
Social Themes 
Totai Themes -0.33 -0.1 5 
*** p.< 001 ** p < .O1 * p < -05 (continuecl.. ) 
APPENDIX G.1 
t-tests of the Dinerence Behveeg Means, Study One 
Ser DaTerences (continued) 
Cornparison t Vahe 
Grade 6 Grade 8 
df= 53 df= 63 
Problem Solving Themes (ResiQial scores, ARr): 
First Sort: 
Theme 1 (Academic) 
Theme 2 (Academic) 
Theme 3 (Academic) 
Theme 4 (Academic) 
Theme 5 (Social) 
Theme 6 (Social) 
Therne 7 (Social) 





Theme 1 (Academic) 
Theme 2 (Academic) 
Theme 3 (Academic) 
Theme 4 (-4cademic) 
Theme 5 (Social) 
Theme 6 (Sociai) 
Theme 7 (Socialj 





t-tests of the Dinerence Between Means, Study One 
Grade Differences 
Achievement 
Academic Teacher Ratings 
Academic Self Perception 
Sociomettic 
Social Teacher Ratings 
Social self Perception 
Knoiviedee Test: 
Total Test Items -2.28" 
Academic Test Items -1.51 
Social Test Items -2.47* 
Roblem Solving Themes (ûrigirial Scores-AR) 
First Sort 
Theme 1 (Academic) 
Theme 2 (Academic) 
Theme 3 (Academic) 
Theme 4 (Academic) 
Theme 5 (Social) 
Theme 6 (Social) 
Theme 7 (Social) 





Theme 1 (Academic) -1.95 
Theme 2 (Academic) -2.29* 
Theme 3 (Academic) -1 -04 
Theme 4 (Academic) -1 .24 
Theme 5 (Social) -2.20* 
Theme 6 (Social) -1.4 1 
Theme 7 (Social) -3.72*** 
TFeme 8 (Social) -1.61 
Academic Themes -2.66* * 
Social Themes -3.4Sf 
Total Themes -3.50*** 
*** p.< O00 ** p < .O2 * p < .O5 
APPENDIX G.2 
t-tests of the Differencc BehKeen Means, Study One 
Grade Differences (continued) 
First Son: 
Theme I (Academic) 
Theme 2 (Academic) 
Theme 3 (Academic) 
Theme 4 (Academic) 
Theme 5 (Social) 
Theme 6 (Social) 
Theme 7 (Social) 





Theme 1 (Academic) 
Theme 2 (Adrnic)  
Theme 3 (Academicj 
Theme 4 (Academic) 
Theme 5 (Social) 
Theme 6 (Social) 
Theme 7 ( S d )  
Theme 8 (Social) 
Academic Themes 
Social Themes 
Total Themes 15.63*** 
*** p.< O01 ** p < .O1 * p < .O5 
APPENDIX G.3 
t-tests of the Difference Between Means, Snidy One 
IndividuaI Themes 
t Value 
Cornparison Grade 6 Grade 8 























































































Pearson Product--Moment Correhtions, Study One, Grades 6 and 8, 
Male and Female Subjecb 
APPENDlX H. la: Pearson Product-Moment Correlations Between Academic and Social 
Competence Taskg Female Subjects 
APPENDTX H lb: Pearson Product-Moment Correlations Baveen Academic and Social 
Competence Tasks, Male Subjects 
APPENDDL H2a: Pearson Roduct-Moment Correlations Between the Knowledge Test and the 
Competence Ta* F e d e  Subjects 
APPENDM H2b: Pearson Product-Moment Conelations Behveai the Knowledge Test and the 
Coqetaice Taçks, Male Subjects 
APPENDIX K3a: Pearson Product-Moment Correlations Betweai Analogical Reasoning and 
Competence Tasks, F e d e  Subjects 
APPENDM K3b: Pearson Product-Moment Correlations Betsveen Analogical Reasoning and 
Coqetence Tasks, Male Subjects 
APPENDIX H4a: Pearson Product-Moment Correlations Between Analogical R e a k g  and 
Coqetence Tasks, ControIIing for Knowledge, Female Subjects 
APPENDIXH..lb: Pearson Roduct-Moment Correlations Betwem Analogicd Rasonkg and 





Pearson Product - Moment Correlations Between the Knowledge Test and Cornpetence Tasks, Studg One 














Knowledge l'est - 'Iota1 Knowledge Test - Acndemic 
6 8 
.34 .54** 
Knowledge Test - Social 
APPENDIX H.3a 
Pearson Product - Moment Correlations Behveen the Analogical Reasoning and Competeace Tasks, Study One 











Analogical Reasonhg (AR) 
Academic Themes Social Themes Tot al Themes 

APPENDIX H.4a 
Pearson Product - Moment Correl~tions Behveen the Andogical Remoning and Cornpetence Tasks, Study One 








Teacher Ra tings 
Social 
Self Report 
Analogical Rerisoning (ARr) 
Academic Themes Social Tlrenies Total 'fhemes 

APPENDiX I 
Principal Components Factor Analysis Using a Varimax Rotation on the Correlations 
Among the Analogid Reasoning Scores for the Individual Themes (Eigen = l), 











Grade 6 Grade 8 
APPENDIX J 
t-tests of the Differences Between Correiations, Study One, Grades 6 and 8 
APPENDM: J. 1: t-tests of the Differences Between Correlations of Analogical Reasoning and 
Competence, Across Competence Tasks (with and without Controllhg for Knowledge) 
APPENDIX J.2: t-tests of the Differences Between Correlations of Analogicd Reasoning and 
Competence, Cornparhg with and without Controhg for Knowledge 

APPENDIX 5.2 
t-tests of the Differences Between Comeiatioiis of Analogical Reasoning and 
Competence, Cornpiring with and without Controhg for Knowledge, Study One, 
Grades 6 and 8 
Grade 6 Grade 8 
ACHT = achievement, TRC = academic teacher ratings, SPC = acxiemic self report 
WARa,ARs = Analogical Reasoning Scores for the total, academic and social themes, without controhg 
for iohdedge 
ARî(r),ARa(r),ARs(r) = Anaiogical Reasoaing Scores for the taal. academic, and social themes, controhg 
for howiedge 
*** p<.oOo, ** p<.o1, v . 0 5  
APPENDIX K 
Academic Causal ModeI, Using 4 Academic and 4 Social Themes, Study One 
APPENDIX K. 1: Academic Causal Modei, Using 4 Academic Themes 
APPENDIX K2: Acadexnic Causal Modei, USng 4 Social Themes 
APPENDIX K.1 
Academic Causal Mode1 (Using 4 Academic Themes), Study One 
GRADE 8 
-23 
ARr b TRC 
\ 
ACHT ACHT $25 
b 
SPC 
ARr - Analogical Reasoning (ARr). using 4 Acadeniic Themes, TRC = academic teacher ratings, ACHT = mhieveinent, SPC = academic self repn 
*++ p.< 001 ** p < .O1 * p < .O5 
AIBPENDIX K.2 








ARr = Analogical Rea~oni~ ig  ( A h )  , using 4 Social Thenies, TRC = academic tacher ratings, ACHT = achievenient, SPC = acadeinic self r e p n  
*+* p.< 001 ** p <  .O1 * p < .O5 
APPENDM L: Extended Analyses from Shidy Two 
APPENDM LI: Descriptive Statistics, Study Two 
APPENDIX L2: Pearson Prodoct-Moment Correlations among Competence Tasks 
APPENDM W: Rincipal Components Factor Analyses using a Varimas Rotation for 
the Individual Themes 
APPENDIX L.4: Pearson Product-Moment Correlations between Individual Themes 
APPENDTX L.5: Pearson Roduct-Moment Correlations between Competence Tasks 
and Knowledge Test 
APPENDIX LI: Descriptive Statistics, Study Two 
Variable Grade Mean Standard Deviation 
Cornpetence Tasks: 
Achievement 6 -6 1 -16 
8 .73 .15 
TR: Academic 6 .8 1 .20 
8 .84 .22 
SP: Academic 6 -76 -16 
8 -75 .16 
Sociometric 6 3 -48 -73 
8 3.47 -59 
TR: Social 6 .77 .20 
8 .76 .2 1 
SP: Social 6 -74 .19 
8 -77 .15 
Knowledge Test 
Total test itmes 6 -90 . I l  
8 -94 .10 
Academic items 6 .9 1 -11 
8 .92 .12 
Social items 6 .89 .16 
8 .94 .10 
AR Task - Both Sorts 
Theme 1 6 2.93- 2.8 1 
8 3.85 3.09 
Variable Grade MeanStandard Deviation 
Theme 2 6 5.5 1 2.97 
8 7.16 3.19 
Theme 3 6 2.84 3.6 1 
8 3.30 3.94 
Theme 4 6 .67 1.56 
8 1.39 2.40 
Theme 5 6 1.28 1.77 
8 2.46 2.80 
Theme 6 6 4.18 3.98 
8 6.14 3.53 
Theme 7 6 3.48 3 -4 1 
8 5.29 3.01 
Theme 8 6 4.19 3.63 
8 6.32 3.10 
Academic Themes 6 3.57 4.26 
8 4.69 5.20 
Social Themes 6 5.46 4.87 
8 8.59 5.17 
Total Themes 6 8.44 4.40 
8 11.01 4.96 
APPENDM L.2: Pearson Product-Moment Correlations Among Cornpetence Tasks, 
Study Two - Grade 6 (above) and Grade 8 (below) - 






APPENDM L.3: Principal Components Factor Analyses usiog a Varimax Rotation (Eigen = 1) for the Individual Themes 
Study Two, Grade 6 and Grade 8 
Grade 6 Grade 8 





Pearson Product-Moment Correlations Between Analogical Reasoning and 
Competence, Study Two, Grades 6 and 8, Male and Female Subjects 
APPENDIX M. 1: Pearson Product-Moment Correlations Between Analogical Reasonhg and 
Competence - without ControllEig for Knowledge 
APPENDJX M2: Pearson Product-Moment Correlations Between Analogical Reasoning and 




t-tests of the Dinuences Between Correiations, Study Two, Grades 6 and 8 
APPENDPC N. 1: t-tests of the Differences Between Co~zelations of Analogical Reasoning 
and Competence, Across Competence Tasks (with and d o u t  Controhg for Knowledge) 
APPENDIX N.2: t-tests of the Merences Between Correlations of Analogical Reasoning 
and Competence, Comparing with and without ControIling for Knodedge 
APPENDIX N.1 
t-tesa of the Dïfferences Between Correlations of AnaIogical Reasoning and 
Competenee, Across Cornpetence Tasks, Stiidy Two 
Grade 6 and Grade 8, with and without Controiiing for Knowledge 
without 
-- 





ACHï = achievement, TRC = academic teacher ratings, SPC = academic self report 
ARt J Ara, Ars = Anaiogical Reasoning Scores for the total, academic, and sacial themes 
*** p<.oOo, ** p<.Ol, * v . 0 5  
APPENDIX N.2 
t-tesa of the Dineremces Between Correlations of Analogid Reasoning and 
Cornpetence, C o m p a ~ g  with and without Controlüng for Knowledge, Study Two, 
Grades 6 and 8 
Grade 6 Grade 8 
ACHT = achievement, TRC = academic teacher ratings, SPC = academic self report 
mt,ARa,ARs = Anaiogical Reasoning Scores for the total, academic and sacial themes, without controlling 
for Caiowiedge 
ARt(r),ARa(r),ARs(r) = Analogical Reasoning Scores for the total, academic, and social themes, controlling 
for knowledge 
*** p<.0007 ** p<.Ol,  * p<.05 
